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In this thesis I investigate the question of whether or not dispositional properties are able to 
necessitate their manifestations. I provide three main discussions that reflect three aspects of my 
question. The first and second discussions concern different aspects of the 'problem of prevention'. 
This is the premise that causal interactions can be subject to interference/prevention, generally 
construed. A number of philosophers have argued that the problem of prevention undercuts the 
necessitation of lawful regularities in the context of dispositional essentialism. We can term this 
issue the 'necessitation issue'. 
 
In the first discussion I examine whether or not antidotes qua preventative entities are 
metaphysically possible within the context of Alexander Bird's (2007) dispositional monism. I 
argue that Bird's theory raises a problem of ontological representation re antidotes. The line of 
thought in this discussion is that it is difficult for Bird to say what antidotes are and how they 
operate; nevertheless, in this discussion I provide a solution to my problem that stays within the 
confines of Bird's dispositional monism. In this section of the thesis I remain neutral on the 
necessitation issue, but I take myself to clarify the question of whether or not dispositional 
properties are able to necessitate their manifestations by criticising Bird's model of 
antidotes/prevention and setting out a replacement.  
 
In the second discussion I examine Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum's (2011) anti-
necessitarian strategies. Mumford and Anjum's 'causal dispositionalism' encompasses a theory of 
dispositional properties, antidotes, and prevention. Mumford and Anjum's causal dispositionalism 
is not subject to the problem of ontological representation that Bird's theory raises; nevertheless, I 
argue that their theory is multiply problematic. The purpose of this discussion, taken as a whole, 
is to show that a recent strategy for attacking the necessitarian claim of dispositional essentialism 
is weaker than it has appeared to a number of philosophers. In this section of the thesis I move 
from a neutral stance on necessitation to a defensive stance.  
 
In the first two stages of the thesis, which concern the problem of prevention, I work with the 
background assumption that dispositional essentialism is a tenable position. In the third section of 
this thesis, however, I begin by endorsing Stephen Barker's (2013) essay The Emperor's New 
Metaphysics of Powers, which argues that the main articulations of dispositional essentialism are 
either internally inconsistent or otherwise disguised versions of brute modalism, where brute 
modalism focuses upon possible worlds as oppose to properties. In response, I develop a 
replacement position for dispositional essentialism that I term 'temporal essentialism'. I advance 
temporal essentialism as a prototype position in the properties and laws debate. It aims to provide 
a metaphysical explanation for lawful regularities by drawing upon the passage of time. In short, 
temporal essentialism is the position that it is built into a system of ontology that it dynamically 
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In this thesis I investigate the question of whether or not dispositional properties are able to 
necessitate their manifestations. I provide three main discussions that reflect three aspects of my 
question. The first and second discussions concern different aspects of the 'problem of prevention'. 
This is the premise that causal interactions can be subject to interference/prevention, generally 
construed. A number of philosophers have argued that the problem of prevention undercuts the 
necessitation of lawful regularities in the context of dispositional essentialism. We can term this 
issue the 'necessitation issue'. 
 
In the first discussion I examine whether or not antidotes qua preventative entities are 
metaphysically possible within the context of Alexander Bird's (2007) dispositional monism. I 
argue that Bird's theory raises a problem of ontological representation re antidotes. The line of 
thought in this discussion is that it is difficult for Bird to say what antidotes are and how they 
operate; nevertheless, in this discussion I provide a solution to my problem that stays within the 
confines of Bird's dispositional monism. In this section of the thesis I remain neutral on the 
necessitation issue, but I take myself to clarify the question of whether or not dispositional 
properties are able to necessitate their manifestations by criticising Bird's model of 
antidotes/prevention and setting out a replacement.  
 
In the second discussion I examine Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum's (2011) anti-
necessitarian strategies. Mumford and Anjum's 'causal dispositionalism' encompasses a theory of 
dispositional properties, antidotes, and prevention. Mumford and Anjum's causal dispositionalism 
is not subject to the problem of ontological representation that Bird's theory raises; nevertheless, I 
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argue that their theory is multiply problematic. The purpose of this discussion, taken as a whole, 
is to show that a recent strategy for attacking the necessitarian claim of dispositional essentialism 
is weaker than it has appeared to a number of philosophers. In this section of the thesis I move 
from a neutral stance on necessitation to a defensive stance.  
 
In the first two stages of the thesis, which concern the problem of prevention, I work with the 
background assumption that dispositional essentialism is a tenable position. In the third section of 
this thesis, however, I begin by endorsing Stephen Barker's (2013) essay The Emperor's New 
Metaphysics of Powers, which argues that the main articulations of dispositional essentialism are 
either internally inconsistent or otherwise disguised versions of brute modalism, where brute 
modalism focuses upon possible worlds as oppose to properties. In response, I develop a 
replacement position for dispositional essentialism that I term 'temporal essentialism'. I advance 
temporal essentialism as a prototype position in the properties and laws debate. It aims to provide 
a metaphysical explanation for lawful regularities that draws upon the passage of time. Simply 
speaking, temporal essentialism is the position that it is 'built into' a system of ontology that it 





In this chapter I shall introduce the reader to the thesis. I think it will be useful to: (i) outline our 
general topic, which is the properties and laws debate in contemporary metaphysics; (ii) set out 
the structure of the thesis and explain its aims and scope; and (iii) provide surveys of the different 
arguments that I will be making. To this end, I have divided the main body of this chapter into the 
following parts. In the first part, Three positions in the properties and laws debate, I shall draw 
upon Bird's (2007) demarcation of the properties and laws debate, which marks out three central 
positions—neo-Humeanism, the necessitation theory, and dispositional essentialism. These three 
central positions form the general background to our discussion. In this part of the chapter I shall 
also introduce the specific problem that I will be tackling in the thesis, which concerns 
dispositional properties and necessitation. (As we shall discuss, dispositional properties, or powers, 
belong to dispositional essentialism). In the second part of this chapter, Structure and aims of the 
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thesis, I shall set out the main sections of the thesis. In this part of the chapter I will be able to 
explain the objectives of these sections as well as the line of thought that holds them together. In 
the third part of this chapter, Original contributions, I will highlight the original contributions that 
this thesis is making to contemporary metaphysics. And in the fourth section of this chapter, 
Chapter outlines, I shall provide outlines of the nine chapters to follow.   
 
1.3 Three positions in the properties and laws debate 
 
The properties and laws debate is currently enjoying a central status in contemporary metaphysics, 
and it commands a high level of activity. Bird (2007, pp.1–4) provides a three-way distinction for 
this debate that is useful in compartmentalising the different positions that philosophers advance. 
He suggests that the properties and laws debate can be viewed as centering on the following 
associated questions.  
 
What is the nature of properties?  
What is the nature of laws?  
And what is the nature of the relationship between properties and laws?  
 
The positions that Bird distinguishes set out different answers to these questions, whilst all 
agreeing (roughly speaking, at least) on a realist stance towards properties and laws.  
 
The first position is neo-Humeanism. Philosophers associated with this position include Lewis 
(1986), Beebee (2000), Lower (1996), and Psillos (2002). We can understand neo-Humeanism as 
the view that properties (and relations) are categorical entities and that laws are regularities. 
Categoricalism is the view that the identity of a property is independent of its physical modal role. 
Let us use the phrase 'physical modal role' to capture what a property does in terms of the causal 
interactions that it enters into and the laws that it is bound up with (adapted from Barker 2013, 
p.606). For example, the scientific predicate 'charge' is involved in causal interactions such as 
electrostatic attraction and repulsion, which are described by Coulomb's law. (At the level of 
quantum electrodynamics, we can think of different magnitudes of charge as different amplitudes 
for photon absorption and emission.) This scientific predicate is a candidate for picking out a 
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property, where the latter is construed as an "element of being", such as a universal or trope (Lowe 
2006, pp.13–5). In the contemporary literature there is a trend towards limiting the properties that 
are accepted by a metaphysical theory to the 'sparse properties', i.e. to the predicates that are 
inventoried by current science, or, more strictly, to the predicates that are inventoried by a 
'hypothetically-finalised' physics (e.g. Armstrong 1978, p.43; Ellis 2009, p.34). Categoricalism 
does not deny that properties have physical modal roles, but it does deny that a property's physical 
modal role is essential to it. A standard way of explicating categoricalism is to say that properties 
have quiddities. Roughly speaking, a quiddity is a ground for the identity of a property (Barker 
2013, p.611). According to categoricalism, then, properties have their identities fixed by their 
quiddities, which stand over and above their physical modal roles. We can note that if properties 
are categorical in the above sense, then a property can retain its identity whilst taking on different 
physical modal roles. For example, whilst it is actually the case that charge is bound up with 
electrostatic attraction and repulsion, it could have been the case—so far as categoricalism is 
concerned—that charge entered into the causal interactions that we associate with Newtonian mass, 
as described by Newton's gravitational law.  
 
This contingency claim for physical modal roles dovetails with the neo-Humean conception of 
laws as regularities. According to the naive version of this view, a law is a regularity of the form 
'For all objects x, if x has property F, then x has property G'. So construed, laws are patterns of 
property instantiation that hold across space and time. By far the most widely discussed version of 
the neo-Humean approach to laws, however, is Lewis' (1986) best systems theory. According to 
this theory, laws are regularities that stand as axioms (or theorems) in the best systematisation of 
the world's matters of fact. The basic idea is that laws are a special kind of regularity—namely, 
laws are those regularities that have a prominent deductive/descriptive role with regard to patterns 
of property instantiation. In any case, the neo-Humean conception of laws—whether naive or 
sophisticated—takes laws to supervene upon the world's matters of fact, such that laws are nothing 
over and above the distribution of properties across objects. To see how this neo-Humean 
conception of laws supports the contingency claim for physical modal roles, we can note the 
explicit absence of 'governing entities' in Lewis' Humean supervenience (e.g. 1986, p.14). Humean 
supervenience is a view that Lewis advanced for the sake of philosophical discussion, in the sense 
that whilst it may have been open to challenges from scientific quarters, its philosophical adequacy 
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was (allegedly) worth defending. According to this view, all that exists are fundamental objects, 
such as point-like particles, and their fundamental properties and relations. With this in mind, by 
the term 'governing entities' we can refer to entities that necessitate—i.e. constrain or force—
patterns of property instantiation (I shall have more to say on this issue below).  
 
Firstly, then, Lewis' properties cannot be governing entities, since Lewis has not modified 
categoricalism in such a way that properties can necessitate. Indeed, the neo-Humean typically 
portrays categorical properties as 'qualities' in order to emphasise their modal inertness. But 
secondly, laws qua regularities are not governing entities, either: this is the import of saying that 
laws are (merely) patterns of property instantiation. So what provides a metaphysical explanation 
for the arrangement of qualities in the world? The distinctive reply of neo-Humeanism is that there 
is no such metaphysical explanation: the distribution of properties across objects is taken to be 
'metaphysically accidental'. Generally speaking, the project of neo-Humeanism is to analyse 
metaphysical concepts such as 'law', 'causation', and 'chance' with the arrangement of qualities as 
its starting point. But this starting point is taken as primitive. In consequence, therefore, if the 
physical modal role of a categorical property is (somehow) provided by its placement in the world's 
matters of facts, then given that these matters of fact are free from the influence of governing 
entities, the neo-Humean is able to claim that both laws and the physical modal roles of properties 
are contingent, since both of these are ultimately decided by 'metaphysically accidental' patterns 
of property instantiation.   
 
The second position is the necessitation theory. Philosophers associated with this position include 
Armstrong (1978), Tooley (1977), and Dretske (1977). We can understand the necessitation theory 
as the view that properties (and relations) are categorical entities and that laws are second-order 
relations that serve as governing entities. Neo-Humeanism and the necessitation theory agree on 
the basic construal of properties. But the necessitation theory breaks away from neo-Humeanism 
in taking laws to be something over and above the world's first-order matters of fact. More 
precisely, laws are second-order relations, i.e. relations that hold between properties as oppose to 
objects, which are thought to necessitate patterns of property instantiation. These second-order 
relations can be termed 'necessitation relations'. They qualify as governing entities in the above 
sense. In the basic case, a necessitation relation, N, holding between two first-order properties, F 
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and G, can be symbolised as 'N(F,G)'. The line of thought is that with properties and relations 
assayed as universals, or repeatable entities, the holding of N between F and G necessitates the 
regularity 'For all objects x, if x has property F, then x has property G'. In this way, laws are distinct 
from the regularities that they necessitate, although there is a commonality to each in terms of the 
properties in question. At this point we can see that the necessitation theory is upholding physically 
necessary connections between distinct existences (see below). That is to say, in virtue of the law 
N(F,G), if it is the case that object x is F, then it is necessarily the case that object x is G. (In the 
case of probabilistic laws this necessary connection has to be finessed—but we shall bypass this 
issue for present purposes.)  
 
The question of whether or not there are necessary connections between distinct existences 
(roughly: entities that do not have each other as parts) is a central question of the properties and 
laws debate. As noted above, neo-Humeanism is committed to contingency claims for both laws 
and the physical modal roles of properties. Indeed, for the neo-Humean there is a radical 
contingency in the world's matters of fact. A third seminal principle that Lewis advances concerns 
the distribution of properties across objects in his plenitude of possible worlds. Famously—or 
notoriously, perhaps—Lewis defends a position of modal realism according to which there are 
infinitely many possible worlds, all of which are fully-fledged concrete existences. (The phrase 
'the actual world' is taken in this set up to indexically pick out the world at which it is spoken.) The 
inventory for this plenitude is Lewis' principle of free recombination. It states that " ... patching 
together parts of different possible worlds yields another possible world" (1986, pp.87–8). So 
construed, Lewis can 'copy and paste' self-contained spacetime regions from his possible worlds 
to 'construct' additional possible worlds; the significance of this principle is that there is at least a 
possible world for every different specification of objects bearing properties and relations. With 
this in mind, given the neo-Humean analysis of laws and physical modal roles in terms of 
arrangements of qualities, we can see that Lewis' plenitude will contain possible worlds where 
there are minor deviations from the actual laws (e.g. where the value of a physical constant is 
slightly higher or lower) as well as possible worlds where the laws are wildly divergent. This 
radical contingency in the world's matters of fact is denied by the necessitation theorist in the 
following sense. The necessitation theorist claims that laws 'contingently' necessitate patterns of 
property instantiation. In the first place, the necessitation theorist denies that the holding of N 
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between F and G is either logically or metaphysically necessary. We can understand metaphysical 
necessity as the absolute necessity of N holding between F and G in all possible worlds; because 
this is denied by the necessitation theorist, they maintain that it is metaphysically possible for F 
and G to be lawfully unconnected. In this way, the necessitation theorist accepts contingency 
claims for both laws and the physical modal roles of properties (in line with neo-Humeanism). In 
the second place, however, if it is the case that N(FG), then the regularity 'For all objects x, if x 
has property F, then x has property G' is necessitated. This necessitation is therefore relative to the 
contingent law. And so the necessitation theorist accepts that there are 'physically necessary 
connections' between distinct existences: for in no possible world can it be the case that N(F,G) 
without it also being the case that all F-objects are G-objects.  
 
The third position is dispositional essentialism. We can understand this position as the view that 
properties are dispositional and that laws are (in some sense) reflections of dispositional properties. 
Philosophers associated with this position include Ellis (2001), Molnar (2003), Mumford (2006), 
and Bird (2007). (I should note that Mumford and Molnar reject the term 'dispositional 
essentialism'. That said, I think that Bird would classify these philosophers in his third position. 
Mumford and Molnar typically talk of 'powers' as oppose to essentially dispositional properties.) 
What does it mean to say that properties are dispositional? The claim at hand is that properties 
have dispositional essences, where the term 'essence' is used, roughly speaking, to refer to the 
'inner nature' of a given entity. (Essences can also be contrasted with accidents; in this context we 
are contrasting the fixed (essential) nature of a given entity with its variable (accidental) nature. 
For example, we might say that it is essential that I have the specific biological parents that I in 
fact have, whereas it is accidental that I have the specific weight that I in fact have.) The distinctive 
claim of dispositional essentialism is that the identity of a property is fixed by its physical modal 
role. Dispositional essentialism is therefore opposed to categoricalism. More specifically, 
dispositional essentialism aims to explicate physical modal roles primarily in terms of 
dispositionality—hence its title. In this way dispositional essentialism is trading upon essence as 
the ground of a property's identity and making the claim that this ground is provided by a certain 
disposition or dispositions (adapted from Barker 2013, pp.612–3). How to understand 
dispositionality is itself the central problem of the philosophy of dispositions, which is a 
neighbouring topic of the properties and laws debate. A prominent trend is to say that dispositions 
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are closely connected to subjunctive/counterfactual conditionals, such that it is possible to 
reductively analyse a disposition in terms of a conditional that makes reference to a characteristic 
stimulus–manifestation pair (e.g. Ryle 1949; Goodman 1954). For example, the disposition of 
fragility is commonly analysed as the disposition to break when struck. The conditional analysis 
of dispositions is first and foremost a neo-Humean attempt to deny dispositionality a fundamental 
status: with disposition ascriptions reductively analysed into subjunctive/counterfactual 
conditionals, the latter can be understood extensionally using possible worlds. In the 1990s, 
however, there was a number of attacks on the conditional analysis, which concerned the problems 
of finks and antidotes (Martin 1994; Bird 1998). I shall discuss finks and antidotes below, but for 
present purposes we can note that these attacks led to a renewed interest in granting dispositionality 
a fundamental status (Cross 2012, pp.115–6).  
 
There are different models of dispositional properties. The standard model is the stimulus–
manifestation model (Bird 2007; Ellis 2001; Yates 2012). This model takes its cue from the 
conditional analysis in drawing upon stimuli and manifestations for dispositional properties, 
although it stands opposed to a reductive analysis. Another prominent view is Martin's (2007) 
mutual manifestation model. In this set up there is no stimulus–manifestation or agent–patient 
distinction, and multiple dispositional properties are thought to 'mutually manifest' as 'reciprocal 
partners' (2007, pp.29–30). In addition, there are several understandings of laws in the dispositional 
essentialist literature, but these different approaches are unified by the view that laws are 
reflections of dispositional properties. At the centre of dispositional essentialism is the conviction 
that properties are self-governing entities. (I make a caveat for this claim below.) We can contrast 
this conviction with the necessitation theory, in which first-order properties are governed from 
above, as it were, by necessitation relations; and so too can we contrast it with neo-Humeanism, 
where there are no governing entities at all. Dispositional properties are often termed powers, and 
these powers are thought to be powerful in the sense that they are capable—from their own 
resources, so to speak—of manifesting further dispositional properties. On this basis, the 
dispositional essentialist ideal is that dispositional properties can be used to provide a metaphysical 
explanation for the patterns of property instantiation in the world. For this reason, dispositional 
essentialism agrees with the necessitation theory that there are necessary connections between 
distinct existences. For example, the dispositional essentialist will say that electrons repel electrons, 
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ceteris paribus, since it is essential to the dispositional property 'unit negative charge' that it 
manifests electrostatic repulsion on other negative charges. Yates (2012, pp.26–7) calls "orthodox 
dispositional essentialism" the view that dispositional properties act as truthmakers for 
subjunctive/counterfactual conditionals, which are then used to deduce laws (construed as 
propositions concerning regularities). According to Yates, then, orthodox dispositional 
essentialism involves three ideas re the metaphysical explanation of laws. Firstly, different types 
of dispositional properties have different types of stimuli and manifestations. Secondly, a given 
type of dispositional property bears a truthmaking relationship to the subjunctive/counterfactual 
conditionals that concern its physical modal role. And thirdly, laws are construed as propositions 
that are deduced from the totality of such subjunctive/counterfactual conditionals. Yates (2012, 
p.26) cites Ellis (2001) and Mumford (2006) as following this view. That said, however, Mumford 
(2006) has argued that laws are superfluous for the dispositional essentialist, since (briefly stated) 
laws qua governing entities cannot be either external or internal to dispositional properties. As 
such, Mumford would deny that dispositional properties are self-governed, although we should 
note that he accepts that the world's matters of fact are metaphysically explainable via the 
manifestations of dispositional properties. Let us also note that there are versions of dispositional 
essentialism that maintain that all properties are dispositional properties, termed 'dispositional 
monism' (e.g. Bird 2007); versions of this theory that maintain a mix of dispositional properties 
and categorical properties, termed 'property dualism' (e.g. Ellis 2001; Molnar 2003); and versions 
of this theory that maintain that properties have dispositional and categorical aspects, or otherwise 
that dispositionality and categoricality are identical, termed the 'limit view' or the 'powerful 
qualities view' (e.g. Martin 2007; Heil 2003, Jacobs 2011).    
 
A distinctive commitment of both the necessitation theory and dispositional essentialism is that 
laws/dispositional properties necessitate. In terms of the necessitation theory we have the idea that 
if it is a law that N(F,G) and object x is F, then it is necessarily the case that x is G. And in terms 
of dispositional essentialism we have the idea that if a dispositional property is suitably related to 
its stimulus (or reciprocal partner), then it necessarily manifests. In both cases, we can think of 
causes, generally construed, as necessitating their effects. This idea can be broken down to separate 
out the closely connected concepts of necessitation, sufficiency, and necessity. To say that cause 
C necessitates effect E is to say that C is sufficient for E—viz. if it is the case that C, then it must 
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be the case that E. As such, where C necessitates E, if it is the case that C, then it is necessarily the 
case that E. A number of necessitation theorists and dispositional essentialists have thought that 
causes necessitate their effects in this way (e.g. Armstrong 1997; Ellis 2001; Bird 2007). But there 
are two caveats to this claim. Firstly, it is standardly thought that causal interactions can be subject 
to interference and/or prevention. For example, even if a match is properly struck, it might not 
light in the desired way if there is a gust of wind. And if the match head is damp, then it may not 
ignite at all. This problem of prevention, to use a concise term, lies behind the finks and antidotes 
attack on the conditional analysis that I noted above.  
 
Problem of prevention: the premise that causal interactions can be subject to interference 
and/or prevention, generally construed. Within different contexts this 'problem' takes on 
different guises: negative and positive. For example, in Bird's dispositional monism it raises 
the question of whether or not ceteris paribus laws are fundamental. In contrast, Mumford 
and Anjum use this 'problem' to set out a sui generis dispositional modality for dispositional 
properties, thereby attacking causal necessitarianism (see below).  
 
With regard to antidotes, which are the simpler of the two devices, Johnston (1994) and Bird (1998) 
argued that the left–right direction of the conditional analysis is false because the manifestation of 
the disposition could be prevented by a further condition (e.g. the gust of wind above). Hence it is 
not true, in general, that for object x to have disposition D (with stimulus S and manifestation M) 
is for x to M if it were S: this causal interaction can be frustrated by antidote A. In line with this 
problem of prevention, the necessitation of regularities is standardly accompanied by a ceteris 
paribus clause that excludes additional forces (e.g. Armstrong 1997, p.231; Bird 2007, p.60). A 
second caveat concerns indeterminism and probability. As we noted above, there is a trend towards 
limiting the properties that are accepted by a metaphysical theory to the sparse properties. With 
this in mind, given the prevalence of non-deterministic processes in the fundamental sciences, the 
epistemic possibility that the sparse properties enter into indeterministic and/or probabilistic causal 
interactions is taken seriously by theories in the properties and laws debate. A typical strategy is 
to restrict the necessitation claim to deterministic causal interactions (e.g. Armstrong 1997, p.230; 




A number of philosophers have argued, however, that the problem of prevention undercuts the 
necessitation of regularities (e.g. Cartwright 1999; Lowe 2006; Eagle 2009; Corry 2010; Schrenk 
2010; Mumford and Anjum 2011). This is despite the caveat above concerning ceteris paribus 
clauses; in addition, this line of criticism is thought to be independent of the issue of indeterminism 
and probability. There are multiple variations on this theme. A prominent argument is based upon 
antecedent strengthening (Eagle 2009; Schrenk 2010; Mumford and Anjum 2011). This argument 
begins with the premise that monotonic reasoning is distinctive of necessitation. According to 
monotonic reasoning, if C necessitates E, then E is the case whenever C is the case, regardless of 
whatever else is the case.  
 
If C necessitates E, then:  
If C and Φ, for any value of Φ, then E 
 
Given the problem of prevention, however, we can substitute antidotes as possible values of Φ, 
which leads to the conclusion that causation fails the test of antecedent strengthening. Recalling 
the example of the struck match, it cannot be the case that striking a match necessitates its lighting, 
since the following conditional is false. 
 
If [match is struck] and [there is a gust of wind], then [match lights]. 
 
According to the antecedent strengthening argument, then, causes do not necessitate their effects 
if antidote-based prevention is possible. (Note that this line of criticism is deployed against both 
the necessitation theory and dispositional essentialism.) These 'anti-necessitarian' philosophers 
also attack the strategy of ceteris paribus clauses that their opponents use to handle the problem 
of prevention. For example, Armstrong's necessitation theory uses a ceteris paribus clause that 
excludes preventative factors from the antecedent of his necessitation relation. Roughly speaking, 
this strategy replaces N(F,G) with N(F-in-the-absence-of-preventative-factors,G). In terms of the 
struck match example, we have the line of thought that N necessitates the regularity 'For all objects 
x, if x is a struck match and x is in the absence of preventative factors (e.g. gusts of wind), then x 
is a lit match'. Schrenk (2011) argues that the exclusion of all of the preventative factors gives 
threatens to replace a fine-grained state of affairs with a maximally-specified spacetime region 
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(e.g. a backwards light cone). He takes this to be problematic as the original insight of Armstrong's 
theory was to understand laws as second-order relations that hold between sparse properties, such 
as specific charges and masses (Schrenk 2011, pp.590–91). On the basis of these anti-necessitarian 
arguments, Mumford and Anjum (2011) have a developed a 'causal dispositionalism'. This position 
is a version of dispositional essentialism—more specifically, it is a version of pan-dispositionalism, 
according to which all sparse and non-sparse properties are powers. The central claim of Mumford 
and Anjum's position is that powers are connected to their manifestations via a sui generis 
dispositional (or 'tending towards') modality. This claim is supported by a vector model of 
causation, whereby multiple powers 'push and pull' against each other for changes. According to 
Mumford and Anjum, then, although the powers of the match and matchbox have essential 
physical modal roles, the causal situation of striking the match can only tend towards its lighting: 
there are no necessary connections between causes and effects.  
 
As a last issue, we should note that Bird's three-way demarcation is challenged by Barker's (2013) 
essay The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers. Bird takes neo-Humeanism, the necessitation 
theory, and dispositional essentialism to exhaust the "metaphysical underpinnings" of the 
properties and laws debate (2007, p.4). I have summarised these positions below. (Note that Bird 
classifies the necessitation theory as 'semi-Humean' because this position rejects dispositional 
properties (Hume's 'occult powers') and downgrades its necessary connections from metaphysical 





1. Neo-Humeanism (e.g. Lewis 1986) 
Categorical properties 
Laws are regularities 
No necessary connections 
 
2. Semi-Humeanism (e.g. Armstrong 1997) 
Categorical properties 
Laws are second-order relations 
Physically necessary connections 
 
3. Anti-Humeanism (e.g. Bird 2007) 
Dispositional properties 
Laws are reflections of dispositional properties  
Metaphysically necessary connections 
 
Barker (2013) sets out a fourth position, which he terms 'brute modalism' (see also Barker and 
Smart 2012). Briefly stated, brute modalism is the position that it is a "basic fact" about possible 
worlds that categorical properties stand in (metaphysically) necessary connections (Barker 2013, 
p.611). According to this fourth position, possible worlds are primitive entities that have primitive 
natures: viz. objects instantiating categorical properties. With this in mind, the modal space of 
Barker's brute modalism is narrower than Lewis' plenitude, since the former but not the latter 
accepts necessary connections between distinct existences. Hence, in brute modalism there will be 
no possible worlds where object x is F but not G (for example). To accomodate his brute modalism, 
Barker outlines a different demarcation of the properties and laws debate, which trades upon "three 
degrees of involvement that physical modality might have in relation to reality at large" (2013, 
p.606). The first-degree uses worlds as a whole to fix physical modal facts (e.g. patterns of property 
instantiation). Lewis' neo-Humeanism qualifies as the paradigm first-degree position, since his 
best systems theory extracts laws from a systematisation of the world's matters of fact. Barker's 
brute modalism also qualifies as a first-degree position; according to brute modalism, it is the 
primitive natures of worlds themselves that fix the distributions of properties across objects. The 
second degree uses second-order relations, and the third degree uses properties; these approaches 
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are represented by the necessitation theory and dispositional essentialism, respectively. Assuming 
that Barker's brute modalism is internally consistent, Bird's three-way demarcation is excluding a 
fourth position. According to Barker, ‘1.’ above should be replaced by ‘1st degree’. 
 
 1st degree 
Neo-Humeanism 
Categorical properties 
Laws are regularities 




Laws are trans-world regularities [accepting this claim involves upgrading brute 
modalism to what Barker terms 'transworld Humeanism'] 
Metaphysically necessary connections  
 
The dialectical purpose of Barker's brute modalism is to undermine the traditional versions of anti-
Humeanism. (In contrast to Bird's usage, I prefer to use the term 'anti-Humeanism' to refer to both 
the necessitation theory and dispositional essentialism.) More specifically, Barker argues that the 
four central articulations of dispositional essentialism are either internally inconsistent or 
otherwise disguised versions of brute modalism. In addition, Barker argues that the necessitation 
theory (ironically) draws upon the resources of dispositional essentialism, since the only tenable 
understanding of the necessitation relation is that it has a second-order dispositional essence. Given 
that the project of dispositional essentialism is in crisis, Barker concludes that both of the central 
versions of anti-Humeanism—i.e. the necessitation theory and dispositional essentialism—are 
illusionary metaphysics. Accordingly, there are two main choices for the properties and laws 
debate: neo-Humeanism and brute modalism. In short, Barker argues that brute modalism is a non-
standard version of anti-Humeanism that has been downplayed in the properties and laws debate. 
 
For example, Barker's criticism of Bird's articulation of dispositional monism concerns the 
difficulty of retrieving a 'governing role' from his SM-relations. According to Bird's stimulus–
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manifestation model, all dispositional properties play the roles of 'disposition', 'stimulus', and 
'manifestation' by standing in second-order stimulus–manifestation relations, which we can term 
'SM-relations'. Bird (2005c) argues that his dispositional properties overcome a central criticism 
of the necessitation theory: viz. that the necessitation relation, as a categorical entity, cannot be 
used to metaphysically explain patterns of property instantiation. Given that Bird's properties have 
dispositional essences, Bird argues that laws can be successfully derived from these entities, as 
noted above. That said, however, Barker (2013, pp.623–28) argues that both Bird's and 
Armstrong's theories are equally unable to account for this governing role. The governing role is 
thought to capture a 'fact of necessitation'. Roughly speaking, in terms of Bird's theory the fact of 
necessitation is as follows: 'If it is the case that SM(P1, P2, P3) at metaphysically possible world 
w—i.e. if it is the case that the SM-relation holds between these three properties at w, so as to 
configure these three entities as causally-relevant dispositional properties in this metaphysically 
possible world—then all objects x that are P1&P2 at w are also P3 at w. Upon close examination, 
Barker argues that Bird's SM-relations are analogous to Armstrong's necessitation relation re the 
governing role: both posits are quiddistic entities. With this in mind, Barker argues that Bird has 
failed to account for the governing role, in line with Armstrong. In addition, Barker argues that 
Bird overlooked this issue because he confused the fact of necessitation at question with the 
concept that his dispositional properties are relationally constituted by the network of SM-relations 
(see also Barker and Smart 2012). Let us term this issue 'Barker's problem of the governing role'. 
Taken together, Barker argues that Bird is either faced with a regress problem or the acceptance 
of brute necessary connections.   
 
1.4 Structure and aims of the thesis 
 
I want to investigate the question of whether or not dispositional properties are able to necessitate 
their manifestations. I have chosen to divide this question into three aspects; correspondingly, I 
have also divided this thesis into three main sections, with each section discussing a different 
aspect of the question. In this part of the chapter I shall begin by briefly stating the aims and 
structure of this thesis.  
 
In this thesis I provide three main discussions that reflect the three aspects of my question. The 
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first and second discussions concern different aspects of the problem of prevention. In the first 
discussion I examine whether or not antidotes qua preventative entities are metaphysically possible 
within the context of Bird's (2007) dispositional monism. I argue that Bird's theory raises a problem 
of ontological representation re antidotes. The line of thought in this discussion is that it is difficult 
for Bird to say what antidotes are and how they operate; nevertheless, in this discussion I provide 
a solution to my problem that stays within the confines of Bird's dispositional monism. In this 
section of the thesis I remain neutral on the necessitarianism–dispositionalism issue, but I take 
myself to clarify the question of whether or not dispositional properties are able to necessitate their 
manifestations by criticising Bird's model of antidotes/prevention and setting out a replacement. 
In short, at this stage of the thesis the metaphysical possibility of antidotes is under scrutiny. 
 
In the second discussion I examine Mumford and Anjum's (2011) anti-necessitarian strategies. 
Mumford and Anjum's causal dispositionalism encompasses a theory of dispositional properties, 
antidotes, and prevention. In addition, Mumford and Anjum draw upon dispositional actualism as 
a modal metaphysics. (Roughly speaking, dispositional actualism is the view that actual 
dispositional properties are the grounds for necessities and possibilities, whether physical or 
metaphysical.) Mumford and Anjum's causal dispositionalism is not subject to the problem of 
ontological representation that Bird's theory raises; nevertheless, I argue that their theory is 
multiply problematic. In the first place, I argue that Mumford and Anjum's antecedent 
strengthening argument is incompatible with their understanding of causation. And in the second 
place, I argue that Mumford and Anjum's modal premise—that it is always possible, at least in 
principle, for a causal interaction to be subject to prevention—is either false or trivial. The purpose 
of this discussion, taken as a whole, is to show that a recent strategy for attacking the necessitarian 
claim of dispositional essentialism is weaker than it has appeared to a number of philosophers. In 
this section of the thesis I move from a neutral stance on necessitarianism to a defensive stance.  
 
At this point I have examined the two aspects of the problem of prevention that are within the 
scope of this thesis. I have examined whether or not antidotes are metaphysically possible (within 
the context of Bird's dispositional monism) and I have examined whether or not the problem of 
prevention can undercut the necessitarian claim of dispositional essentialism (within the context 
of Mumford and Anjum's causal dispositionalism). With this in mind, at the beginning of the third 
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stage of the thesis I take myself to be in a position to draw the following conclusion. Dispositional 
properties are able to necessitate their manifestations if (i) Bird's problem of ontological 
representation re antidotes is avoided, and if (ii) the anti-necessitarian strategies of Mumford and 
Anjum are countered in the way that I propose. This is the first of two central conclusions that I 
make in this thesis: viz. I conclude that dispositional properties are able to necessitate their 
manifestations. In other words, I defend Mumford and Anjum's antithesis, i.e. causal 
necessitarianism. Crucially, this conclusion allows that dispositional properties do not necessitate 
their manifestations if they enter into indeterministic and/or probabilistic causal interactions.  
 
The third discussion concerns Barker's (2013) problem of governance. At this stage of the thesis I 
examine a third aspect of the question of whether or not dispositional properties are able to 
necessitate their manifestations. This stage of the thesis involves a change of direction. In the first 
two stages of the thesis, which concern the problem of prevention, I work with the background 
assumption that dispositional essentialism is a tenable position. I do not question the tenability of 
a property-based understanding of physical modality, and I tacitly assume that dispositional 
properties are the kinds of beings that are able to provide a governing role. In the third section of 
this thesis, however, I begin by endorsing Barker's (2013) essay. As we noted in the previous part 
of this chapter, Barker's central argument is that the main articulations of dispositional essentialism 
are either internally inconsistent or otherwise disguised versions of brute modalism, where brute 
modalism focuses upon possible worlds as oppose to properties.  
 
Given that I accept the central argument of Barker's essay, I spend the remainder of the third section 
of the thesis developing a position that I term 'temporal essentialism'. I advance temporal 
essentialism as a prototype position in the properties and laws debate. On the one hand, this 
position is designed to bypass Barker's criticisms of dispositional essentialism and the 
necessitation theory, since it does not draw upon either dispositional properties or necessitation 
relations as governing entities. On the other hand, however, temporal essentialism is non-identical 
to Barker's brute modalism; in addition, I take temporal essentialism to differ from brute modalism 
in that the former can provide a metaphysical explanation for why there are lawful regularities. (In 
the case of brute modalism, it is a brute fact that a possible world has a certain pattern of properties.) 
The line of thought in this discussion is that Barker's problem of governance is a more fundamental 
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aspect of my question than the problem of prevention, since if dispositional properties cannot 
provide a governing role, then, a fortiori, these entities cannot necessitate or dispose towards their 
manifestations. At this more fundamental level of investigation, I make the second central 
conclusion of this thesis: although dispositional essentialism is untenable, temporal essentialism 
is a promising alternative.  
 
Temporal essentialism is a two-category ontology of objects and (categorical) Platonic universals. 
I analyse laws as second-order relations that hold between first-order properties, in line with the 
necessitation theory. That said, however, I do not call upon these entities to provide a governing 
role. In contrast, the duty of these second-order relations is to provide a function (in the sense of a 
unique mapping) from their first place to their second place. With this in mind, I term these second-
order relations 'selection relations' as oppose to 'necessitation relations'. I symbolise a selection 
relation as '$', and where it is the case that $(F,G), fixing upon F as the input fixes upon G as the 
output. The central concept in temporal essentialism is that Platonic universals can provide this 
'selection role', and that a candidate for Barker's governing role is the cooperation of laws qua 
selection relations with what I term a 'formal ontological operation' (see below). I think that a 
source of difficulty for the necessitation theory and dispositional essentialism is that these positions 
have asked properties/relations to carry the burden of a governing role on their own. The proposal 
at hand, however, is that the selection relations provide a set of instructions, so to speak, that are 
acted upon by a different actor; and as the title of my position suggests, this actor is time. Time is 
called upon to play a role of 'actualisation'.  
 
This proposal involves two main steps. In the first place, I draw upon Tooley's (1997) growing 
block model, which is a dynamic theory of time whereby past and present states of affairs are 
actual whereas future states of affairs are non-actual. According to Tooley, necessitation relations 
govern patterns of property instantiation across time; in addition, Tooley suggests that his 
necessitation relations provide a metaphysical explanation for the passage of time: viz. states of 
affairs are actualised via the governing role of laws. In the second place, however, temporal 
essentialism construes the passage of time as the performance of a formal ontological operation, 
pace Tooley's necessitation theory. I can introduce a formal ontological operations as a 
development of Lowe's (2006) formal ontological relationships. According to Lowe, formal 
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ontological relationships (e.g. instantiation) are not themselves entities, or 'elements of being'. 
Nevertheless, these posits are thought to set out the possible ways that different types of entities 
can stand to one another in virtue of their real essences. Formal ontological operations are formal 
in this sense, but their structure is non-relational. More specifically, I take formal ontological 
operations to be a type of operation that is performed by the ontology in all and only those cases 
where its condition is true. In short, formal ontological operations are the 'ontological correlates' 
of imperative sentences qua if–then commands. Roughly speaking, formal ontological operations 
have the following structure.  
 
If [condition] is true, then perform [operation] 
If [condition] is not true, then do not perform [operation] 
 
How can we understand the passage of time as the performance of a formal ontological operation? 
In line with Tooley's growing block model, the performable operation modifies the temporally-
variable aspects of temporal essentialism: viz. objects and (first-order) states of affairs. The domain 
of objects and first-order states of affairs is temporally-variable in the sense that (i) those objects 
that are actual and (ii) those first-order states that are actual vary with the passage of time. This is 
the central concept of a dynamic theory of time (in the context of a states of affairs ontology). Pace 
Tooley's necessitation theory, however, the actualisation of states of affairs in temporal 
essentialism is construed as the iterated performance of a formal posit (contrast entity—i.e. 
contrast necessitation relation or dispositional property). I term the formal operation in question 
the 'temporal imperative'. Simplifying, it has the following structure.   
 
 If object x is present, and x instantiates first-order property X, such that $(X,Y), then 
actualise! state of affairs y's being Y at the next present moment, where Y is a function of 
X via $.  
 
In this way, the condition–operation structure of the temporal imperative is modifying the 
temporally-variable aspects of temporal essentialism, such that this modification is sensitive to 
laws, construed as second-order relations (selection relations). In short, I argue that this is a time-
based metaphysical explanation of lawful regularities. The line of thought is that dynamic 
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temporality is built into the form of the ontology, and that, so construed, the form of the ontology 
is active. In addition, the content of the ontology is self-regulating if this activity is 'instructed' by 
the selection relation.     
 
It will be useful at this point to make a number of remarks that concern the motivation for this 
thesis, the scope that I have chosen, and the original contributions that I intend to make towards 
contemporary metaphysics.  
 
With regard to the motivation for this thesis, I have chosen to investigate the question of whether 
or not dispositional properties are able to necessitate their manifestations for two reasons. In the 
first place, dispositional essentialism is currently undergoing a period of expansion. Perhaps since 
the late-1990s, with the publication of Mumford's (1998) Dispositions, there has been a growing 
interest in taking properties to have dispositional essences. Important books in this movement 
include Ellis' (2001) Scientific Essentialism, Molnar's (2003) Powers, Mumford's (2004) Laws in 
Nature, Martin's (2007) The Mind and its Place in Nature, Bird's (2007) Nature's Metaphysics, 
and Mumford and Anjum's (2011) Getting Causes from Powers. Some classic books and papers 
that fall within this tradition include Popper’s (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Mellor’s 
(1974) In Defence of Dispositions, Harré and Madden’s (1975) Causal Powers, and Shoemaker’s 
(1980) Causality and Properties. At the present moment, there is a vast literature on dispositions 
and dispositional properties, and philosophers have sought to apply dispositional essentialism to a 
range of issues that extend beyond the properties and laws debate, such as mental causation in the 
philosophy of mind and virtue theory in ethics. My own view is that this fresh perspective on 
dispositional properties is partly responsible for the high level of activity that the properties and 
laws debate commands. With this in mind, a background motivation of this thesis is to contribute 
towards contemporary metaphysics by making a number of critical arguments that concern two 
recent versions of dispositional essentialism, as well as constructing a prototype position in the 
properties and laws debate.  
 
And in the second place, the necessitarianism–dispositionalism issue is significant for dispositional 
essentialism. Whether or not dispositional properties are able to necessitate their manifestations is 
a question that is closely connected to the dispositional essentialist approach to laws and causation. 
22 
 
In addition, this question is bound up with the following associated topics in metaphysics and the 
philosophy of science: prevention, determinism, probability, uncaused events, and the distinction 
between physical and metaphysical modality. The necessitarianism–dispositionalism issue places 
a spotlight upon what we can term the 'manifestation operation' of dispositional properties. 
Dispositional essentialists agree that dispositional properties are the kinds of beings that can 
manifest additional entities (standardly, these additional entities are dispositional properties). So 
construed, dispositional properties have a manifestation operation, whereby, for example, 
additional dispositional properties are actualised in response to stimulus properties. With this in 
mind, to clarify the modality of this manifestation operation is to clarify the model of dispositional 
properties at hand. As such, the question of whether or not dispositional properties are able to 
necessitate their manifestations is of high importance for a fundamental question of dispositional 
essentialism: What are dispositional properties, and what are these kinds of beings able to do? In 
this thesis I conclude (in the first instance) that dispositional properties are able to necessitate their 
manifestations, and in drawing this conclusion I hope to show that Bird's understanding of what 
dispositional properties are is untenable, and that Mumford and Anjum's understanding of what 
dispositional properties are able to do is untenable. With regard to the third section of the thesis, I 
think it is healthy—given the prominent status of dispositional essentialism—to criticise this 
movement, and, where necessary, to set out alternative versions of anti-Humeanism. If there are 
serious problems for dispositional essentialism in Barker's essay, then it is beneficial for anti-
Humeanism that philosophers are charting out a different approaches to the governing role.  
 
I have restricted the scope of this thesis in two ways. Firstly, I have chosen to divide the question 
of whether or not dispositional properties are able to necessitate their manifestations into three 
aspects. These three aspects are: (i) the metaphysical possibility of antidotes in Bird's dispositional 
monism; (ii) the anti-necessitarian strategies of Mumford and Anjum's causal dispositionalism; 
and (iii) temporal essentialism as a solution to Barker's problem of governance. But there are 
additional aspects to the question of this thesis that I shall not engage with. Perhaps the two most 
pressing aspects that I have chosen to exclude are: (iv) how dispositional essentialism can 
understand indeterministic and/or probabilistic causal interactions, and (v) how dispositional 
essentialism can provide truthmakers for negative truths. Aspects (iv) and (v) are both significant 
for the problem of prevention. Aspect (iv) is a sub-theme of the second section of the thesis, 
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although I do not provide a systematic treatment. My reason for this is that I think that the question 
of how dispositional essentialism can understand indeterministic and/or probabilistic causal 
interactions should draw upon the philosophy of science to a significant extent, but in this thesis I 
want to keep the focus upon the metaphysics of necessitation and governance. And whilst aspect 
(v) is important for the problem of prevention, I think it is outweighed by aspects (i)–(iii).  
 
A second way in which I have restricted the scope of this thesis is to focus upon two recent versions 
of dispositional essentialism: in the first section of the thesis I investigate the metaphysical 
possibility of antidotes within the context of Bird's dispositional monism, and in the second section 
of the thesis I investigate the anti-necessitarian strategies of Mumford and Anjum's causal 
dispositionalism. My own view is that the cost of this restriction is outweighed by the benefit of a 
systematic treatment. In this thesis I have adopted—to use these phrases—a 'narrow and deep' 
approach as oppose to a 'wide and shallow' approach. With regard to the first section of the thesis, 
the problem of ontological representation re antidotes is tied up with different components of 
Bird's dispositional monism; these include his treatment of the conditional analysis of dispositions, 
his stimulus–manifestation model of dispositional properties, and his arguments on the existence 
of antidotes and ceteris paribus laws. It takes some pains to show that it is difficult for Bird to say 
what antidotes are and how they operate—one reason for this is that Bird argues for the elimination 
of antidote-sensitive dispositional properties. A key argument of Chapter 3, however, is that Bird's 
elimination strategy (counter intuitively) requires both antidotes and antidote-sensitive 
dispositional properties. As such, I have chosen to dedicate the first section of the thesis to Bird's 
dispositional monism, since I want to set out a well-developed criticism. In any case, Bird's theory 
is (in my opinion) the most detailed version of dispositional essentialism in the properties and laws 
debate, and his stimulus–manifestation model of dispositional properties is the ideal background 
for investigating the metaphysical possibility of antidotes. With regard to the second section of the 
thesis, although a number of philosophers have advanced anti-necessitarian arguments within the 
context of dispositional essentialism, Mumford and Anjum have recently brought these issues to 
the fore in a book-length treatment. And whilst I take Mumford and Anjum's Getting Causes from 
Powers to be a significant and original book, I think that its authors are subject to a number of 
interconnected oversights. For the purposes of defending causal necessitarianism, then, I believe 
that a detailed discussion of these oversights and their interconnections is of greater significance 
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than a survey of anti-necessitarian arguments from different quarters. And lastly, with regard to 
the third section of the thesis, although I advance temporal essentialism as a prototype position in 
the properties and laws debate, I provide a careful and extended discussion of this theory. In doing 
so I aim to clearly articulate the way in which dynamic time can interact with the properties and 
laws debate.  
 
1.5 Original contributions 
 
What original contributions is this thesis making to contemporary metaphysics? Briefly stated, in 
this thesis I set out two lines of criticism. The first targets Bird's dispositional monism; the second 
targets Mumford and Anjum's causal dispositionalism. These lines of criticism are extended and 
culminate in two important points for the properties and laws debate. On the one hand, I aim to 
show that antidotes—the lead actors of the problem of prevention—are currently receiving no 
ontological representation in their author's metaphysics: Bird's dispositional monism. As far as I 
am aware, this troubling issue has gone unnoticed in the properties and laws debate. And on the 
other hand, I aim to show that the leading contemporary defenders of causal dispositionalism, 
Mumford and Anjum, have committed systematic errors. As such, I set out a systematic critique 
of their position. My hope is that this systematic critique can be used by philosophers to ward off 
the central arguments that have been deployed against causal necessitarianism. Constructively 
speaking, I also develop a prototype position for the properties and laws debate: temporal 
essentialism. This position is a serious attempt to solve Barker's problem of the governing role. To 
do so, I introduce a new theoretical posit: formal ontological operations. Accepting formal 
ontological operations requires a break from the prevalent conception of how ontological theories 
can be constructed; these posits also set the groundwork for a new approach to time and its passage. 
Temporal essentialism aims to show that there is a fertile and under cultivated connection between 
the properties and laws debate and the philosophy of time.  
 
More specifically, although each of the nine chapters to follow contain various levels of exposition, 
they all set out original arguments, whether minor or major (see below). (The exception to this is 
Chapter 7, which is purely expository.) The first two sections of the thesis are, for the most part, 
critical, whereas the third section of thesis is exclusively constructive. In building my three primary 
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lines of argument—those that relate to the three aspects of my question—I also develop secondary 
points, which are used to support the overarching discussion. For example, Chapter 2 introduces 
Bird's dispositional monism and prepares for the central argument of Chapter 3 by criticising Bird's 
reading of Coulomb's law. In addition, Chapter 5 prepares for the central argument of Chapter 6 
by criticising Mumford and Anjum's understanding of probabilistic dispositional properties. 
Chapter 4 introduces Mumford and Anjum's causal dispositionalism and sets out a criticism that I 
take to be fatal for their position—this is the most 'stand-alone' chapter of the thesis, so to speak. 
Chapters 8–10 outline temporal essentialism, but the original motivation for this position, i.e. 
Barker's The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers, is re-introduced in Chapter 10.  
 
1.6 Chapter outlines 
 
In this part of the chapter I shall provide outlines of the nine chapters to follow. The first section 
of the thesis contains two chapters—chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2, Alexander Bird's Dispositional 
Monism, sets out Bird's dispositional monism and provides a criticism of his reading of Coulomb's 
Law. This chapter prepares for the main argument of this section of the thesis, which is presented 
in Chapter 3, Potencies and Antidotes. As noted, Chapter 3 argues that Bird's dispositional monism 
gives rise to a problem of ontological representation re antidotes. I also develop a solution for this 
problem. 
 
Chapter 2, Alexander Bird's Dispositional Monism, begins by outlining Bird's derivation of laws 
from dispositional properties, or 'potencies' as he prefers. At the centre of this derivation is two 
theses. The first is Bird's stimulus–manifestation model, which assigns a stimulus and 
manifestation property to each dispositional property. (Given dispositional monism, these stimulus 
and manifestation properties are themselves dispositional properties.) And the second is the 
conditional analysis, construed as a metaphysically necessary truth. With these theses in hand, Bird 
derives laws (understood in this context as regularities) from the subjunctive conditionals that 
reflect his dispositional essences. The critical discussion of Chapter 2 concerns his reading of 
Coulomb's Law. This criticism trades upon the issue of stimulus conditions: viz. the types of states 
of affairs that provide the stimulation condition for a dispositional property—e.g. 'Sx' or S1x&S2y'). 
I argue that Bird is using the conditional analysis to specify the stimulus conditions of dispositional 
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properties. But this is a problematic division of labour: Bird's reading of Coulomb's law uses a 
complex stimulus condition that his network of SM-relations cannot explain. On this basis, I set 
out two modifications for Bird's dispositional monism. Firstly, I suggest that dispositional 
properties can fall into different sets. These different sets will have different arrangements of 
stimulus and manifestation properties. This modification involves using a distinct type of SM-
relation for each set of dispositional properties, since in Coulomb's law we require a four-place 
internal relation. And secondly, I suggest that each set of dispositional properties will have to be 
primitively associated with a different version of the conditional analysis. My line of thought is 
that the conditional analysis is providing the specification of the stimulus condition, and so with 
each different type of stimulus condition we require a different metaphysically necessary truth. 
 
Chapter 3, Potencies and Antidotes, begins by outlining two strategies that Bird develops for 
dealing with the problem of prevention. Bird's ceteris paribus strategy modifies the conditional 
analysis by adding a clause, C, that excludes finks and antidotes. In contrast, the elimination 
strategy modifies his stimulus–manifestation model by replacing a dispositional property that is 
sensitive to antidotes with a different dispositional property that is 'antidote-free'. This involves 
replacing the relevant stimulus property, i.e. the Platonic universal, S, with a different stimulus 
property: 'S-in-the-absence-of [all possible antidotes]'. (This elimination strategy is backed up by 
Bird's argument that finks are metaphysically impossible at the fundamental level of reality with 
which his theory is poised—hence their absence.) Both of Bird's strategies for dealing with the 
problem of prevention raise a question of ontological representation: how are we to understand 
what antidotes are and how they operate within the context of Bird's dispositional monism? I argue 
that Bird has no answer to this question. Chapter 3 provides a repair for Bird's ceteris paribus 
approach, which is the stronger of the two strategies. There are two steps to this repair. The first is 
to modify Bird's SM-relations such that there are additional places for dispositional properties to 
play the role of antidotes. And the second is to modify the form of Bird's subjunctive conditionals, 
such that we can build the negation of the instantiation of the antidotes into the antecedent of the 
conditional. At the end of this chapter I note that this gives a passive understanding of prevention, 
since the antidotes are simply dispositional properties that are required to be instantiated; but I 




The second section of the thesis contains three chapters—chapters 4, 5, and 6. Chapter 4, Stephen 
Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum's Causal Dispositionalism, sets out Mumford and Anjum's causal 
dispositionalism and argues that its two main components are in conflict. Chapter 5, Probabilistic 
Powers in the Vector Model of Causation, prepares for the next chapter by arguing that Mumford 
and Anjum's understanding of probabilistic powers is ontologically uncritical. Chapter 6, Possible 
Prevention aims to show that Mumford and Anjum's modal premise—that it is always possible, at 
least in principle, for a causal interaction to be subject to prevention—is either false or trivial.  
 
In Chapter 4, Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum's Causal Dispositionalism, I begin with a 
discussion of Mumford and Anjum's position. I divide their causal dispositionalism into two main 
components. The first is a vector model of causation, which encompasses a distinctive view of 
dispositional properties, or powers. The central feature of this approach is that it uses a double 
understanding of manifestation. Mumford and Anjum say that powers 'operate' when they are in 
certain circumstances. These operations are construed as component vectors, which can interact 
via vector algebra. This set up facilitates the ontological analysis of complex causes, where 
different causal factors (i.e. operative powers) 'push and pull' against one another. Mumford and 
Anjum’s second understanding of ‘manifestation’ draws upon the resultant vector of a given causal 
situation. I term this understanding 'manifestation qua change'. In those causal situations where 
there is sufficient magnitude, a new power or set of powers are instantiated upon a subject of 
change. This is the effect in Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation. The second 
component of Mumford and Anjum's causal dispositionalism is their antecedent strengthening 
argument against necessitation. As noted, this argument underlies the claim that powers are 
connected to their manifestations qua changes via a sui generis dispositional (or 'tending towards') 
modality. The critical discussion of Chapter 4 aims to show that Mumford and Anjum's antecedent 
strengthening test is incompatible with their vector model of causation. The line of thought is that 
Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation approaches complex causes as resultant vectors; 
so construed, the attempt the strengthen a causal situation with countervailing powers (i.e. 
antidotes) moves from one resultant vector to another. Problematically, however, the antecedent 
strengthening test requires (in this context) that the complex cause retains its identity so as to be 




In Chapter 5, Probabilistic Powers in the Vector Model of Causation, I introduce Mumford and 
Anjum's model of probabilistic powers, criticise this model, and provide a replacement that stays 
within the boundary of their vector model of causation. Mumford and Anjum construe the 
operation of probabilistic powers as multi-headed component vectors. The operations of 
probabilistic powers are directed towards two different types of change, where each direction has 
a certain magnitude. In this chapter, however, I argue that Mumford and Anjum's model of 
probabilistic powers is metaphorical, in the sense that there is no metaphysical explanation for how 
probabilistic powers can secure the possibility of different alternative manifestations qua change 
within a single causal situation. What Mumford and Anjum should have said, I think, is that 
probabilistic powers operative disjunctively, such that, in the simplest case, there is either a 
component vector directed towards change F or a component vector directed towards change G. 
The motivation for this replacement view is that it uniquely secures the possibility of different 
alternative manifestations qua change within a single causal situation. In addition, I propose that 
we have now secured a genuine notion of anti-necessitarian behaviour as this notion properly 
applies to probabilistic (and indeterministic) powers.     
 
In Chapter 6, Possible Prevention, I provide a discussion of the connected concepts of determinism, 
probability, and dispositional actualism as these apply to Mumford and Anjum's causal 
dispositionalism. The overall objective of this chapter is to show that Mumford and Anjum face a 
dilemma concerning the modal premise of the antecedent strengthening argument. The modal 
premise in question states that it is always possible, at least in principle, for a given causal situation 
to be subject to countervailing powers, such that the effect (i.e. the manifestation qua change) is 
prevented. The dilemma that I discuss proceeds as follows. The opening move is to emphasise that 
Mumford and Anjum's case against causal necessitarianism is thought to be independent of the 
question of whether or not there are probabilistic powers and/or uncaused events in the actual 
world. As such, the first horn of the dilemma is for Mumford and Anjum to attempt to maintain 
the truth of their modal premise in spite of the lack of these (comparatively uncontroversial) 
failures of necessitation. But this route leads to a significant difficulty, which is that if there are no 
probabilistic powers or uncaused events, then it is impossible—counter intuitively, perhaps—for 
powers to be in merely possible (i.e. non-actual) spatial locations. The argument for this claim is 
slightly complex, but the basic line of thought is that if there are no probabilistic powers in the 
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world, then it is physically impossible for powers to be in merely possible spatial locations; and if 
there are no uncaused events in the world, then it is metaphysically impossible for powers to be in 
merely possible spatial locations. This is important because the modal premise of the antecedent 
strengthening argument effectively states—in the context of Mumford and Anjum's vector model 
of causation—that it is possible, at least in principle, for powers to be in non-actual spatial locations. 
The second horn of the dilemma is for Mumford and Anjum to explicitly draw upon probabilistic 
powers and/or uncaused events. But this route trivialises the antecedent strengthening argument, 
since we are accepting in advance that the world contains probabilistic causal processes, and it is 
relatively uncontroversial that such causal processes do not necessitate their effects. I also argue 
that uncaused events do not affect the necessitarianism–dispositionalism issue: uncaused events 
would serve to make a world temporally indeterministic but not causally indeterministic. 
 
The third section of the thesis contains four chapters—chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10. Chapter 7, Stephen 
Barker's Brute Modalism, sets out Barker's three degrees of physical modal involvement, his brute 
modalism, and two of his arguments that affect anti-Humeanism. Chapters 8, 9, and 10 develop 
temporal essentialism. Chapter 8, Temporal Essentialism I, provides its basic ontology, which 
draws upon Tooley's Platonic factualism. Chapter 9, Temporal Essentialism II, discusses Tooley's 
growing block model, and its application in temporal essentialism. Chapter 10, Not a World of 
Powers but a Powerful World, outlines Lowe's form–content distinction, the concept of a formal 
ontological operation, and the concept of a time-based metaphysical explanation for lawful 
regularities. I have already discussed Barker's The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers relative 
to the scope of this introduction, so let us begin with the outline for Chapter 8.  
 
Chapter 8, Temporal Essentialism I, begins by introducing temporal essentialism. I discuss the 
basic line of thought in this position, as well as listing its ontological categories and formal 
ontological posits. Briefly stated, this line of thought is as follows. Firstly, a dynamic theory of 
time is accepted, in this case Tooley's growing block model. Secondly, Lowe's distinction between 
ontological form and ontological content is accepted. Thirdly, I propose that we can understand a 
temporally dynamic world in terms of a rule-following ontology, where the rule in question is 
provided by a formal ontological operation. The ontology is rule-following in this sense: the 
actualisation of objects and first-order states of affairs is the consequence of a formal ontological 
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operation. And fourthly, I propose that by modifying the formal ontological operation—to make 
it either sensitive or insensitive to the content of the ontology—we can classify the resulting world, 
respectively, as either anti-Humean or neo-Humean. In this way, there is a conceptual connection 
to be made between the structure of dynamic time and the properties and laws debate (specifically: 
the issue of necessary connections between distinct existences). The second task of Chapter 8 is to 
set out the basic ontology of temporal essentialism. To this end I draw upon Tooley's Platonic 
factualism, which is a states of affairs ontology. The basic ontology at hand centres around a 
distinction between objects (existentially dependent concrete entities) and Platonic universals 
(existentially independent abstract entities). Strictly speaking, it recognises four ontological 
categories: (i) objects, (ii) first-order properties, (ii) a first-order relation, and (iv) a second-order 
relation. Chapter 8 outlines the motivation for accepting Platonic universals, the theoretical roles 
of the four ontological categories, and their distinguishing features.  
 
Chapter 9, Temporal Essentialism II, begins by discussing Tooley's growing block model, which 
is a dynamic theory of time. Roughly speaking, a theory of time is dynamic if the totality of states 
of affairs are different at different times. According to Tooley's growing block model, states of 
affairs that are past and present are actual whereas states of affairs that are future are non-actual. 
In addition, actual states of affairs are (dynamically) indexed to times, such that future states of 
affairs are actualised with the passage of time. Tooley's central argument for his growing block 
model draws upon a thesis concerning singular causation and probability. The overall picture is 
that states of affairs can only be causally related in a world that approximates—to a significant 
degree—the growing block model. How is Tooley's growing block model applicable to temporal 
essentialism? As a necessitation theorist, Tooley argues that necessitation relations govern patterns 
of property instantiation across time; in addition, he suggests that his necessitation relations 
provide a metaphysical explanation for the passage of time: states of affairs are actualised via the 
governing role of laws. But this line of thought is subject to Barker's problem of the governing 
role—or so I suggest. Accordingly, my approach is to use the resources of Tooley's growing block 
model to set out a different metaphysical explanation for lawful regularities and the passage of 
time (viz. the formal ontological operation). First and foremost, I draw upon Tooley's concept of 
'actual at a time', which indexes states of affairs to a positive integer—e.g. a's being F is actual at 
t1. With this in mind, I set out a four-part operation for the temporal imperative. If the condition of 
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this formal ontological operation is satisfied, then its performable operation modifies the temporal 
index of first-order states of affairs (and objects), adds objects to the domain of temporal 
essentialism, and constructs states of affairs (both monadic and dyadic). 
 
Chapter 10, Not a World of Powers, But a Powerful World, begins by outlining Lowe's form–
content distinction. Roughly speaking, Lowe's formal ontological relationships (e.g. instantiation) 
delimit the possible ways that different types of entities can stand to one another in virtue of their 
real essences. I argue that these formal posits set out the 'synchronic syntax' of Lowe's four-
category ontology. For example, objects in Lowe's theory can instantiate kinds but not attributes; 
as such, the state of affairs 'object a instantiates kind K' is metaphysically possible, whilst the state 
of affairs 'object a instantiates attribute A' is metaphysically impossible. The metaphysical 
explanation for this is essence-based: objects, kinds, and attributes have general essences, i.e. real 
essences that are shared by the members of these ontological categories. In this way, objects are 
(essentially) the types of entities that can instantiate kinds but not attributes, and this delimitation 
of states of affairs is temporally invariant. On this basis, I approach formal ontological operations 
as 'active' formal posits that control the 'diachronic syntax' for states of affairs. At this point I 
assume a diachronic model of lawful regularities, according to which the lawful regularity 'All Fs 
are Gs' = df 'If at time t
n object x is F, then at time tn+1 object y is G'. Given this assumption, if there 
are necessary connections between distinct existences qua causes and effects, and if it is a law that 
$(F,G), then the diachronic syntax of the ontology will actualise the state of affairs b's being G (at 
t2) in response to the state of affairs a's being F (a t1). The middle part of Chapter 10 defends the 
concept of a formal ontological operation. The end part of Chapter 10 argues that temporal 
essentialism is a candidate solution for Barker's problem of the governing role. This solution 
involves dividing the governing role into a role of actualisation (provided by the temporal 




Section One  













This chapter has two aims. Firstly, I shall provide a description of Bird's (2007) theory of 
dispositional monism. This will be useful for our investigation in the next chapter of the thesis, 
where I criticise Bird's model of antidotes. A second aim of this chapter is to provide a critical 
discussion of Bird's understanding of 'stimulus conditions' as oppose to 'stimulus properties'. This 
discussion will also be of use in the next chapter when we use it to understand antidotes in Bird's 
stimulus–manifestation model. 
    
2.2 The derivation of laws and the problem of finks and antidotes 
 
A key feature of Bird's dispositional monism is that it is restricted to sparse properties, and the 
fundamental sparse properties at that. (This distinguishes Bird's view from some other recent work 
on the metaphysics of dispositions that has supported the admission of macroscopic predicates 
(fragility, solubility, and so on) into the ontological category of dispositional properties (e.g. Vetter 
2010; Mumford and Anjum 2011)—such predicates are 'non-fundamental sparse' properties in 
Bird's terminology (see below). Accordingly, then, Bird (2007, pp.10–5) proposes the following 
two-fold assumption for his ontology: (i) there is a genuine difference between sparse and 
abundant properties; (ii) this difference is genuine insofar as it is a difference of ontology. At this 
point Bird claims that sparse properties are universals, whereas abundant properties are not. This 
is the sense in which the sparse-abundant distinction is reflective of a genuine ontological 
difference: given the further assumptions that all properties belong to a single ontological 
category—namely, the ontological category of properties, however that is conceived—as well as 
the idea that no predicate can be admitted to the ontological category of objects, it follows, at least 
for a two-category ontology of objects and properties, that abundant predicates do not refer to 
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existing entities. If we go back to Lewis' (1986) distinction, where he characterises abundant 
properties as capturing the semantic values of meaningful predicates, we can see that Bird is in 
line with the quite widely-accepted idea that there is not a corresponding property for every 
meaningful predicate (e.g. Armstrong 1978; Heil 2003). Having rejected abundant properties, there 
is a further decision to make regarding the spectrum of sparse properties. Bird's discussion here 
draws upon Schaffer (2004). The question is whether or not non-fundamental sparse properties, 
such as those inventoried by the 'non-fundamental' sciences, e.g. chemistry and biology, should be 
accepted as universals in addition to the fundamental properties, assumed to be those studied by 
fundamental physics (or at least a hypothetically-finalised physics). Two main views are identified, 
which Bird remains neutral between, though he prefers the first view. The first view is that only 
the sparse fundamental properties exist. There can then be a graduated sparse to abundant 
distinction, with the former being properties closer to physics and the latter being properties further 
away. The second view is that all sparse properties exist, whether fundamental or not (Schaffer 
2004 defends this view). No need for a gradual distinction in this case: all sparse properties exist, 
and the sparse-abundant distinction maps onto the 'exists/non-exists' distinction. 
 
As a last point on this issue, throughout his book Bird seems to accept a two-category ontology of 
objects and universals, drawing upon Armstrong (1978). But the variation that he prefers makes 
use of Platonic universals as oppose to Armstrong's Aristotelian universals. As is the case at a 
number of points in his position, Bird does not require that the dispositional essentialist adopt 
Platonic universals, though he argues that understanding properties as necessary existents brings 
certain advantages (2007, pp.50–9). All that is required at this stage, Bird suggests, is an 
ontological distinction between sparse and abundant properties. 
 
With this in mind, Bird's (2007) dispositional monism is the view that all fundamental properties 
are dispositional properties in virtue of their dispositional essences. Dispositional monism is a 
version of dispositional essentialism, the thesis that at least a subset of fundamental properties are 
dispositional properties in virtue of their dispositional essences. According to Bird, the foundations 
of dispositional essentialism support a theory of laws that bypasses the central difficulties of 
regularity theories (e.g. Lewis 1986) and necessitation theories (e.g. Armstrong 1983). These 
central difficulties are, respectively, the problem of accidental regularities and the problem of 
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contingent necessitation (Bird 2005b, pp.355–7). As a first pass, Bird models dispositional 
essences upon the conditional analysis (CA).  
 
(CA)  D(S,M)x↔(Sx□→Mx) 
 
Note that x is the object of predication, D(S,M) is the dispositional predicate, S is the stimulus and 
M is the manifestation. According to (CA), dispositional predicates have a stimulus and 
manifestation, such that, were the stimulus to be co-instantiated (with the object bearing the 
disposition), then the manifestation would be produced. Hence, on the left–right direction of (CA), 
true dispositional predications entail true counterfactual/subjunctive conditionals that refer to the 
stimulus, manifestation and object of predication. And vice versa for the right-left direction.  
 
In line with the dispositional predicates of (CA), Bird's dispositional properties (i) have a stimulus 
and manifestation, such that, (ii) were the stimulus to be co-instantiated, then the manifestation 
would be produced. Taken together, (i) and (ii) are the form of the dispositional essence of a 
dispositional property: (i) concerns the essential relationship that holds between a dispositional 
property, stimulus and manifestation, whereas (ii) concerns the essential relationship that holds 
between the co-instantiation of the stimulus and the production of the manifestation, i.e. a 
counterfactual/subjunctive implication.   
 
To say that a property has a dispositional essence or is essentially dispositional is to say first 
that that property has some essence that may be characterised dispositionally ... Thus 
according to dispositional essentialism, the real essence of some potency P includes a 
disposition to give some particular characteristic manifestation M in response to a 
characteristic stimulus S (Bird, 2007, p.45). 
 
Note that dispositional properties are termed 'potencies' by Bird. Note also that Bird (2007, pp.45–
6) accepts the strong thesis that the dispositional essence of a dispositional property is sufficient 
for fixing its identity. That is to say, the essence of a dispositional property is 'exhausted' by its 
dispositional essence. The weaker thesis, cited above in Bird's "P includes a disposition ... " but in 
fact rejected, is that the essence of a dispositional property is 'partially exhausted' by its 
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dispositional essence; in this case, whilst dispositional properties have dispositional essences, the 
latter are insufficient for fixing the identity of the former. That being said, however, the weaker 
thesis (termed DEp) is sufficient for Bird's theory of laws.  
 
(DEp)  □(Px→D(S,M)x) 
 
Recall that Bird is modelling dispositional essences upon (CA). Accordingly, (CA) is taken to be 
a metaphysically necessary truth. "Since the dispositionalist holds that the dispositional nature of 
properties is essential, (CA) is not merely an analysis of the dispositional concept 'D' but rather 
characterises the nature of the property D. Hence (CA) is metaphysically necessary" (2005b, 
p.355).  
 
(CA□)  □(D(S,M)x↔(Sx□→Mx))   
 
As a first pass, then, Bird's theory of laws makes use of (DEp) and the left–right direction of (CA□). 
Bird takes laws to be general regularities that are ontologically grounded by dispositional 
properties. For the reason that dispositional properties are the ontological grounds of laws, the 
general regularities in question are thought to be lawful or non-accidental regularities (Bird 2007, 
p.46). Given that the dispositional essences of dispositional properties are the ontological grounds 
of general regularities, laws are thought to be metaphysically necessary (Bird 2007, pp.48–50).  
 
Bird's (2007, pp.46–8) formal characterisation of laws draws upon first-order modal logic with 
modus ponens for the subjunctive/counterfactual conditional. It runs as follows. First, the right-
hand side of (DEp) is substituted for the right-hand side of (CA□). That is to say, Bird substitutes 
























That said, the left–right direction of (CA) is thought to be false, in virtue of finks and antidotes 
(Martin 1994; Bird 1998). Given that, ipso facto, (CA□) is false, the first pass of Bird's theory of 
laws is thought to be false (Bird, 2005b, p.359).  
 
In general, counter-examples to the left–right direction of (CA) aim to show that true dispositional 
predications do not entail true counterfactual/subjunctive conditionals. Martin's (1994, pp.5–7) 
'reverse-cycle' fink makes use of a wire with the dispositional property 'live'. In line with (CA), the 
dispositional property 'live' has a stimulus and manifestation; these are, respectively, 'touched by 
a conductor' and 'conduct electricity'. So construed, (CA) states that the true dispositional 
predication 'the wire is live' entails the true counterfactual/subjunctive conditional 'if the wire were 
to be touched by a conductor, then the wire would conduct electricity'. Martin's fink, however, is 
a device that has a sensor for detecting the touching of the wire by the conductor and a mechanism 
for rendering the wire dead. It operates such that if the wire were to be touched by a conductor, 
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then the fink would render the wire dead. On this basis, Martin argues that the left–right direction 
of (CA) is false: in virtue of the fink, the (true) dispositional predication 'the wire is live' does not 
entail the counterfactual/subjunctive conditional 'if the wire were to be touched by a conductor, 
then the wire would conduct electricity'. Accordingly, the left-side of (CA) is true, whereas the 
right-side of (CA) is false. 
 
Bird (2007, pp.25–6) argues that finks (reverse-cycle and forward-cycle) draw upon two key 
characteristics of dispositional properties. The first is that there is a time delay in between the co-
instantiation of the stimulus and the production of the manifestation. For example, at t1 the wire is 
touched by the conductor (the co-instantiation of the stimulus), at t2 the wire 'starts' to conduct 
electricity and at t3 the wire 'is' conducting electricity (the production of the manifestation). In this 
case, the wire 'starting' to conduct electricity at t2 is the time delay. The second key characteristic 
is that it is possible for objects to lose/gain dispositional properties. Taken together, these 'formal 
characteristics' give rise to the possibility of the following pattern of states of affairs. At t1 object 
x has dispositional property D and stimulus S, but ~D at t2 (in virtue of the stimulus causing the 
fink to effect the loss of D from x). Given the assumption that the continued persistence of a 
dispositional property from t1 to t
3
  is a necessary condition of the production of the manifestation, 
in this case it follows that the manifestation is not produced (~M at t3). Overall, then, finks prevent 
the production of the manifestation in virtue of the stimulus causing the reverse-cycle fink to effect 
the loss of the dispositional property. In this way, a necessary condition of the production of the 
manifestation is not satisfied. 
 
In contrast, Bird's (2007, pp.27–9) antidotes are thought to interfere with the circumstances of a 
dispositional property, such that the production of the manifestation is prevented. In this case, the 
circumstances of a dispositional property are a different type of necessary condition for the 
production of the manifestation (in contrast to the continued persistence of the dispositional 
property re finks). Bird says: 
 
[W]e can see how the exceptions [to the left–right direction of (CA)] may arise. Let x have 
the disposition D to yield manifestation M in response to stimulus S. On normal occasions, 
when x does yield that manifestation in response to that stimulus, this occurs because of the 
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combined operation of (i) the properties of x that constitute the causal basis of D and (ii) 
certain additional, typically environmental conditions. The exceptions [to the left-left right 
direction of (CA)] arise when one or other of these is absent. If (i) is made to be absent then 
the disposition suffers from a fink; when (ii) is absent it suffers from an antidote (Bird 2004, 
p.262: my square brackets).      
 
Bird's (1998, p.228) counter-example to the left–right direction of (CA) makes use of a poison 
(arsenic) and its medical-antidote (dimercaprol). Let us take arsenic to have the dispositional 
predicate 'poisonous'. Its stimulus and manifestation are, respectively, 'ingested by a person' and 
'kill the person'. So construed, (CA) states that the true dispositional predication 'the arsenic is 
poisonous' entails the true counterfactual/subjunctive conditional 'if the arsenic were to be ingested 
by a person, then the arsenic would kill the person'. Dimercaprol, however, is a medical-antidote 
that interferes with the causal process of arsenic, such that, if the former were ingested by a person, 
then the latter would not kill the person. Accordingly, the left-side of (CA) is true, whereas the 
right-side of (CA) is false. 
 
Note that Bird sets out a number of explanations for antidotes; prima facie, these draw upon two 
different types of operation. In the first place, the operation of antidotes is taken to be their 
interference with the circumstance of a dispositional property: "[An] antidote to a disposition 
leaves the disposition unchanged but alters the environmental conditions that are required to permit 
the disposition to yield its characteristic manifestation" (Bird 2005b, p.358–9). In the second place, 
however, the operation of antidotes is taken to be their interference with the causal process of the 
production of the manifestation. Bird explains this point: 
 
An object x is disposed to display response r under stimulus s. At time t it receives stimulus 
s and so in the normal course of things, at some later time t', x gives response r ... An antidote 
to the above disposition would be something which, when applied before t', has the effect of 
breaking the causal chain leading to r, so that r does not in fact occur (Bird 1998, p.228).   
 
In clarification, then, these two explanations appear to draw upon two different types of operation: 
the first interferes with circumstances whereas the second interferes with causal processes; it 
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follows, prima facie, that the production of the manifestation has two necessary conditions re 
antidotes. First, the circumstance of a dispositional property has to be suitable for the production 
of the manifestation (but it may become unsuitable via interference). And second, the causal 
process of the production of the manifestation has to be unbroken (but it may become broken via 
interference). Either way, the operation of interference in question is thought to prevent the 
production of the manifestation.  
 
Recall that the left–right direction of (CA) is thought to be false, in virtue of finks and antidotes. 
Given that, ipso facto, (CA□) is false, the first pass of Bird's theory of laws is thought to be false 
(Bird, 2005b, p.359). In response, as a second pass Bird models dispositional properties upon a 
ceteris paribus conditional analysis (CA*).    
 
(CA*)  D(S,M)x→(Sx&CP□→Mx) 
 
Note that CP is the exclusion of finks and antidotes for D(S,M). As a second pass, then, Bird's 
dispositional properties (i) have a stimulus and manifestation, such that, (ii) were the stimulus to 
be co-instantiated and there are no finks and antidotes, then the manifestation would be produced. 
In the case of (ii), the essential relationship that holds between the co-instantiation of the stimulus 
and the production of the manifestation is a 'ceteris paribus counterfactual/subjunctive implication'.  
 
In line with the rejection of (CA□) and the acceptance of (CA*), the second pass of Bird's theory 
of laws makes use of (DEp) and (CA*). Bird (2007, p.60) does not provide the following details, 
but we might reconstruct it as follows. Firstly, the right-hand side of (DEp) is substituted for the 
right-hand side of (CA*). (Below I have drawn upon Vetter (2009, p.227).) 




(1*) □(Px→(Sx□&CP→Mx))  
 












And fifth, Bird generalises over the unbound variable x.  
 
(5*) ∀x(ceteris paribus((Px&Sx)→Mx)) 
 
Accordingly, in the second pass of Bird's theory of laws, dispositional properties are the ontological 
grounds of ceteris paribus regularities (Bird 2007, p.59–60). Bird explains: 
 
The counterexamples to (CA) would make serious trouble for the dispositionalist view of 
laws, if all laws were straightforward exceptionless universal generalisations. But we know 
that they are not. For many laws are ceteris paribus laws (cp-laws) ... My suggestion is two-
fold. First, we can see these cp-laws as reflections of dispositions. Second, the disturbing 
factors that are required to be absent are precisely the sorts of factor that provide 
counterexamples (finks and antidotes) to the conditional analysis (Bird 2005b, p.359). 
 
At this point the direction of argument is that the second pass of Bird's theory of laws is not false 
in virtue of finks and antidotes, since finks and antidotes are counter-examples to (CA□) but not 
(CA*). Accordingly, the second pass runs as follows. (i) Bird models dispositional properties upon 
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(CA*) and (ii) draws upon these entities as the ontological grounds of ceteris paribus regularities. 
In addition, however, Bird sets out a direction of argument that moves from the explanandum of 
ceteris paribus regularities to the explanans of dispositional properties that are modeled upon 
(CA*), together with the existence of finks and antidotes. As Bird puts it:  
 
[The] moral of this story is that the failure of (CA) due to finks and antidotes is no difficulty 
for the dispositionalist account of laws. On the contrary, the very existence of finks and 
antidotes explains why not all laws are perfectly general but some are exclusive cp-laws. 
Had (CA) been true, then the dispositional conception would have required all laws to be 
perfect generalisations—which would have permitted cp-laws to have refuted the 
dispositional conception (Bird 2005b, pp.361–2: my italics).  
 
So Bird makes use of finks and antidotes as explanans for the explanandum of ceteris paribus 
regularities. As such, in so far as there are ceteris paribus regularities, the existence of finks and 
antidotes is advantageous, not disadvantageous. We will return to this issue in the next chapter.    
 
2.3 Finks and antidotes at the fundamental level 
 
At this stage Bird sets out a pair of arguments concerning the non-existence of finks and antidotes 
at the fundamental level (see also Bird 2004, pp.262–7).  
 
The argument against the existence of finks at the fundamental level is thought to be decisive (Bird 
2007, p.62). It begins by noting that the operation of reverse-cycle finks, i.e. the removal of the 
causal basis of the disposition after the stimulus but before the manifestation, cannot take place at 
the fundamental level for the reason that such dispositions do not have distinct causal bases: at the 
fundamental level, dispositional properties are their own causal bases. Nevertheless, it is thought 
that objects may gain/lose properties 'directly' at the fundamental level (Bird cites electrons 
changing their spin direction as a candidate case of fundamental objects directly gaining/losing 
properties). If the idea of objects gaining/losing properties in this direct manner is workable, then 
it seems that Bird has a basic model of fundamental 'finkish instantiation' (the form of which is 
identical to the non-fundamental case, with the modification that the dispositional property is lost 
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directly after the stimulus but before the manifestation). With this in mind, Bird notes two 
conditions of fundamental finkish instantiation. The first is that the manifestation cannot be 
simultaneous with the stimulus; otherwise there would be no time-delay for the direct loss of the 
dispositional property. And the second is that the stimulus cannot be sufficient for the 
manifestation (sufficient 'simpliciter'), for in that case we could have the stimulus and dispositional 
property suitably paired together, and the dispositional property removed from the object, but the 
manifestation nevertheless occur (as a kind of delayed effect). For the finkish-instantiation to work, 
it seems as though we need both a time gap for the removal of the disposition, as well as some 
kind of dependence of the manifestation on the persistence of the disposition (after the stimulus). 
As Bird notes, both of these conditions are mysterious.  
 
At this point (2007, pp.60–2) an argument is set out that attacks the idea of there being successive 
states of affairs at different times that are not intrinsically different. The basic idea is that 
fundamental finks cannot operate as there is no time to remove the dispositional property. So far 
we have this basic model, which is built on both of the above conditions: x has P and S at t1 and 
M occurs at tn, such that (i) these times are not the same time, and (ii) such that P is required to 
persist for M to occur at tn. But because there is no intrinsic difference between any of the states 
of affairs in between t1 and tn, Bird argues that one of these cannot have a consequence that the 
others do not have, and so we cannot assume that M uniquely depends on the occurrence of one of 
these states of affairs. This principle (i.e. same intrinsic character gives same possible effects) leads 
Bird to conclude that either (i) the manifestation of P is simultaneous with S, such that there is no 
chance of finkish-removal, or (ii) there are no times in between t1 and tn, such that the latter time 
is the next moment (here Bird uses quantised time). But this also has the consequence of there 
being no possibility of finkish-removal, and so Bird concludes that finks cannot occur at the 
fundamental level. 
 
Whereas the argument against fundamental finks is thought to be successful, Bird notes that 
antidotes are more difficult to deal with, as they are "more common" (2007, p.62). The argument 
is also defeasible, which is interesting when thinking about the possible existence of ceteris 
paribus laws. Some background to the argument is necessary. Bird (2007, pp.38–41) sets out some 
difficulties for translating antidote-sensitive dispositions into antidote-free dispositions (this is 
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within the context of Choi's (2003) response to Bird's arguments against the conditional analysis). 
Here Bird is concerned to criticise the following strategy: the antidote-sensitive disposition to give 
manifestation M in response to stimulus S can be replaced with the antidote-free disposition to 
give M in response to S {in the absence of A1, A2, A3, ...}, where this is the set of all possible 
antidotes to the disposition in question. The core of this strategy is that the stimulus of the 
disposition is replaced with a complex 'property': 'S in the absence of ...'. But there are several 
problems with this, according to Bird. One such argument (2007, pp.39–40) aims to show that a 
covert disposition that can be multiply realised cannot be replaced by an overt disposition with 
antidote-free stimulus. (We can note that a 'covert' disposition is one that does not have an explicit 
stimulus–manifestation profile, such as 'fragility' in comparison to 'the disposition to break when 
struck'.) Here the thought seems to be that the disposition 'being poisonous' could be realised by 
distinct causal bases, such that these poisons all work in different ways and are different types of 
poisons. Bird then says that a given antidote, A, whilst being an antidote to some poisons, is not 
an antidote to all poisons. He then says that the following overt disposition, which is antidote-free, 
cannot be used to analyse 'being poisonous': viz. the disposition to kill (M) in response to ingestion 
in the absence of all antidotes to all poisons (S). This is because we could have somebody who is 
bitten by a snake and so ingests snake venom and dies (despite administering A). (We suppose 
then that antidote A has no effect on snake venom.) Now, on the one hand, it is clear that the death 
can be explained by reference to the poisonous nature of the snake venom. On the other hand, 
however, since A has been taken, this case cannot be explained by using the above antidote-free 
disposition.  
 
I return now to the consideration of fundamental antidotes. A general model is given for antidotes: 
"the failure of a disposition to manifest itself is due to interference not with the disposition itself 
but rather with the additional conditions that are required" (Bird 2007, p.62). Bird then suggests 
that the arguments against the translation of covert dispositions that are antidote-sensitive into 
overt antidote-free dispositions have less bite when we are considering the fundamental level. In 
particular, the multiple realisation problem cannot arise (dispositions have no realisers distinct 
from themselves at this level). Bird thinks that this leaves two main options for fundamental 
antidotes. The first is that the antidote may operate by way interfering with a mechanism that may 
be broken down into distinct steps. Bird gives the example of a row of 100 dominoes, such that 
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the first domino has the disposition to bring about the fall of the 100th domino in response to being 
knocked over (the idea here is that we have the antidote of removing, say, the 29th domino). But, 
it seems natural to replace this process with 99 dispositions (all acting at a single level). In this 
case, we can replace the disposition above with separate dispositions, e.g. to knock over the next 
domino if knocked over (and this will be antidote-free, apparently for the reason that the 
aforementioned antidote, i.e. removing a domino, will be the removal of the stimulus or 
manifestation itself) (Bird 2007, pp.62–3). A second possibility, however, is that the manifestation 
has no mechanism: it is the same direct gaining of properties that were discussed in Bird's anti-
fink argument. This is the general model: "[T]here is no mechanism bringing about manifestation 
M—it is brought about by D and S directly. However, the further possible condition A is such that 
D and S will not bring about M" (2007, p.63). (I note here that this is slightly different to the first 
antidote model: here the antidote interfered with additional conditions that are required; in this 
case it seems to be the additional condition (i.e. 'A') that prevents M's coming into being.) But, in 
any case, Bird is optimistic for the elimination of these dispositional properties into their antidote-
free versions. Here is what he says:  
 
However, one might be less sceptical about the eliminativism route considered above. Since 
we are dealing with the fundamental level, and have already removed the problem of multiple 
realizability, it might be reasonable to expect that any dispositions of this sort will suffer 
from relatively few antidotes. In which case their incorporation into an antidote free 
disposition will not look so gerrymandered. Thus in this case it will be up to our fundamental 
science to decide whether there are antidote sensitive dispositions and ceteris paribus laws. 
But the direction of the development of physics with ever fewer fundamental properties and 
corresponding forces indicates that the prospects for antidote-free fundamental properties 
and thus strict laws only at the fundamental level are promising (Bird 2007, p.63).     
 
What is the pair of arguments intended to establish? The following, I think. First, it is not fatal to 
Bird's position if there are finks and antidotes, since that just means we might have some 'strict' 
laws (following the derivation above) and also some ceteris paribus laws, in those cases where the 
finks and antidotes operate (or perhaps all laws are ceteris paribus). Second, however, when we 
closely examine finks and antidotes, and question whether or not they could exist at the 
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fundamental level, we find that the answer is, respectively, 'no' and 'probably not'. Taken together, 
then, Bird looks to be saying that ceteris paribus laws are improbable. 
 
2.4 Discussion on stimulus properties and stimulus conditions 
 
In the next chapter I shall begin to make my argument against Bird's understanding of antidotes. 
By way of preparation, however, I want to firstly set out a consideration that concerns the resources 
of Bird's ontology and the notion of 'stimulus conditions'.  
 
We should make a distinction between the stimulus property of a potency and its stimulus 
condition. The stimulus property of a potency is a bona fide potency, given Bird's thesis of 
dispositional monism. Bird's 'SM-relations' are asymmetric three-place relations that hold between 
three potencies, such that, relative to each other, these relata play the roles of dispositional property, 
stimulus property and manifestation property (2007, p.145). When we consider a given potency 
qua dispositional property, we are considering the first relatum in a given SM-relation, such that 
its stimulus property and manifestation property are the second and third relata, respectively. But 
there is more to the antecedents of Bird's subjunctive conditionals than a stimulus property. In the 
default case, which is typically assumed, the antecedent requires not merely that the stimulus 
property is instantiated, but rather that it is instantiated by the same object that instantiates the 
potency—that it is instantiated by the 'potency-object', as we might say. This move from a stimulus 
property to a stimulus condition is apparent if we recall (DEp) and (CA□). Note that x is a variable 
and P, D, S and M are constants.  
 
(DEp)  □(Px→D(S,M)x) 
(CA□)  □(D(S,M)x→(Sx□→Mx)) 
 
A stimulus property is a potency that is playing a role (i.e. S), whereas a stimulus condition is a 
state of affairs (i.e. Sx); the latter but not the former is drawn upon by (CA□). More specifically, 
the stimulus condition is a type of state of affairs, where the object is a variable and the stimulus 
property is a constant. (Hence, where a and b are constants, a's being S and b's being S are tokens 
of the type of state of affairs x's being S.) In the default case, then, given that the stimulus condition 
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(Sx) uses the potency-object (x) for its object-variable, if the stimulus condition is the case, then it 
is 'automatically' the case that the potency and stimulus property are co-instantiated. The default 
case is such that the co-instantiation of the potency and stimulus property is subjunctively 
sufficient for the production of the manifestation, but the stimulus condition does not explicitly 
refer to the potency. In contrast, the requirement of co-instantiation is achieved by default: it is a 
consequence of the stimulus condition (Sx) using the potency-object (x) for its object-variable. 
 
This raises a point of interest. Given that (CA□) is specifying the stimulus condition in the default 
case, is it the case that (CA□) is to be modified where we have a more complex stimulus condition? 
I think that's right, but I'd like to introduce some supporting ideas to begin with. 
 
A more difficult potency requires that the stimulus property is instantiated by some 'foreign' object 
that is nevertheless related to the potency-object in a specific way. This requires a correspondingly 
more complex state of affairs for the stimulus condition. Such a case is provided by Bird's reading 
of Coulomb's law. Under pressure from his dislike of multi-track potencies, Bird fragments 
Coulomb's law into single-track potencies (2007, pp.21–4). Consider a given track, where Q1 is 
the charge of interest, Q2 is the opposing charge, R is the spatial relation and F is the component 
force. Where x is Q1, the associated subjunctive conditional is: 'if it were the case that y is Q2 and 
x has R to y, then it would be the case that x is F. Here we have two stimulus properties—Q2 and 
R (R is in fact a dyadic relation)—that are embedded, respectively, in the stimulus condition 'y is 
_ and x has _ to y' (with properties removed for illustration).  
 
These observations raise the issue of object-sensitivity for potencies. We could take the same 
stimulus properties above, Q2 and R, but provide a different stimulus condition, e.g. 'x is Q2 and y 
has R to z'. Needless to say, this is a bad reading of Coulomb's law. Pressingly, x's being Q2 loses 
the idea—essential to Coulomb's law—that Q1 and Q2 are charges of distinct particles. More 
pressingly, y's having R to z loses the idea—also essential to Coulomb's law—that the spatial 
relation holds between the charged particles that have the charge of interest and the opposing 
charge, i.e. x's being Q1 and y's being Q2. Potencies are object-sensitive, then, in that their stimulus 
conditions disclose the required objects of their stimulus properties. Sacrificing this feature 
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threatens a sensible understanding of scientific predicates and law statements (in this case charge 
and Coulomb's law).     
 
It is important to note that potencies can also be object-sensitive qua their manifestation property. 
Bird (2007, p.165) makes a useful distinction between active and passive potencies: the former but 
not the latter produce their manifestation property on a foreign object that is, presumably, related 
to the potency-object in a specific way. As it happens, the object-sensitivity of charge draws upon 
the 'default case' of a passive potency, i.e. the potency and manifestation property are co-
instantiated (where x is Q1, the produced manifestation is x's being F). It is tempting, then, to say 
that potencies have manifestation conditions as well, where these disclose the required objects of 
their manifestation properties. This is correct, but we might dislike the term 'condition' being used 
for the manifestation property and its required object, since, in contrast to the stimulus condition, 
it is not a condition qua the content of the antecedent of the subjunctive conditional, i.e. there is a 
sense in which it is not a condition proper. Where the need arises, I shall use the term 'manifestation 
circumstance' for this reason. 
 
I return now to the point of interest, raised earlier. Here the worry was that (CA□) would have to 
be modified as we move between potencies with different object-sensitivities, since it is 
responsible for specifying these object-sensitivities. To reinforce this issue, I think it is useful to 
consider the close connection between (DEp) and Bird's SM-relations. Because Bird's SM-relations 
(stimulus–manifestation relations) are three-place relations, I shall sometimes term them ‘DSM-
relations’. 
 
(DEp)  □(Px→D(S,M)x) 
(DSM)  DSM[P, PS, PM] 
 
Having distinguished the stimulus property from the stimulus condition, a natural question to ask 
is whether or not Bird's DSM-relations specify stimuli properties or stimuli conditions. (I leave the 
parallel point on manifestations to one side for simplicity and in light of the Coulomb case.) I think 
the answer has to be that the DSM-relation provides a function from a specific potency to a specific 
stimulus property. As noted, Bird's DSM-relations are asymmetric three-place relations that hold 
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between three potencies. I agree that these relations have some interesting formal properties; for 
example, they might be construed as second-order relations that are internal to their relata and 
constitutive of their relata (Barker 2009, p.247), but I do not see how the relation nor their relata 
have any obvious connection to object-variables, which is of concern when we are thinking about 
object-sensitivity. So stimulus conditions will not be found in Bird's graph theoretic machinery. 
As is well known, Bird has argued that his potencies can be structurally individuated on a graph 
theoretic basis. The idea, in short, is that if the population of potencies standing in the network of 
DSM relations meets well-defined criteria of strong asymmetry, then the identities of its 
dispositional properties are fixed by their structural positions (Bird 2006).  
 
This interesting limitation suggests a nice reading of Bird's thesis (DEp). We can put the same 
question to it: is the subscript (S) in D(S,M) referring to a stimulus property or a stimulus condition? 
Given that the stimulus condition Sx is explicit in the subjunctive conditional of (CA□), it is natural 
to think that the subscript (S) in D(S,M) is referring to the stimulus property, not the stimulus 
condition. One consideration is that we have (S) rather than (Sx) as the subscript. But a more 
interesting consideration is that, if the subscript (S) in (DEp) is thought to be a stimulus property, 
then this thesis matches up nicely with Bird's DSM-relations. That is to say, the left–right reading 
of (DEp) describes the function that is provided by Bird's DSM-relation. In both cases we move 
from the specification of a potency to its stimulus property and manifestation property (and no 
more). 
 
There is a connection between this observation and Barker and Smart's (2012) distinction between 
constitution and governing roles for potencies that I think is worth drawing out. A brief treatment 
of Barker and Smart's distinction will suffice for now, since it is topic of Chapter 7. In short, Barker 
and Smart suggest that Bird's potencies have two roles or aspects, but that Bird only accounts for 
one of these, ontologically speaking. The first role is one of constitution, such that the identity of 
a potency is constituted by its entering (along with the totality of other potencies) into a network 
of DSM-relations (termed 'SR-relations' by Barker and Smart). The constitution role for potencies 
is targeting the idea that the identity of a potency is fixed by its place in the network of DSM-
relations and other potencies. But this role is separated from a governing role, which, in contrast, 
is targeting the idea that a potency can produce its manifestation property—forcing its instantiation, 
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so to speak, in response to the obtaining of its stimulus property. In effect, Barker and Smart's 
issue is that Bird's graph theory resources, i.e. his DSM-relations, only account for the constitution 
role, such that the governing role, which is obviously central to anti-Humean metaphysics, is left 
without ontological foundation. (Note that Barker (2013) argues for the stronger claim that the 
graph theoretic resources are unsuitable for even their constitution purposes). Important as this 
issue is in itself, I think it is interesting to see that, if we are right about the object-sensitivity of 
potencies being left out of the workload of the DSM-relations and (DEp), under Barker and Smart's 
distinction the issue of object-sensitivity and the specification of stimulus conditions then becomes 
a matter of governance. Following their line of thought, it then becomes something without 
ontological foundation. In short, whilst we might have had the idea that the DSM-relations fixed 
the identity of potencies, this can only be upheld if we divorce the issue of object-sensitivity from 
that of the identity of a potency. This raises an interesting question for Bird: what is the ontological 
basis of the stimulus conditions? If these are not involved with the essence of a potency qua its 
constitution, i.e. qua its position in the network of DSM-relations, are we to say that a potency can 
have different stimulus conditions (whilst keeping its identity and therefore keeping the same 
stimulus property)? Given my brief comments on the importance of object-sensitivity for more 
complex potencies like Q1 in Coulomb's law, this might be a question of concern. 
 
I think it may be helpful at this point to reiterate my points so far. First, there is a distinction 
between stimulus properties and stimulus conditions. The former are potencies whereas the latter 
are types of states of affairs. Second, this distinction is an important one, since it is a way of 
understanding the object-sensitivity of physical predicates and law statements in 'dispositional 
essentialist' terms. At the very least, an account of object-sensitivity is a desideratum of a theory 
of potencies. Third, Bird's DSM-relations do not account for object-sensitivity: they provide the 
stimulus property of a potency, not its stimulus condition. In addition, given the close connection 
between Birds DSM-relations and (DEp), it is left to (CA□) to upgrade the stimulus property of a 
potency, which is fixed by its DSM-relation, into a fully-fledged stimulus condition. Fourth, and 
lastly, the issue has a connection to Barker and Smart's complaint that the governing role is 




So far, then, it looks as though (CA□), which is closely connected to Barker and Smart's governing 
role, is carrying the burden of specifying the object-sensitivity of potencies. I explained at the 
beginning of this section how the requirement of co-instantiation can be achieved by simply using 
the potency-object as the object-variable for the stimulus property. But, obviously, this move 
cannot work for the single-track interpretation of Coulomb's law. Let's now look at the mismatch 
that this brings, before I set out my recommendation for Bird in dealing with the problem. Below 
are two sets of schemes, detailing a DSM-relation together with (DEp) and (CA□). Only their left–
right directions are important. The first set have the stimulus property and manifestation property 
removed, so as to show their form in the absence of these entities. The second set show, in bold, 
how the DSM-relation 'plugs' the stimulus property and manifestation property into the subjunctive 
conditional.    
 
(DSM)  DSM[P,_,_] 
(DEp)  □ (Px→D(_,_)x) 
(CA□)  □ (D(_,_)x→_x□→_x) 
 
(DSM)  DSM[P,S,M] 
(DEp)  □ (Px→D(S,M)x) 
(CA□)  □ (D(S,M)x→Sx□→Mx) 
 
Whilst the now substantive responsibilities of (CA□) may be worrying, there does not seem to be 
any further problems so far as simple potencies are concerned, i.e. so far as those potencies that 
require no special object-sensitivity requirements are concerned. What Bird's reading of Coulomb's 
law shows, however, is that (CA□) will have to be modified so as to properly model the object-
sensitivity of the potencies at hand. The problem is that the default form for the subjunctive 
conditional '_x□→_x' is multiply unsuitable. We can clearly see this if we set out the various 







Stimulus properties: Q2 and R 
Stimulus condition: y is Q2 and x has R to y  
Manifestation property: F 
Manifestation circumstance: Fx 
 
There appear to be two differences between the default case and the Coulomb case, as we might 
call it. Firstly, the potency has two stimulus properties, Q2 and R. This raises the issue that the 
antecedent of the subjunctive conditional requires a complex antecedent. Is this a major problem? 
I don't think it is. At several places in his (2007) book, Bird envisages that complex stimuli will be 
a complication of the more standard presentation of his dispositional monism. For example, in his 
discussion of multi-track dispositions and their prospective reduction into single-track dispositions, 
the case of a conjunctive stimulus is thought to be non-reducible (pp.21–4). Another example is 
Bird's (p.103) discussion of the essence of potencies, where it is stated that, "If the potency is 3-
adic, because it has a two-part stimulus, then it will be essentially 3-adic, on the grounds that the 
stimulus and manifestation of a potency are essential to it". If there is a two-part stimulus, then the 
obvious move is to replace the DSM-relation with a 'DSSM-relation'. This modified relation is an 
asymmetric four-place relation that holds between four potencies. Its first place is the dispositional 
property place, the second that of the first stimulus property, the third that of the second stimulus 
property, and the fourth that of the manifestation property. Perhaps saying that the second place of 
the DSM-relation is occupied by two dispositional properties might resist this move. But I think 
this reply starts to put pressure on the sense in which Bird's graph theory is using our understanding 
of relations to explain the numerical identity of potencies, since it is a non-standard view that a 
three-place relation can have four relata. A different view might be that we could keep the DSM-
relation as a three-place relation, but have the conjunction of the two stimulus properties, Q2 and 
R, as a single relata. That might be more promising, I think, given that conjunctive properties are 
typically permitted on factualist lines. Note that factualism is Bird's background ontology, 
signalled explicitly at (2007, p.107). The second general problem is one that we have already noted: 
the object-sensitivity for the stimulus properties (Q2 and R) and the manifestation property (M) 
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have specific requirements if we are to understand Coulomb's law in terms of objects having 
distinct dispositional properties.  
 
So we can see that the requirements of Coulomb's law take us beyond the standard set up of a 
single stimulus property with the default object-sensitivity (i.e. where the stimulus property is 
required to be co-instantiated by the same object that bears the potency). At this point I want to 
note the following. Firstly, in the Coulomb case it would appear that we need to modify Bird's 
DSM-relations in something like the way that I alluded to in the previous paragraph. There will be 
many ways to do this, but I suggest the following method (which is loosely based upon one of the 
previous methods). With regard to the dispositional properties that feature in Coulomb's law, we 
can use a four-place relation, which we can term a 'DSRM-relation'. Its first place will be the 
dispositional property place for Q1, the second that of the charge Q2 stimulus property, the third 
that of the displacement relation R, and the fourth that of the component force manifestation, F. 
As far as I can see, something needs to be changed in Bird's framework, since we want there to be 
a way of moving from Bird's graph theory resources to the relevant subjunctive conditionals. The 
suggestion at hand can provide a starting point, I suggest, since we can view the DSRM-relation 
as providing a function from Q1 to the other properties/relations Q2, R, and F. I'd like to put Barker 
and Smart's worries to one side in this section of the thesis, since I will discuss these at the end of 
our investigations. So we are not presently concerned that there is a general problem in moving 
from relationally-constituted dispositional properties to subjunctive conditionals. Rather, our 
present discussion is concerning a point of detail. With this in mind, the point at hand is simply 
that Bird's DSM-relations look ill-equipped to handle three stimulus/manifestation universals, as 
oppose to the standard number of two. But a second component to the problem is that the form of 
the subjunctive conditional is different in the Coulomb case than it is in the standard case. As we 
have noted above, we have the following difference. 
 
Default case: 'If it were the case that [stimulus property]x, the it would be the case that 
[manifestation property]x' 
Coulomb case: 'If it were the case that [stimulus property/Q2]y and x[relation/R]y, then it 




What we can see now is that there is no straightforward move from (i) specifying the stimulus 
and manifestation properties of a potency to (ii) specifying the required stimulus condition and 
thereby the form of the subjunctive conditional in question. We can see this because we could 
keep the DSRM-relation above, and thereby keep fixed our quartet of properties (Q1, Q2, R, and 
F) but use the 'default case' subjunctive, as below.  
 
'If it were the case that [Q2 and R]x, then it would be the case that [F]x' 
 
But, for the reasons that we have noted, this is unsuitable. So for the Coulomb case we need not 
only a specific number of properties/relations (three properties and one relation), but also the 
right type of subjunctive conditional to 'plug' these into. And as the dummy subjunctive directly 
above shows, upholding Bird's version of (CA□) for all potencies, whereby we move from the 
specification of a stimulus—manifestation profile to a single type of subjunctive conditional 
(the default one), will give the incorrect results. Accordingly, as far as I can see Bird needs to 
make the following changes to accommodate his reading of Coulomb's law. First, different types 
of potencies can be involved with different types of constitution relations. Some potencies will 
have simple pairs of stimuli and manifestations, whereas some potencies (such as Q1 and its 
relatives) will have more complex combinations of stimulus properties and relations. And 
second, we will need to associate a different form of subjunctive conditional with different types 
of potencies. So we might have multiple potencies that require the default subjunctive 
conditional, but there will also be a number of potencies that require the Coulomb form of the 
subjunctive, which we have looked at above. And we can of course envisage more complex 
'dispositional essentialist' understandings of laws, whereby the stimulus conditions and 
manifestation circumstances differ from both the default case and the Coulomb case. Restricting 
ourselves to the default case and the Coulomb case, however, I show below how this would 







(DEp)   □(Px→D(S,M)x) 
(CA□)   D(S,M)x→(Sx□→Mx)    
 
DSM-relation:   
 [disposition, stimulus property, manifestation property] 
Subjunctive:  




(DEp*)   □(Px→D(S,R,M)x) 
(CA□*)   D(S,R,M)x→(Sy&xRy□→Mx)    
 
DSRM-relation:  
 [disposition, stimulus property, relation, manifestation property] 
Subjunctive:  
 If [stimulus]y and x[relation]y, then [manifestation property]x 
 
In the next chapter I shall apply this kind of approach to Bird's antidotes. As a concluding remark 
we can notice that despite these different structures for dispositional essences, this modification 
would still give Bird a unified stimulus–manifestation model, since we still have the underlying 
idea that there is a subjunctive sufficiency from one group of properties (e.g. Q2 and R) to another 
(e.g. F). And subjunctive sufficiency from one group of entities to another is one notion of what 
the stimulus—manifestation distinction is attempting to capture. As far as I can see, however, the 













My contention in this chapter is that Alexander Bird's (2007) dispositional monism cannot explain 
the operation of antidotes, viz. their interference with the circumstances that are necessary for a 
dispositional property to produce its manifestation. Bird introduced antidotes as a counterexample 
to the left–right implication of conditional analyses of disposition ascriptions, such that disposition 
ascriptions do not entail counterfactual/subjunctive conditionals if antidotes are exercising their 
operation of interference (Bird 1998; c.f. Johnston 1992). In the case of extrinsic antidotes, the 
thought is that dispositional properties produce their manifestations as a combination of (i) the 
obtaining of their stimulus and (ii) the obtaining of extrinsic circumstances, where these elements 
are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the production of the manifestation. 
Accordingly, antidotes are designed to prevent the manifestation of a dispositional property by 
exercising their operation of interference upon the extrinsic circumstances of a dispositional 
property, such that these do not obtain (i.e. such that the extrinsic circumstances are unsuitable for 
the production of the manifestation).  
 
Unfortunately, however, Bird's dispositional monism cannot explain the operation of interference 
that antidotes exercise upon external circumstances—or so I argue. The reason for this is simple: 
Bird's dispositional monism does not contain antidotes, external circumstances, or the operation 
of interference. In contrast, Bird's dispositional monism is exhausted by objects and dispositional 
properties, where the latter are thought to be natural properties that are essentially dispositional. 
Hence, there is a prima facie problem of improper ontological representation: Bird's ontology of 
objects and dispositional properties cannot properly represent antidotes, external circumstances, 
or the operation of interference. It follows a fortiori that Bird's ontology cannot properly represent 




What are the prospects for dissolving this prima facie concern? In this chapter I consider two 
general strategies, both of which are problematic. The first is Bird's ceteris paribus strategy for 
making his potencies sensitive to antidotes. And the second is Bird's elimination of antidotes. At 
a first pass, this second strategy looks to frustrate my topic in this chapter. For suppose that we 
agree that there is a problem of improper ontological representation re antidotes; if Bird can 
successfully argue that there are no antidotes then this would be a difficulty of little importance. 
This dialectical point is well received. (I am grateful to Matthew Tugby for discussion on this 
issue). Nevertheless, when we examine Bird's strategy for eliminating antidotes in more detail, we 
will see that what he is actually doing is eliminating dispositional properties that are sensitive to 
antidotes in favor of dispositional properties that are not sensitive to antidotes (i.e. he is eliminating 
antidote-sensitive dispositional properties in favor of antidote-free dispositional properties). It is 
important to realise, however, that this is not equivalent to eliminating antidotes. In fact, I shall 
suggest that Bird's elimination strategy ends up presupposing the existence of antidotes. (To jump 
the gun slightly, what Bird's elimination strategy does do is to replace a type of stimulus property 
with another (suspicious) type of stimulus property.) 
 
3.2 The ceteris paribus strategy 
 
Let us briefly recap Bird's first treatment of antidotes. Here the basic dialectic is as follows. In his 
essay Laws and Essences, Bird introduces the notion of a simple essentialism, by which he means 
a version of his dispositional monism that completely bypasses, or ignores, the problem of finks 
and antidotes (2005a, p.442). As we would expect, when restricting our attention to 'sure fire' or 
'deterministic' potencies, these entities generate exceptionless regularities that concern, in the 
default case, the co-instantiation of the potency and stimulus property, on the one hand, and the 
production of the manifestation property, on the other. But simple essentialism is of course 
unsuitable as it stands.  
 
This is the case for two connected reasons. The first is that there are numerous examples of ceteris 
paribus laws, at least at on a macroscopic level. It is a platitude that water boils at 100°C, but this 
is only the case at standard atmospheric conditions. With higher pressures, a greater temperature 
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is required for the boil; at lower pressures, a lesser temperature will suffice. (Indeed, it is possible 
to boil water at room temperature, given the right conditions). Accordingly, there is not a strict 
regularity between a sample of water being 100°C and it boiling. A second point, connected to the 
first, is that the discussion of finks and antidotes in the conditional analysis literature (e.g. Martin 
1994; Lewis 1997; Bird 1998; Gundersen 2002) provides examples, typically this-worldly and 
macroscopic, of dispositions that fail to produce their supposed manifestation because of some 
interfering or preventative factor (i.e. because of the fink or antidote under discussion). Taken 
together, these considerations are problematic for Bird's simple essentialism, which consequently 
looks dogmatic and uncritical. But no matter, Bird's simple essentialism was never designed as a 
metaphysics of nature, but rather as a stepping stone that illustrates his chosen model of potencies 
and their close connection to the conditional analysis. What the problems do require, however, is 
that Bird somehow has to account for imperfect regularities in nature, whilst simultaneously 
accommodating the counterexamples to the basis of his derivation of lawful regularities, i.e. whilst 
simultaneously accommodating the counterexamples to the conditional analysis. His resolution to 
these twin difficulties is quite neat: Bird suggests that, to the extent that a system of dispositional 
essentialism may require the grounding of imperfect regularities and ceteris paribus laws, this can 
be achieved by using finks and antidotes as the preventative entities, i.e. by using those entities 
that prevent the manifestation in the cases of exception (Bird 2005b, p.359).  
 
This is Bird's first treatment of finks and antidotes (the first of two lines of thought he presents). It 
basically involves modifying the subjunctive conditional that is associated with a potency from 
having a mere stimulus condition to having both a stimulus condition and a second condition, the 
latter of which is some kind of clause that excludes the presence of finks and antidotes. As I shall 
explain below, this is a slightly complicated move, which Bird himself admits to be problematic 
(2007, pp.36–8). We should note for the time being that this move upgrades Bird's simple 
essentialism into what we might call a critical essentialism, which is thought to be apt for a 
metaphysical representation of reality in all of its (epistemically possible) untidy and imperfect 
details. (Note that the introduction of the exclusion condition is independent of the potency having 





3.3 The elimination strategy 
 
Bird's second treatment of finks and antidotes is interesting. As I outlined in Chapter 2, Bird 
presents arguments against the existence of finks and antidotes at the fundamental level. Given 
that Bird has connected the issue of ceteris paribus laws to finks and antidotes, what is effectively 
at stake in these arguments is the requirement for Bird's dispositional essentialism, which is 
explicitly designed for the fundamental level, to generate imperfect regularities. A word of warning 
here. One understanding of Bird's first treatment of antidotes, i.e. the ceteris paribus strategy, is 
that it is set up for the macroscopic realm. I think this is a misreading. At all times Bird is focused 
on the fundamental level, but the first treatment stands to the second as a backup position. This is 
a non-trivial standing, since, as Bird explains, his argument against antidotes at the fundamental 
level is speculative and defeasible. That said, given that Bird is at least expecting the absence of 
finks and antidotes at the fundamental level, we might wonder, as noted in the introduction to this 
chapter, how these entities could pose a problem for Bird's dispositional monism. The key point 
here is that Bird's elimination strategy does not eliminate antidotes, but rather presupposes their 
existence; indeed, they are now used to explain why potencies produce their manifestations. In this 
chapter I take no issue with Bird's argument against finks, hence my focus upon antidotes; but I 
think Bird's argument against the existence of antidotes at the fundamental level is problematic. I 
should note that Bird's argument against fundamental finks is also accepted by Corry (2011). In 
outline, this elimination strategy involves recasting a potency that suffers from antidote-based 
prevention into a different potency that has a decidedly unstable metaphysical nature: the new 
potency has as its (single) stimulus property S-in-the-absence-of-antidotes. Crucially, we should 
note that Bird's elimination strategy for finks and antidotes does not give the same system as that 
of his simple essentialism, despite possible initial impressions.  
 
The issue can be clearly made by distinguishing between two senses in which one could eliminate 
antidotes. The first is to say that antidotes do not exist in the way that one might say that witches 
do not exist. That is, we deny the membership of antidotes into the fundamental level of the actual 
world. A second strategy is to say that antidotes do not exist in a certain way, but that they still 
exist in another way. The second sense of 'elimination' is what Bird goes for.  Bird eliminates not 
antidotes, but potencies that are sensitive to antidotes in favor of potencies that are antidote-free. 
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It is crucial for my argument that this is different to what we might call the elimination of antidotes 
proper, i.e. the first route. Indeed, when we consider what being an antidote-free potency consists 
in, we will see that Bird's elimination strategy is curiously named twice over. First, antidotes are 
not eliminated. And second, potencies are still sensitive to antidotes (although in a different way).  
 
To see how this works, we need to go back to the discussion of antidotes in Lewis (1997) and Choi 
(2003; 2006). (Manley and Wasserman (2011) provide a wide-ranging discussion of the 
conditional analysis literature.) If we consider Bird's medical antidote as a putative counterexample 
to the simple conditional analysis, there are two strategies (amongst others) that its defenders could 
take so as to preserve the left–right direction. One is to deny the counterexample outright, i.e. to 
deny that there are the kind of medical antidotes under discussion, such that, a fortiori, death by 
ingestion cannot be prevented by medical antidotes. That looks rather dogmatic, given that there 
is nothing flashy about the counterexample. In addition, it is to invite further counterexamples, 
since this strategy would have to be upheld across all putative antidotes. What is worse, however, 
is that even if all of the candidate examples of antidotes in the empirical world were somehow 
denied, Bird could then move on to merely possible cases of antidotes, such as the physicist-
sorcerer, who prevents the breaking of a vase by administering shockwaves that cancel out the 
vibrations that would otherwise lead to fracture lines. (I should note that Gundersen (2002, p.401) 
takes issue with this "modalised-masking", i.e. he takes issue with the idea that a workable 
counterexample to the conditional analysis need only show that there is some possible world in 
which the disposition obtains the stimulus but that the manifestation does not occur (see also 
Gundersen 2004). Nevertheless, denying that antidotes exist is one way of saving the simple 
conditional analysis. On this type of elimination, we deny that (i) there are antidotes, such that (ii) 
if the stimulus property and the disposition property are co-instantiated, then there is always a 





Bird: (CA) is false because there are cases of D and S being co-instantiated but where M is 
not produced. This can be so even for a deterministic disposition, because the antidote A can 
prevent D from producing M.  
 
Defender of (CA): There are no such cases. It is true in all possible worlds that 
D(S,M)x→(Sx□→Mx). Deterministic disposition or otherwise, there are no A-like entities to 
prevent the production of M.  
 
The strategy of Lewis and Choi, however, is to build the absence of the antidote into the stimulus 
property of the disposition. According to Lewis' two-step approach to the conditional analysis, we 
firstly analyse a covert disposition term into an overt disposition term (by specifying its stimulus 
and manifestation), before analysing the overt disposition term by way of some kind of 
counterfactual or subjunctive conditional. Importantly, both of these steps can be simple or 
complex, and the elimination strategy at hand involves rejecting the first step as a simple analysis. 
So, in the case of fragility, we could have as a simple analysis 'the disposition to break when struck' 
or the complex analysis 'the disposition to break when struck in the absence of the physicist-
sorcerer [and perhaps also all other antidotes]'. (Below I will provide a more detailed discussion 
of these steps and how they are related to Bird's system.) 
 
What is interesting about this strategy is that it achieves two things. Firstly, we do not deny the 
existence of the antidote (the physicist-sorcerer can still exist). And secondly, we do not deny that 
there can be exceptions to the co-instantiation of properties D and S and the production of M. But 
it is not the case that the physicist-sorcerer prevents the manifestation of breaking in response to 
the vase's being struck. And this is because the vase never was disposed to break when struck, but 
rather it was disposed to break when struck in the absence of the physicist-sorcerer. In terms of 
Bird's ontology, what this means is that the stimulus property of the disposition is no longer a 
simple property (i.e. the stimulus property proper, S), but rather a complex property where the first 
property is the stimulus property proper, S, and the second property is the absence of possible 





Importantly, on this strategy antidotes will still have an explanatory role. Their absences now 
feature as 'causes' for the triggering of dispositions. And interestingly, present or obtaining 
antidotes can still prevent the manifestation of a disposition in some sense of this term. For 
consider the case where x is disposed to M if S, but where antidote A is present. In this situation 
the complex stimulus property will not be satisfied (although the object is stimulated the antidote 
is not absent), and so the disposition will not manifest. So we have a kind of prevention by denial 
of stimulus condition. These two understandings of prevention are given below.  
 
Prevention 1:  
 
An object has a disposition that has a simple stimulus. This simple stimulus obtains but its 
manifestation does not occur due to prevention by some antidote.  
 
Prevention 2:  
 
An object has a disposition that has a complex stimulus. This complex stimulus does not 
obtain, though the disposition obtains its stimulus property proper. The failure of its complex 
stimulus to be satisfied via the presence of the antidote (which is required to be absent) 
prevents the production of the manifestation by preventing its being triggered.   
 
To see the importance of this, let's go back to Bird's scheme of a fundamental antidote. It is a 
condition, A, such that x has D(S,M) and x is S, but M does not occur. Note that D(S,M) is a 'standard' 
dispositional property, with a simple stimulus property (i.e. its stimulus condition is just its 
stimulus property proper, plus some object-sensitivity). We have the following type of state of 
affairs. I place the antidote on a different object to avoid the issue of intrinsic antidotes. 
 
(i) Dx & Sx, Ay 
 
Because D is a standard dispositional property, we are here understanding A as preventing the 
manifestation M in line with Prevention 1. Everything is right for the production of M, but M does 
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not occur, hence the status of A as a counterexample to the simple conditional analysis. In contrast, 
where A is absent (and where we are ignoring finks), M will be produced if x is S and D.  
 
(ii) Dx & (S&~A)x & Mx  
 
We can think of (i) and (ii) as two different forms of complex states of affairs (as they contain 
different types of properties, and also a different number of objects) that we want to model if we 
not simply denying the existence of antidotes and the exceptions to regularity that they give rise 
to (as we might deny the existence of witches). In the case of (i), although D and S are co-
instantiated, M is not produced (due to A). And in the case of (ii), D and S are co-instantiated and 
A is absent, so M is produced (and M is produced partly because A is absent).    
 
The significance of this is as follows. The elimination strategy that Bird sets out is not what it may 
appear to be. When Bird says that he is denying that there are ceteris paribus regularities and 
antidotes at the fundamental level, we might have thought that he is taking the hypothetical stance 
above. That is to say, we might have thought that he thinks there is the following kind of 
exceptionless regularity: For any object, x, if x has D and S, then x has M. And this because, quite 
bluntly, there are no antidotes. But that is dogmatic and non-empirical. Perhaps nature is like that, 
but Bird does not want to be hostage to that fortune. Instead, antidotes are eliminated in such a 
way that the exceptions to the regularities that they are associated with are still accepted. And this, 
of course, is because the absence of the antidote is now a requirement of the production of the 
manifestation. Hence, where the antidote is present, the manifestation will not fire, feigning (i) 
above; and where the antidote is absent the manifestation will fire, since the dispositional property 
now has attained its complex stimulus property, (ii) above. That is why Lewis and Choi's strategy 
for antidotes is quite clever: it preserves the appearances (empirical cases of D&S&A but not-M), 
but alters the analysis such that D&S does not give the triggering of the manifestation (which is 
really D&(S-without-A)). This can be disguised by lumping together simple and complex stimulus 
properties under the term 'stimulus'. In effect, the counterexample of antidotes works by using the 
stimulus property proper as the stimulus condition qua antecedent of the conditional; the 
elimination response is to expand the 'stimulus' to require the absence of the antidote (and this is 




3.4 How do Bird's two strategies stand to the conditional analysis? 
 
In this section of the chapter I want to try and get a clearer picture of Bird's ceteris paribus and 
elimination strategies. As we shall see, there are problematic aspects to both strategies. 
 
A profitable way to understand what is going on here is to look at Bird's approach towards the two 
steps of Lewis' conditional analysis. The first of these steps involves the translation of a covert 
disposition predicate into an overt disposition predicate, the latter of which has an explicit stimulus 
and manifestation pair. This can be done in a 'simple' or 'complex' manner. According to the simple 
manner, 'fragility' would translate into the disposition to 'break when struck'. According to the 
complex manner, however, 'fragility' might be translated into the disposition to 'break when struck 
in the absence of possible antidotes'. Note that this is Lewis' (1997) and Choi's (2003) strategy for 
dealing with antidotes as a counterexample to the conditional analysis. The second step of the 
conditional analysis, Lewis explains, involves choosing a certain counterfactual or subjunctive 
conditional for the overt dispositional predicate. This too can have a simple and a complex 
procedure. The simple case would involve the antecedent of the conditional referring to the 
stimulus predicate/property, which is fixed in the first step above, as well as specifying the object-
requirements of that predicate/property. In the default case, this is the same object-variable as the 
object-variable that is used for the disposition. Hence, where x has the disposition, the antecedent 
of the conditional is 'Sx'. A similar setup is used for the consequent of the conditional. As is well 
known, however, Lewis' complex subjunctive conditional breaks away from this route and adds 
the requirement of the continued existence of the causal basis of the disposition etc. so as to bypass 
the problem of reverse-finks. Thinking more generally about Lewis' distinction between these two 
steps, there are other types of complication that we can use for the subjunctive conditional whereby 
the second step of the conditional analysis is complex.   
 
First Step: a covert disposition is translated into an overt disposition. 




Unsurprisingly, given Bird's model of potencies, his two main theses (DEp) and (CA□) directly 
correspond to these two steps.  
 
(DEp)  □(Px→D(SM)x) [like the first step] 
(CA□)  □(D(SM)x→(Sx□→Mx)) [like the second step] 
 
First consider the left–right direction of (DEp). Bird uses this entailment to move from a certain 
object instantiating a certain potency (where the latter is a fundamental property with a 
dispositional essence) to the same object having a certain disposition. This reveals Bird's model of 
dispositional essences as using a stimulus-manifestation model of dispositions. As I suggested in 
Chapter 2, we can read this thesis as fixing the stimulus property and manifestation property of a 
potency, once we fix upon a given potency. So construed, there is a close connection to Lewis' 
first step, since that involves moving from a covert disposition to an overt disposition with a 
stimulus and manifestation pair. Now consider the left–right direction of (CA□). This entailment 
also mirrors what is going on in Lewis' second step, since we are associating a certain disposition 
(that has its stimulus and manifestation specified) with a certain subjunctive conditional.  
 
Let us term Bird's ceteris paribus strategy his 'CP model' and his elimination strategy his 'E model'. 
What is interesting is that Bird's CP model and E model use opposite combinations of simple steps 
and complex steps for (DEp) and (CA□). Given that these two thesis correspond to Lewis' two steps, 







(simple DEp)  □(Px→D(SM)x) 
(simple CA□)  □(D(SM)x→(Sx□→Mx)) 
 
CP Model:  
 
(simple DEp)  □(Px→D(S,M)x) 




(complex DEp)  □(Px→D(S-absence-A,M)x) 
(simple CA□)  □(D(S-absence-A,M)x→(S-absence-Ax□→Mx)) 
 
Let us start with the CP model. Bird's CP model involves adding a requirement to the subjunctive 
conditional that Cx is the case, where C is thought to be a condition that excludes antidotes. The 
overall idea is that Bird wants to make his potencies sensitive to antidotes and finks. As we have 
noted, simple essentialism is dogmatic, and so we have to find a way to explain why, for example, 
water does not boil at 100°C. In the view at hand, C might be a condition that excludes non-
standard atmospheric pressures (amongst other things). But the following is very important. Unlike 
the E model (see below), Bird has not argued for any change to the specification of the stimulus 
or manifestation of his potencies. Because of this, (DEp) is simple but (CA□) is revised, i.e. 
complex. This corresponds to Lewis' complex second step, where we connect a certain overt 
disposition to a certain complex counterfactual/subjunctive. Importantly, in contrast to the 
subjunctive conditionals of Bird's simple essentialism, we are now using a conjunctive or complex 
antecedent (where Cx is the new conjunct).  
 
Moving on to the E-model, we have the same form of subjunctive conditional as we have for Bird's 
simple essentialism. That is to say, the antecedent is simple. But Bird has now changed the form 
of the stimulus property from S to S-absence-A (or, more precisely, to S in the absence of all 
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possible antidotes: I shall often omit this complication). This directly corresponds to Lewis' and 
Choi's strategy for dealing with antidotes. Note that the E Model has changes (in bold) to both 
(DEp) and (CA□), but this is only because the change to the former is 'carried through' to the latter. 
Getting these relationships clear puts us in a better place for understanding Bird's strategies for 
dealing with antidotes and the problems that they might face.  
 
3.5 Further discussion on the ceteris paribus strategy 
 
With this in mind, let us return once more to the ceteris paribus strategy. At a point in his book 
(2007, pp.36–8) where ceteris paribus laws and antidotes are discussed within the context of the 
conditional analysis, Bird provides a discussion of the model of subjunctive conditional that he 
will use for his CP strategy (i.e. complex CA□). Bird explains how finding a function from a 
disposition to its conditions that exclude antidotes is difficult, and at the time of writing has not 
been solved. What we want to avoid is just saying that C is the conditions where the disposition 
does not manifest, as this might involve triviality (which is important to avoid for a conceptual 
analysis of dispositions). But now this strategy is being used as an ontological thesis, i.e. as a 
'general truth' such that a dispositional property entails a certain subjunctive conditional. I say this 
because Bird has already said that (CA□) is "metaphysically necessary" (2005, p.355); so it is 
reasonable to assume that the refined version for the CP strategy should also be metaphysically 
necessary. 
 
I think Bird's problem for the function is connected to my original worry that Bird does not have 
an ontological category of antidotes nor a forthcoming metaphysical analysis of what it means to 
be an antidote. For these reasons, he does not have a way of moving from a given potency to the 
ontological import of C in Cx. Just as in the context of the conditional analysis Cx may be trivial 
without the required function, in Bird's theory of laws, since Cx is doing work (it is used to explain 
why a potency does or does not manifest), without some understanding of what antidotes are and 





One way to bring out this issue is as follows. Despite the issue of object-sensitivity that I noted in 
the last chapter, there is a 'good connection' between the ontological resources of Bird's theory and 
his simple essentialism. What I have in mind is that the ontological resources of Bird's theory are 
exhausted by objects and (to take his preferred view) Platonic universals. But, correspondingly, 
Bird's two central theses—(DEp) and (CA□)—only refer to object variables and constants for 
universals. So when we make the theory 'critical' for the purposes of interference and prevention, 
we can see that both of Bird's strategies introduce new kinds of beings—'C' in the CP model and 
'S-absence-A' in the E model. Hence the problem of a possible lack of ontological representation. 
In both cases, we can investigate whether or not these kinds of beings can be understood in terms 
of properties. With regard to the CP model—our current concern—we are now going to see if we 
can provide a function from a given potency to its antidotes.      
 
A first point is that what we want Cx to exclude in a property-based metaphysics of laws is the 
manifestation property of what we can call an 'antidote-property'. Consider the example of the 
moderating boron rod (Mellor 1974; Bird 1998). It is plausible that the boron rod has some 
property—'made of boron', let us say—that explains why it can prevent the nuclear pile from 
blowing up. Indeed, I presume that boron is good at absorbing radiation. That said, it cannot be 
the mere presence of an antidote object (with its relevant properties) that is sufficient for prevention, 
since the first antidote may be subject to another, i.e. there may be double prevention. Because of 
this, it seems that what we want to be absent is the manifestation of the property 'made of boron'. 
A simple model would have the manifestation be the proxy property 'absorption'. To clarify, I 
suggest that antidotes should be seen to prevent on the basis of their properties, and that it looks 
plausible that it is the manifestations of these properties that are important. So far, then, we have 
the following idea.  
 
Antidote property: A is disposed to M1 if S*  
Antidote-sensitive property: D is disposed to M if S; D is 'sensitive' to M1. 
 
So the idea is that the C conditions for the antidote-sensitive property, D, should be capturing M1. 
Given Bird's dispositional monism, M1 is of course a potency (Note in the above I term the stimulus 
for the antidote property, in this case boron, as S*. This is to remain neutral on whether or not the 
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antidote property can have the same stimulus property as the antidote-sensitive property, i.e. D. 
We of course have to provide 'boron' with some kind of stimulus and manifestation, since Bird's 
view is that all properties fall under the stimulus–manifestation model).  
 
That said, it will be useful to have a backup position: perhaps it is just certain properties that we 
want to exclude, which we will call the 'antidote properties'. But I think that both suggestions are 
an improvement on Bird's model of a possible fundamental antidote, which approaches these 
entities as 'conditions'. That, I think, is a non-starter for the ontology of Bird's dispositional monism, 
since it only has objects and properties/relations at its disposal. As such, my charge of a poor 
ontological representation of antidotes could be easily made. 
 
For the default case of object-sensitivity where M1 is required to be absent from the potency-object 
(i.e. where we want to stop the object that bears the potency from being co-instantiated with M1), 
we can suggest the scheme below.  
 
CP Model:  
 
(simple DEp) □(Px→D(S,M)x) 
(complex CA□) □(D(S,M)x→(Sx&Cx□→Mx))  
 
Cx = it is not the case that M1x 
 
This is the starting point of my repair to Bird's CP model. The next step is to link up the antidote-
sensitive potency, D, to M1. Here I suggest, building on the material in Chapter 2, that we can use 
a reconfigured SM-relation. The idea is that the relation now has an extra place for the 
manifestation of the antidote property that we want to exclude. I call it a 'DSAM-relation'. All it 
does is to give a function from a given place on the relation to its other places (hence, if we fix its 
third relatum, say, then we fix a determinate universal that stands in, say, the second place). Here 
is a simple case where there is one antidote. (I envisage that further places would be needed for 






Note that P1–P4 are potencies in this ordered relation. The proposal is that this DSAM-relation 
links a potency to a stimulus property, antidote-manifestation, and manifestation. At this point I 
raise the issue that although we have provided a function from a potency to its possible antidote(s), 
we have not explained the content of Cx. This is important, because Cx prima facie involves 
negatives or absences. (I am grateful to Matthew Tugby for discussion on this matter.) Given my 
work in chapter 2, where I argue that (CA□) is doing some important work of fixing object-
sensitivity, I can adapt Bird's complex second step in his CP model (i.e. the complex subjunctive 
conditional) so that it has the following form: 'If it is the case that x is _ and not the case that x is 
_, then it will be the case that x is _'. Using the same diagrams as before, we can show this scheme 
as follows. Blow it, I show Bird's original CP model for reference.  
 
Modified CP Model: 
 
DSAM-relation [D,_,_,_] 
(DEp [now complex])    □(Px→D(_,_,_)x) 
(CA□[now complex in a different way])   □(D(_,_,_)x→(_x & ~_x □→ _x)) 
 
Original CP Model:  
 
DSM-relation [D,_,_] 
(simple DEp)     □(Px→D(_,_)x) 
(complex CA□)     □(D(_,_)x→(_x&Cx□→_x)) 
 
The first line shows Bird's modified DSM-relation, with a place added for the manifestation of an 
antidote-property (e.g. 'absorbs' for 'made of boron'). This is the DSAM-relation. Given that I 
suggested that (DEp) is closely connected to Bird's graph theory, we now have a different general 
model of a disposition. For one antidote, dispositional properties are now 'three-place operators', 
with a stimulus property, antidote-manifestation, and regular manifestation. This is shown in the 
second line, where we have a replacement for (DEp). And lastly, we have my version of Bird's 
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complex subjunctive conditional. I have changed the form of this proposition so that it has a ready 
built place for the antidote-manifestation. The motivation for this is that we can avoid having a 
'material absence'. Here the idea is that the antidote manifestation will be a positive property that 
the form of the subjunctive conditional requires not to be the case. I further discuss the relevance 
of material absences below. 
 
As with the discussion of Coulomb's law, I am arguing that different types of dispositional 
properties will have different requirements for their subjunctive conditionals. In the case of 
antidote-sensitive properties, Bird has already committed himself to the idea that we can have a 
complex antecedent, where the second conjunct excludes antidotes. Chapter 2 argues that there is 
something going on with subjunctive conditionals that is not provided for in the constitution 
relations of dispositional properties (namely, object-sensitivity). My response is to say that Bird 
needs to take as primitive that his potencies are connected to different forms of subjunctive 
conditional. The subjunctive conditional will have different possible forms, and these will be filled 
with properties by the graph theory. I think all of this gives a suggestion for dealing with Bird's 
problem of the 'Cx function' and its ontological representation. Here is the same type of scheme as 
above but with some property constants. 
  
Modified CP Model: 
 
DSAM-relation [D,S,M1,M] 
(DEp [now complex])    □(Px→D(S,M1,M)x) 
(CA□[now complex in a different way])   □(D(S,M1,M)x→(Sx & ~M
1x □→ Mx)) 
  
This could be used for where we want to exclude M1 from the same object that instantiates D. With 
regard to antidote-manifestations that need to be excluded from other objects that are spatially 
related to the potency object, we can combine the above suggestion, i.e. the DSAM-relation, with 
the suggestion of the previous chapter that is focused on Coulomb's law. Let us call this a 
'DSARM-relation'. It has the following places: disposition, stimulus, antidote-manifestation, 
relation, manifestation]. I show two lines below for how this relation would plug properties into a 




 (CA□) (D(S_,_,_,_)x→(_x & ~_y & x_y □→ _x)) 
 (CA□) (D(S,M1,R,M)x→(Sx & ~M
1y & xRy □→ Mx)) 
 
I should summarise our discussion so far. We are currently investigating Bird's ceteris paribus 
strategy for antidotes. Crucially, this strategy involves saying that the subjunctive conditional that 
is associated with a given potency is complex, in the sense that it has a conjunctive antecedent. In 
this antecedent, Bird postulates a condition, Cx, which is thought to exclude finks and antidotes. 
In our discussion we have only looked at antidotes (given that Bird argues, decisively I believe, 
against the existence of finks at the fundamental level). But there is a problem of ontological 
representation, which Bird himself alluded to in his discussion of the conditional analysis. It is this: 
how can we provide a function from a given disposition predicate to its set of all possible antidotes? 
Well, I am not sure how we could do that in the context of a conceptual analysis of dispositions, 
but I do think that a sensible modification to Bird's view re the ontological correlate of this problem 
is to alter Bird's graph theoretic resources. We have now answered the question of what antidotes 
are: they might either be the manifestations of regular potencies, where the latter are now identified 
as antidotes, or otherwise they might just be sets of potencies (where these masking potencies 
come from, as it were, would be of no relevance). This is my suggestion for the ontological 
representation of 'conditions' in Bird's ontology. But the prices seem quite high. Firstly, we need 
to modify the graph theoretic resources. And secondly, we need lots of different versions of (CA□), 
understood as metaphysically necessary truths. As far as I can tell, there is no way to move from 
a given potency standing in certain second-order relations to the precise subjunctive conditional 
that this strategy requires. So it will have to be taken as primitive that, for example, that DSARM-
relation above matches up with the subjunctive conditional in question. (In a way, this issue is 
encroaching upon Barker and Smart's (2011) complaint that dispositional essentialism faces an 
'explanatory gap'. We discuss this in Chapter 7.) I note that Bird appears to require both of these 
general types of modification anyway, given our discussion in the last chapter concerning object-
sensitivity. And finally, it is interesting to see that Bird would need to provide a truthmaker for the 





3.6 Further discussion on the elimination strategy 
 
I want to briefly move back to Bird's elimination strategy, or E model. Let us recall the difference 
between Bird's CP model and his E model re Lewis' first and second steps. In particular, the E 
model uses a simple second step (so the subjunctive has a simple antecedent, just like Bird's simple 
essentialism), but it uses a complex first step, such that the stimulus property is now 'S in the 
absence of A'. At this point, we can note that there are several possible understandings of the term 
'stimulus' that might surround Bird's system.  
 
 
(1) The stimulus property, taken as a monadic universal (i.e. 'S') 
(2) The stimulus condition, which can be many things. For example, we can have a monadic 
universal with a specific object variable (e.g. Sx). Or we could have the stimulus condition of 
the CP strategy (e.g. Sx&Cx). A more complex combination would be, for instance, 'SxCy'.  
(3) The antecedent of a subjunctive conditional, which can be many things. 
(4) A stimulus property, taken as some kind of complex universal. 
 





(complex DEp)  □(Px→D(S-absence-A,M)x) 
(simple CA□)  □(D(S-absence-A,M)x→S-absence-Ax□→Mx) 
 
The bolded text is showing that Bird has modified his graph theory resources. So we now have a 
different kind of modification to the CP model. In the E model we are basically changing 'what it 
is to be' a stimulus property. This is different to the (original) CP model because in that case the 
graph theory resources were left untouched, but Bird added a clause to the subjunctive conditional. 
(To avoid confusion here I should reiterate that in my discussion of Bird's CP model I suggested 
that he should modify the graph-theory resources to provide a function from a potency to its 
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antidotes; I also suggested further changes to the form of the subjunctive conditional.) Interestingly, 
however, the elimination model raises two problems. First, as I argued above, we still have 
antidotes in the system. We can clearly see this because the complex property 'S in the absence of 
all possible antidotes' is bearing some type of relation to antidotes. This is our problem of what 
antidotes are for an ontology of objects and potencies. But the E model also raises a new problem, 
which is the metaphysical status of the new understanding of stimulus properties. How do these 
entities, which involve both absences and antidotes, fit in with Bird's idea that the identity of 
potencies is to be structurally determined by a network of SM-relations?   
 
Here we might introduce a fork for Bird. Either the property 'S-absence-A' is a simple property 
(option (1) above) or it is a complex property (option (4) above). If we go down the first route, 
then the predicate 'S-in-the-absence-of-A' refers just to the monadic universal, 'S', and 'in the 
absence of A' just means that the possible antidotes do not exist, or otherwise that the possible 
antidotes are not suitably related to the potency. That is to say, the second part of the predicate is 
not really a property name but rather a description of either the state of the graph theory network 
or otherwise the state of the circumstances of the potency object x. So the idea would be that the 
predicate 'S-absence-A' is referring to (i) the standard stimulus properties of Bird's simple 
essentialism and his (original) CP model, on the one hand, as well as (ii) capturing, somehow, the 
fact that there are no antidotes that are relevant to the potency of which S is playing the stimulus 
role. The central problem with this approach, however, is that it not clear how it is any different to 
the original CP model, since, as we have discussed, Bird's (original) CP model is basically the idea 
that we do not have to meddle with the objects and properties of Bird's system but that we can 
nevertheless have a clause that makes potencies sensitive to antidotes. So if this were Bird's 
approach, then his E model would use a simple (DEp) with a complex (CA□), pace the schemes 
above.  
 
Instead, I think that if Bird wants a distinctive E model then he has to follow the second route 
above and say that 'S-absence-A' is a complex property. But it is quite mysterious what this 
complex property would be. I can think of two possible strategies. Firstly, we could say that in 
Bird's graph theory network we keep the standard DSM-relation, but suggest that the middle place 
of this relation accepts a conjunction of universals, namely S and not-A. (There would be two 
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properties in the simple case where there is a single antidote, but perhaps the conjunction would 
be infinite if there are infinite antidotes that can 'attack' the potency.) Then the DSM-relation can 
'plug' properties into the subjunctive conditional in the way that we envisaged in this chapter and 
the last, except that the (simple) antecedent of the conditional would receive both S and not-A. 
The second strategy would be that we forgo negative universals and understand antidotes in terms 
of the constitution relation. So on this view, we would need to say that the DSM-relation is replaced 
by a DSAM-relation, where we have a place for the potency of interest, the stimulus property, the 
antidote, and the manifestation. But here is the problem. We cannot understand the absence of the 
antidote, which on this way of thinking is the property that stands in the 'A' place of the four-place 
relation, in terms of the subjunctive conditional requiring the inserted property to be absent. This 
is how it was with the modified CP model that I presented above. Instead, as we know by my 
labouring this point, the E model is building the antidote sensitivity into the stimulus property 
itself, whatever that might mean. With this in mind, the subjunctive of the E model has to have the 
basic form 'If P were the case, then Q would be the case', where there is a subjunctive sufficiency 
from the antecedent to the consequent. Now, if we are not building the absence of the antidote into 
the subjunctive conditional, nor accepting genuine negative properties, the only remaining 
resource, as far as I can see, is to understand the 'absence' aspect of 'in the absence of A' as arising 
though the DSAM-relation. So the view now is that it is somehow built into this constitution 
relation that the antidote property (which is really just a garden-variety potency, we should 
remember) is required to be absent. But I do not know how such a proposal would proceed.   
 
3.7 Active and passive conceptions of antidotes 
 
A curiosity that emerged in our discussion of Bird's treatment of antidotes is that these entities 
receive a distinctively passive construal; in short, they are not construed as causal entities whose 
'effective operation' is one of prevention, but rather as components of a condition of exclusion (his 
CP model) or otherwise shadow-like attenuations of potencies (his E model). This may look 
inappropriate for a system of dispositional monism, where we might have required that antidotes, 
if they are not to be genuinely eliminated, should at least be modelled as a type of causal agent, if 
not directly construed as regular potency-bearing objects. (I am grateful to Matthew Tugby for 
discussion on this topic.) Taking this idea as a starting point, at this final stage of the chapter I set 
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out some active understandings of antidote-prevention, and contrast these with Bird's approaches. 
I think it is clear from the outset that we are interested in properties here as oppose to objects: 
dispositional monism, as with the other major positions in the properties and laws debate, is a 
property-driven metaphysics.  
 
Beginning with the active construal of antidote-properties, a central distinction is whether or not 
we would like to buy into a basic or primitive operation of prevention. To introduce this idea, we 
can consider the following. One way of thinking about Bird's potencies is that they have a certain 
manifestation action: in response to the suitable obtaining of the stimulus property, the 
manifestation property is produced. To be sure, as we move between different theories of 
dispositional properties, the nature of the manifestation operation will vary. With regard to Bird's 
theory, the manifestation operation has two central formal characteristics: (i) at least in the case of 
sure-fire potencies, the relationship between the stimulus condition and the manifestation property 
is one of subjunctive sufficiency; (ii) the operation of production is conceived by Bird, 
interestingly, as that of 'concretising' a state of affairs, or, more specifically, as 'making concrete' 
a 'contingently abstract' manifestation circumstance (Bird 2007, p.114). I think this raises the 
question of whether there could be another operation, one of prevention. According to this view, 
a given antidote, e.g. a moderating boron rod, would be an object that has a certain property—let's 
say, for simplicity, being 'made of boron'; and this property would prevent the nuclear pile from 
chain-reacting in virtue of its basic operation of prevention. Taking properties to have a dedicated 
prevention operation raises a sub-question. Might we have dispositional properties, perhaps all of 
them or a certain number, with both of these operations, i.e. with both a manifestation operation 
and a prevention operation? Or might the view be that there are dedicated antidote-properties that 
uniquely have the prevention operation? Martin (2007, p.29) appears to hold the first view, when 
he says that "a disposition line is what the disposition is for, what it is not for, and what it is 
prohibitive against with alternative actual or nonactual reciprocal disposition partners"; as far as I 
know, the second view has not been upheld.  
 
A second understanding of active antidote-properties seeks to understand these entities using only 
the manifestation operation of a dispositional property. In the case of Bird's dispositional monism, 
the idea would be that some antidote-property just is a standard potency, with a stimulus condition 
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and manifestation circumstance. The key distinction between this second view and the first, of 
course, is that we are no longer thinking about a dedicated prevention operation. In contrast, the 
idea at hand is that antidote-properties just are potencies, and hence we need to find a way to 
understand their putative operation of prevention in terms of the manifestation operation of garden-
variety potencies. (As we shall discuss in Chapter 4, Mumford and Anjum hold a view like this, 
whereby interference and prevention are understood in terms of the 'operation' of powers.)  
 
Whilst there may be further possible models of active antidote-properties, in this chapter I have 
outlined what I take to be the two central understandings. My choice of these two models is 
motivated by the idea that, effectively, Bird could either accept or reject a dedicated prevention 
operation. If he accepts such a dedicated prevention operation, then we would expect his actual 
treatment of antidotes to be replaced by this new machinery. (I should note that Schrenk (2011) 
has outlined several schemes for understanding interference and prevention within the context of 
Armstrong's system that are related to the two schemes above.) On the other hand, if Bird rejects 
the basic prevention operation but still seeks some active construal of antidotes, then the most 
natural idea would be to understand antidotes in terms of potencies, that is to say, to understand 
the putative prevention operation of boron rods and the like in terms of the manifestation operation 
of potencies. So too would this hypothetical decision involve replacing his actual treatments of 
antidotes.  
 
I'd now like to move on and explain why Bird's actual treatment of antidote-properties uses a 
passive metaphysics of prevention. At this point we can define an active-passive distinction, which 
up until now has been assumed as intuitive. When we consider the two active strategies considered 
above, we can see that they both construe the 'efficacy' of prevention, as it were, as the outcome 
of some operation. In both cases, where we have a token case of prevention, it will have occurred 
in virtue of the operation at hand. With the first active model, we considered the prevention 
operation to be basic; whereas, with the second model, we envisaged that the prevention operation 
would be collapsed into the manifestation operation of regular potencies. In either case, it is the 
execution of some operation that is doing the preventative work. With regard to Bird's treatments, 
however, antidote-properties enter the picture either as the content of some exclusionary condition, 
or otherwise as the stimulus property itself, suitably reconfigured of course. I think this shows a 
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key difference that we can exploit for our distinction. In both of Bird's cases, as well as my 
modification, the antidote-property is not causally operative, but only “causally relevant”. (This is 
a turn of phrase that Ellis (2001, pp.135–8) uses to defend categorical relations, e.g. spatial 
relations, in the context of his scientific essentialism, a property dualism for dispositional 
essentialism). In short, on the passive conception, antidote-properties are not 'doing' anything qua 
operation, though their instantiation is nevertheless relevant to whether or not the potency that is 
connected to these entities is able to manifest. I think this is a useful way of understanding an 
active-passive distinction for the metaphysics of prevention (at least with regard to dispositional 
properties).  
 
Let's now take another look at Bird's treatment of antidotes with our distinction in mind. I'll 
concentrate upon the ceteris paribus strategy, which looks to be the stronger of the two strategies. 
We noted in our earlier discussion that Bird does not explicitly focus upon antidote-properties as 
oppose to antidotes (construed as objects). I said that this was important, because antidotes are 
prima facie propertied-objects. Nevertheless, Bird recognises the problem of specifying a function 
from the potency to its possible antidotes, whatever their specific construal. I suggested that we 
can solve Bird's issue by reconfiguring the DSM-relation into a higher-place relation that 
designates a set of potencies as the possible antidote-properties of the potency of interest. In 
summary, antidotes are now being thought of as potencies that are connected to the potency of 
interest in a similar way that the stimulus property is. A crucial difference, however, is that it is 
the absence of the antidote-properties that is required in the antecedent of the subjunctive 
conditional.  
 
This set up is obviously different to our active models of antidote-properties, which I canvassed 
above. I think the most important difference is as follows. If we consider the requirements of Bird's 
dispositional monism, where all potencies fall under a stimulus-manifestation model, we can see 
that the antidote-properties are themselves potencies. Indeed, the approach of reconfiguring Bird's 
graph theory resources presupposes this arrangement. So construed, however, in direct contrast to 
the active models (both of them), the manifestations of the antidote-properties are not connected 
in any obvious way with the potency of interest. This point is easy to see with an example. If we 
think of Bird's nuclear pile, the idea is that the nuclear pile has the disposition to chain react in 
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response to, say, too much water evaporating away (Bird 2007, p.32). Suppose, then, that too much 
water has boiled away, but that the moderating boron rod is in place. We suggested earlier that it 
is the properties of the boron rod that are responsible for its preventative role, and a simplified 
construal is that being made of boron will be of primary relevance. Taken together, then, a simple 
model is that the nuclear pile is an object that has a dispositional property to chain-react in response 
to too much water evaporating. However, there is an antidote-property to this disposition: being 
made of boron. I suggest that Bird's ceteris paribus strategy can be approached as saying that the 
obtaining of the stimulus property (water evaporation) and the non-obtaining of the antidote 
property (being made of boron) is subjunctively sufficient for the manifestation to chain-react. But 
now consider the property being made of boron. Given dispositional monism, it has its own 
DSAM-relation, which may or may not concern the properties of 'water evaporation' and 'chain 
reacting'. That is, according to our model so far, the antidote-property's absence is needed for the 
potency of interest to manifest, but the antidote-property's own stimulus and manifestation have 
no immediate connection to this act of prevention nor to the stimulus property and manifestation 
property of the potency of interest.  
 
One reason why this is perhaps troubling is that the antidote examples in the conditional analysis 
literature often trade on the antidote's causal profile. With the case of the boron rod, it is its 
absorption of radiation that will be cited in explanations of how it prevents the nuclear pile from 
chain-reacting. Another example of an antidote that is introduced using its causal profile is Bird's 
medical antidote, which can be thought of as frustrating the causal chain that leads from a poison's 
stimulus to its manifestation. There are quite a lot of complications here, but one discernible worry 
is that Bird's passive treatment of antidotes has ended up quite far removed from some of his 
original examples. To clarify, on the treatment at hand potencies are sensitive to antidote-
properties simply in so far as these entities are required to be absent; there is no mention of the 
causal profiles of antidote-properties, i.e. their stimulus-manifestation profiles. This is what I was 
attempting to capture in saying that the passive approach to prevention denies any role for the 
operation of the antidote-property: in short, its manifestation (e.g. absorption) has nothing to do 




In light of our discussion of active and passive approaches to prevention, we can state again a 
modification to the DSAM-relation, i.e. to my suggestion for Bird's ceteris paribus strategy for 
antidotes. Perhaps it should be the manifestation of the antidote-property that is required to be 
absent from the proximity of the potency of interest, not the antidote-property itself. Quite aside 
from Bird's dispositional monism, I think there may be a good theoretical reason for saying this. 
This is that we can have cases of double prevention, such that a preventer is prevented from 
preventing (e.g. Mumford and Anjum 2009). Staying with our simplified case of the nuclear pile, 
if we were to have a second antidote, one that worked on the boron rod, such that it could no longer 
absorb the radiation, then we might think that the chain reaction could occur despite the presence 
of the boron rod, since it would now be ineffective in absorbing radiation. Because of this, we may 
think that it is the absorption of the boron rod that has to be absent, so to speak, not the boron rod 
itself. In this way, we would expect a better link between the explanation of antidote-prevention 
in the conditional analysis literature and our model of antidote-sensitive potencies. 
 
I think there is something to this line of thought, but there are two problems that it raises. Both of 
these problems are difficult to evaluate, and I shall not attempt to do so. Nevertheless, I present 
them to the reader as points of interest. A first problem is as follows. By making the manifestation 
of the antidote-property the relata of the DSAM-relation, it is at least the manifestation of the 
antidote-property that is a causal relevance to the potency of interest. But it is still only a causal 
relevance. What has happened now is that, using again the case of the boron rod, it is the 
instantiation of the property of absorption that is required to be absent if the potency of interest 
(i.e. being disposed to chain react, or being critically radioactive) is to manifest. By our active-
passive distinction above, however, this still qualifies as a passive conception. Although it is the 
manifestation of the antidote-property that is important, it is not the execution of the manifestation 
operation of the antidote-property that really prevents anything; rather, the manifestation of the 
antidote-property is merely connected to the potency of interest as a property that has to be absent. 
Whether this is a significant problem or not, I am not sure.  
 
A second point may also be of interest. One objection to the above line of thought is that Bird's 
examples of antidotes are macroscopic, and hence, at the fundamental level with which his 
ontology is interested, we should be careful in thinking that antidotes can have preventative 
81 
 
operations such as absorption and breaking causal chains. Bird himself thinks that the only possible 
fundamental case of an antidote is a 'condition' such that whilst the stimulus of a potency is present 
the manifestation does not occur (Bird 2007, p.63). (Note that Bird thinks this because the idea of 
the antidote frustrating a causal chain, which is drawn upon for a number of macroscopic examples, 
including the medical antidote, can be seen to involve a causally redundant disposition; in short, 
given Bird's single track approach, a chain of dispositions and manifestations will give a number 
of separate little dispositions, not a single big disposition with the first stimulus of the chain as its 
stimulus and the last manifestation of the chain as its manifestation.) It is perhaps interesting to 
note that this suggests a passive construal of antidotes; the term 'conditions' fits well with the 
ceteris paribus strategy fitting antidotes into an exclusionary clause as entities that need to be 


















Our first task in this chapter is to outline Mumford and Anjum's causal dispositionalism. For the 
sake of simplicity, I shall refer to this theory as 'dispositionalism'. In this outline I have chosen to 
divide Mumford and Anjum's dispositionalism into two components. The first component is their 
vector model of causation, which draws upon Lombard's (1986) notion of events and quality 
spaces. This component also includes Mumford and Anjum's adaptation of Martin's (2007) 
conception of powers as mutual manifestation partners. The second component is Mumford and 
Anjum's antecedent strengthening argument. This argument is Mumford and Anjum's main tool in 
their criticism of causal necessitarianism. (Again, for the sake of simplicity I shall refer to their 
target theory as 'necessitarianism'.)  
 
My motivation for dividing Mumford and Anjum's dispositionalism into these two components is 
that whilst they are designed to work cooperatively in the critique of necessitarianism, the 
antecedent strengthening argument trades upon a modal thesis that is independent of the vector 
model of causation. The modal thesis at hand states that it is always possible, at least in principle, 
for a token causal process to be subject to 'additive prevention'. Importantly, the support for this 
modal thesis is not the vector model of causation, but rather a background metaphysics of modality. 
In the next two chapters, I shall argue that this metaphysics of modality does not support the modal 
thesis that the antecedent strengthening argument requires. It follows, I believe, that Mumford and 
Anjum's vector model of causation is in fact neutral between dispositionalism and necessitarianism. 
Given this line of argument, it is useful for my purposes to divide Mumford and Anjum's 




In the second half of this chapter I argue that Mumford and Anjum's antecedent strengthening 
argument cannot be applied to their own vector model of causation. More specifically, I argue that 
there is something self-refuting about the application of additive prevention to complex causes that 
are understood in terms of resultant vectors.  
 
4.2 The vector model of causation 
 
Let us shall begin, therefore, with Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation. Its first aspect 
is a basic ontology. Mumford and Anjum accept a version of pandispositionalism according to 
which all properties are powers. In general, powers are individuated at the type-level by their type 
of manifestation. In line with pandispositionalism, these manifestations are further powers (or 
clusters of further powers). The type–token distinction is understood in terms of Armstrong's (1978) 
immanent realism. So construed, a type of power, P, is thought to be strictly identical to its tokens, 
p1–pn (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.14). A point of importance is that Mumford and Anjum's 
powers are multi-track, such that these entities are individuated at the type-level by their types of 
manifestations. I shall return to this issue below, however, since it is tied in with Mumford and 
Anjum's conception of powers as component vectors.  
 
The second aspect of Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation is their adoption of 
Lombard's notion of events and quality spaces. According to Lombard, events are essentially 
changes. More specifically, events are essentially changes for a 'subject of change' with regard to 
a 'dimension of change'. Let us consider, for example, the ripening of a banana. As the banana 
ripens it changes from green to yellow. Let us also assume that it changes from small to large. In 
this case we would have two Lombardian events. Both of these would be centred on the banana as 
the subject of change, but the first would have colour as its dimension of change whereas the 
second would have size as its dimension of change. According to Lombard's notion, then, a single 
subject of change can undergo different events during the same temporal interval, where these 
different events are distinguished under different dimensions of change. Lombardian events are 
closely connected to quality spaces. According to Lombard, a quality space is a set of mutually 
exclusive properties. These mutually exclusive properties are understood in terms of determinates 
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and determinables. In the case of the banana, for example, this subject of change has the mutually 
exclusive determinates green and yellow that belong to the determinable colour. If a subject of 
change loses a member of a quality space, P, then it must gain a different member, Q. In so doing, 
the subject has changed with regard to this dimension of change (Lombard 1986, pp.113–9).  
 
According to Mumford and Anjum adoption, a quality space is a background for possible changes, 
whereby a subject of change moves through the quality space as it changes (2011, pp.23–7). In 
line with Lombard's framework, quality spaces are centred upon a subject of change for a 
dimension or dimensions of change. (The basic case makes use of a single dimension of change). 
Mumford and Anjum's quality spaces have a 'starting point' that is represented by a central line. 
The starting point is the subject of change as it stands to the dimension of change at a moment. For 
example, in the case of temperature, the subject of change might be 24°C. In the basic case, there 
is not only a single dimension of change (in this case temperature), but also just two mutually 
exclusive properties for the subject of change to gain. These are represented by the 'F' and 'G' that 
flank the central line on either of its sides. In line with our example case, F might be the hotter 
temperature of 25°C and G might be the cooler temperature of 23°C. A movement through 
Mumford and Anjum's quality spaces, then, is the subject of change losing its starting temperature 
of 24°C and gaining either 25°C or 26°C. In line with pandispositionalism, the starting point and 
the properties F and G are thought to be powers (or clusters of powers). (Note that all diagrams to 












Mumford and Anjum's leading idea is that 'operative powers' can be represented as component 
vectors. This is the third aspect of their vector model of causation. Let us begin with the notion of 
operative powers. Mumford and Anjum accept a modified version of Martin's (2007, p.51) model 
of powers as mutual manifestation partners. The basic aim of this approach, I think, is to downplay 
(e.g. Bird's 2007) distinction between the 'active' dispositional property and the 'passive' stimulus 
property (c.f. Tugby 2013a). In addition, the agent–patient distinction of Aristotle's model of 
capacities is bypassed (Aristotle Met. Θ.3). In contrast, a set of powers has each other as their 
'reciprocal partners for mutual manifestation'. Given their acceptance of this model, Mumford and 
Anjum do not think that powers are distinguished into disposition and stimulus roles. Nevertheless, 
powers have a conditional aspect. The concept of stimulation is rejected, but powers still 'come 
together' for mutual manifestation. As a first pass, then, powers P1–Pn are operative just in case 
they are reciprocal partners that are suitably related to each other. But what does this 'suitable 
relation' consist in? There is no well-defined answer to this question, but Mumford and Anjum 
often talk of spatiotemporal bringing together (2011, p.26) as well as geographical proximity (2011, 
p.100). Taken together, then, powers P1–Pn are operative just in case they are proximate reciprocal 
partners. (For the sake of simplicity I shall use the term 'proximate' to capture the general idea of 
reciprocal partners being suitably related. A plausible point of detail is that different reciprocal 
partners have different proximity requirements, such as 'contact' or '10 meters' etc.) Let us note 
that Mumford and Anjum's powers are multi-track in the sense that a type of power, P1, can operate 




Importantly, there is a distinction between the operation of a power and the manifestation of a 
power. In particular, a power can be operative without manifesting. This distinction is completely 
removed from Bird's (2007) theory, as well as the other central views of dispositional properties 
in the literature (e.g. Ellis 2001; Molnar 2003; Mumford 2004; Martin 2007). What is the 
distinction? I said above that Mumford and Anjum's powers are individuated at the type-level by 
their type of manifestation. I have also explained how Mumford and Anjum's model of powers 
makes use of the notion of reciprocal partners. But here lies a set up of considerable complexity. 
The starting point to Mumford and Anjum's notion of the manifested power is that powers P1–Pn 
are reciprocal partners if and only if their types of manifestation fall into the same dimension of 
change. We can recall that that a dimension of change concerns the determinate–determinable 
distinction and its application to mutually exclusive properties. The thought at hand is that P1–Pn 
have as their manifestation types either F or G, where F and G are the possible changes of a quality 
space. (More complex dimensions of change would place a correspondingly looser restriction on 
what it is to be a reciprocal partner.) Let us say, for example, that P1 is the power of 'fire' whereas 
P2 is the power of 'ice'. These are reciprocal partners for the reason that P1 has as its manifestation 
type 'makes hot' whereas P2 has as its manifestation type 'makes cold'. P1 and P2 are therefore 
powers whose manifestation types concern the same dimension of change: temperature. P1 and P3 
would also be reciprocal partners, where P3 is the power of 'laser' with the manifestation type 
'makes hot'. (Please forgive the examples.) In this way, different types of powers have different 
types of manifestations. (Note that the same type of power can have different types of 
manifestations: hence, fire can 'heat' as well as 'melt'. This is a second sense in which the powers 
of Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation are multi-track.) In virtue of these types of 
manifestations, sets of powers have a "causal relevance" to one another where their manifestation-
types concern the same dimension of change (Mumford 2011, p.26).   
 
Accordingly, there is a close connection between Mumford and Anjum's quality spaces and their 
model of powers. The former are based around a dimension of change, whereas the latter have 
manifestation-types that fall into causal relevancies. We can recall that Mumford and Anjum's 
quality spaces are also centred upon a subject of change. In the typical case, this is a single object, 
though in more complex cases it could be a collection of objects, such as a pile of sand (Mumford 
and Anjum 2011, p.27). Putting the pictures together, then, consider a subject of change that is a 
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certain temperature, let us say a volume of air that is 24°C. The powers 'fire' and 'ice' have 
manifestation-types that are causally relevant in that they concern the determinable of temperature. 
Where tokens of these types of powers are proximate to the subject of change and each other, they 
will become operative. According to Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation, these 
operative powers are represented by component vectors that are directed with a certain magnitude 
towards their types of manifestation. Crucially, these types of manifestation are, in turn, 
represented by properties in the quality space; for example F (25°C) and G (23°C). (The 
manifestation-type 'make hot' would be a proxy, I think, for e.g. 'make 25°C at spatial distance r'. 
Note that this is a second sense in which Mumford and Anjum's powers are multi-track: 'fire' can 
'make hot' in different magnitudes depending upon its geographical proximity to a subject of 
change.)  
 




Mumford and Anjum employ a standard notion of vector algebra for their component vectors. To 
recapitulate, a component vector is representing a token power that is operative with regard to a 
certain subject of change. In the simple case of a one-dimensional quality space, the properties F 
and G are the manifestation types of the operative powers. As such, there will be a number of 
component vectors that are directed towards either F or G with a certain magnitude. The resultant 
vector, then, will be one of two possibilities. The first possibility is that the addition of the 
component vectors gives a resultant vector that is directed towards either F or G with a certain 
magnitude. The second possibility, however, is that the component vectors cancel out such that 
there is no overall directed magnitude towards F or G. Mumford and Anjum term the first 
possibility a "directed resultant" and the second a "zero resultant" or "equilibrium" (Mumford and 
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Anjum 2011, pp.27–30). (If we understand the F-side of the quality space to involve positive units 
and its G-side to involve negative units, then the F-directed component vectors will be positive 
magnitudes and the G-directed component magnitudes will be negative magnitudes; so construed, 
a resultant vector that is neither positive nor negative will be a zero resultant.) (Diagram 3. shows 
a directed resultant vector as a circle-arrow.)   
 




The fourth and final aspect of Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation is their notion of 
manifestation qua change. We have already discussed how Mumford and Anjum's powers are 
individuated at the type-level by their type of manifestation. But so far we have only applied this 
discussion to the notions of operative powers and quality spaces. Perhaps the cornerstone of 
Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation, however, is that there is a double understanding 
of disposition, manifestation, cause, and effect. Let me outline these dualisms before explaining 
how powers manifest qua change.  
 
The first idea of disposition takes place in Mumford and Anjum's notion of operative powers. This 
is a classic idea of dispositionality in that a power does not have to be operative to be able to be 
operative. If something can Φ in virtue of its nature without having to be Φ, then it arguably has a 
disposition to Φ. More specifically, reciprocal powers are operative if and only if they are 
proximate. Interestingly, there is no way to interfere and/or prevent the operation of a power on 
Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation. (I shall discuss this issue further in the next two 
chapters.) The operative power, then, is a first idea of dispositionality. (Given that powers are 
operative when they are proximate to their reciprocal partners, this operation of powers is also 
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suggestive of a first sense of manifestation.) But where Mumford and Anjum break away from the 
standard approach is that the operation of a power does not result in any change. In particular, it 
does not result in a property-instantiation. In contrast, the operative power simply 'pushes' towards 
its manifestation type, which is why component vectors represent operative powers. According to 
Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation, these pushes are themselves dispositional 
(Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.74). A causal situation, whereby a number of token powers are 
operative with regard to a subject of change for a dimension of change, is no more than a 'resultant 
disposition' towards the manifestation of the powers proper. And this second notion of 
dispositionality and manifestation concerns the notion of manifestation qua change, as opposed to 
a push towards a change. As a final issue, it is important to note that Mumford and Anjum have a 
double understanding of causation. In the first place, the coming together of operative powers is 
itself causation, even if there is no change. And in the second place, bona fide change is causation. 
More on this below.  
 
The notion of manifestation qua change draws upon the use of a 'threshold line' for the quality 
space. I will qualify the modality of the present sentence in the next section of this chapter, but a 
first pass at the notion of a threshold line is that it is a point on the quality space for each of its 
possible changes such that, if the resultant vector meets one of these points, then the appropriate 
possible change is actualised. For example, with regard to the quality space for temperature, the 
threshold line for F would be a point such that, if the resultant vector meets this point, then the 
subject of change gains F (i.e. 25°C) and loses its starting point for this dimension of change (i.e. 
24°C).  
 
The idea is that an effect occurs when there is enough for it. Given the complexity of 
causation—its polygenous nature—an effect is typically produced by many different factors 
working at once, some of them disposing towards the effect in question, and some of them 
disposing away. When c1–cn [the operative powers] do succeed in producing e, it is like the 
causes reaching a finishing line or threshold for e to occur (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.72: 









If a manifestation qua change occurs, then the subject of change is thought to have moved through 
the quality space. It is important to note, however, that the quality space itself does not show a 
change, pace Lombard's (1986, pp.114–9) graphs of changes. Mumford and Anjum propose that 
a change will take the subject of change (e.g. the volume of air) into a new quality space where 
the starting point is different. Each quality space shows how the operative powers are disposing 
towards a possible change at a given moment. We would therefore expect different moments to 
have different operative powers in light of the different manifestations qua changes that are taking 
place from moment to moment.  
 
Events will be produced by powers at work: at least the events that are caused will be 
(whether some events are uncaused, we leave open). Events will be the changes produced 
when powers exercise themselves. And some of these changes will then push other powers 
together. The exercising of one power may put sugar into tea, for instance. When suitable 
partnered powers are pushed together, they will in turn manifest themselves. And so it goes 
on (Mumford and Anjum 2011, pp.2–3). 
 
I shall conclude this section of the chapter with a discussion of Mumford and Anjum's endorsement 
of complex causes. Mumford and Anjum (2011, pp.11–3) appeal to Mill's (1843, p.217) concept 
of the composition of causes as well as Molnar's (2003, p.194) concept of polygenic causation. In 
both cases the basic idea is that a cause is complex. According to Mill, a cause is the totality of 
positive and negative factors that are constantly conjoined with the effect. Molnar's polygenic 
concept does not use negative factors, but the idea in this case is that multiple powers are typically 
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the cause of a single effect. Complex causes are important for Mumford and Anjum. As we shall 
discuss in the next section this chapter, Mumford and Anjum's case against necessitarianism trades 
upon the possibility of 'additive prevention'. The point of departure for their line of argument, then, 
is to set out a model of prevention. As the previous chapters have aimed to show, this is no easy 
task. Mumford and Anjum's chosen route is to understand interference and prevention in terms of 
'countervailing powers'. These are operative powers that are directed away from a possible change; 
they are countervailing with respect to this possible change. Hence, in the case of the temperature, 
the operative power 'ice' would be countervailing with respect to the possible change F (the hotter 
temperature of 25°C). According to Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation, then, the 
first notion of cause is the operative power, which is represented by the component vector. And 
the second notion of cause is the totality of operative powers, which are represented by the resultant 
vector.  
 
The model shows what it is to be a cause, namely, to be one of the operating powers, 
represented as a vector, that disposes towards that effect. But whether, how, and to what 
extent the effect occurs will be determined polygenically: by many factors working together 
(Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.31: original italics). 
 
Lastly, let us note again that Mumford and Anjum accept that there are effects qua operating 
powers and effects qua manifestations (i.e. effects understood as manifestations qua change). 
Importantly, this entails that there can be causation where there is no change, in line with Mumford 
and Anjum's view that the operation of powers is itself causation (2011, p.30). 
 
4.3 The antecedent strengthening argument 
 
Such is the first component of Mumford and Anjum's dispositionalism. Let us now move on to its 
second component: the antecedent strengthening argument. Additional details of the vector model 
of causation will be introduced as appropriate.  
 
The opening move of Mumford and Anjum's antecedent strengthening argument is the claim that 
prevention is a prima facie problem for the thesis of necessitarianism. We can recall that 
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necessitarianism is the general thesis that a cause necessitates its effect. Mumford and Anjum 
understand necessitation as the sufficiency of the cause for the effect (as oppose to the cause merely 
being a necessary condition for the effect). "The necessity view is that whenever we have the cause 
C, we must have the effect E" (2011, p.60). The opening move, then, is to point out that in cases 
of successful prevention we do not have the effect E even though the cause C occurs. Mumford 
and Anjum's case against necessitarianism is further motivated by their point that necessitation 
should be a universal concept, such that it is a mistake to speak of C necessitating E in some cases 
but not in others (i.e. in all those cases that are not subject to prevention). "If someone were to say 
that, in some cases being water necessitated being H2O, but in other cases it did not, prima facie it 
would seem as if they did not understand the meaning of necessity" (Mumford and Anjum 2011, 
p.47). (Note that it will be convenient on occasion to use 'necessity' and 'necessitation' 
synonymously; as is the case in Mumford and Anjum's text, the context should make clear that 
there is no confusion on these two terms.)  
 
There are two aspects to Mumford and Anjum's antecedent strengthening argument. The first 
aspect is a view that concerns monotonic reasoning. Mumford and Anjum propose that monotonic 
reasoning is distinctive of necessity. According to monotonic reasoning, if A necessitates B, then 
B is the case whenever A is the case, regardless of whatever else is the case. Mumford and Anjum 
propose that: "In the case of genuine necessity, where A necessitates B, no new information or 
extra premise can prevent B if A is the case" (2011, p.57). Monotonic reasoning is to be contrasted 
with non-motonic reasoning, where we can revise the sufficiency of A for B in light of a new 
premise. On this basis, Mumford and Anjum propose their antecedent strengthening test for 
causation. Where a cause putatively necessitates its effect, Mumford and Anjum think that we 
should have a true conditional of the form: 'If C and Φ, for any value of Φ, then E'.  
 
The second aspect of Mumford and Anjum's antecedent strengthening test is a thesis concerning 
the possibility of additive prevention. Let us begin, however, with their distinction between 
interference and prevention. The intuitive distinction is that a causal process is subject to 
interference when its effect occurs in a non-standard way. For example, a bullet that is fired from 
a gun may begin travelling towards its intended target, but a gust of wind may blow it off course 
to a certain degree, such that it no longer hits the bull's eye but rather one of the surrounding rings. 
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In terms of the vector model of causation, interference is represented by a directed resultant that is 
frustrated by a countervailing power. The operative powers are still favouring one side of quality 
space, but the resultant vector has a lower magnitude than it would have had were it not for the 
countervailing powers. In contrast, a causal process is subject to prevention, intuitively, if its effect 
does not occur. In terms of the vector model of causation, prevention is represented by a zero 
resultant. In this case, the countervailing powers are such that there is no overall disposition 
towards one side of the quality space. The overall idea, then, is that interference involves a directed 
resultant, whereas prevention involves a zero resultant (Mumford and Anjum 2011, pp.53–6).  
 
Mumford and Anjum's antecedent strengthening argument makes use of additive prevention. This 
is a case where there is no directed resultant and where the equilibrium has been achieved by the 
addition of a countervailing power. There is a principled reason for Mumford and Anjum's focus 
on additive prevention. In the first place, given that Mumford and Anjum think that there is 
causation occurring even if the threshold line is not met, a case of additive interference is less 
interesting for their anti-necessitation purposes. In the gun scenario above, for example, there is a 
sense in which the bullet still hits the target, even though the shooter's central intention has not 
been fulfilled. More importantly, however, where the prevention involves the addition of a 
countervailing power, Mumford and Anjum will be able to deploy their premise that the cause plus 
any addition to the cause should be sufficient for the effect. (Let us note that there are cases of 
subtractive interference and prevention; in these situations, the powers that are pushing towards 
one side of the quality space are removed, such that the countervailing powers have a stronger hold 
on the resultant vector). 
 
We can return to the modal thesis. It states that it is always possible, at least in principle, for a 
token causal process to be subject to additive prevention. The support for this thesis is complex, 
but for current purposes we can note two things. In the first place, Mumford and Anjum take the 
modal thesis to be "empirically plausible" (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.56). This statement is 
motivated by the prevalence of actual cases of additive prevention. In the second place, however, 
Mumford and Anjum later state that the type of modality at hand is metaphysical: so construed, it 
is metaphysically possible that all token causal processes could be subject to additive prevention. 




With these two aspects of the antecedent strengthening argument in place, Mumford and Anjum 
conclude that causes do not necessitate their effects.    
 
Let us assume the Millian thesis that the causes of an event are complex. Suppose, for the 
sake of argument, that there are four causes of an effect e, namely, c1, c2, c3 and c4. Let us 
assume also that there is an instance where c1–c4 in fact produced e ... even if c1–c4 caused e, 
they did not necessitate e because there was at least the possibility that some additional factor, 
let us call it ci, could have occurred and, had it occurred, even though c1–c4 occurred, e did 
not occur (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.56). 
 
We cannot say that if A, then necessarily B, even where A is typically a cause of B. We can 
take the conditional if C1–C4, then E, and strengthen the antecedent with Ci, and produce a 
conditional that is false. C1–C4 may be the striking of the match, the presence of oxygen, the 
dryness of the wood, the flammability of the tip, and they may, when combined, succeed in 
producing fire. But now we can add more to the antecedent—there was also a gust of wind—
and we see that this additional factor could result in the match failing to light, even though 
C1–C4 remain in place (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.58). 
 
We can see that the antecedent strengthening argument is trading upon the idea that the operative 
powers of a cause can "remain in place" whilst the additive preventer (in these examples a fifth 
operative power) ensures that the effect does not occur. We therefore have a line of thought that 
fits into the formal machinery of the antecedent strengthening argument. Let us take c1–c4 to be 
the cause, A; e to be the effect, B; and ci to be a possible value of Φ. It follows that the conditional 
'If A and Φ, then B' is false. And this conclusion is generalisable to all tokens of all types of causal 
processes (via different possible values of Φ). On this basis, Mumford and Anjum conclude that 
necessitarianism is false (2011, p.58). Given that dispositionalism is at least in part the rejection of 
necessitarianism, Mumford and Anjum's antecedent strengthening argument plays a central role in 
establishing their position. (In the next two chapters I shall further examine the positive content of 




4.4 Complex causes and totality clauses 
 
In this section of the chapter I want to outline a response to Mumford and Anjum's dispositionalism 
that is attributed to Matthew Tugby (Mumford and Anjum 2011, pp.67–70). Afterwards, I shall 
outline Mumford and Anjum's counter-response. In the last section of this chapter, I shall defend 
Tugby's response against Mumford and Anjum and provide a development. For the purposes of 
this chapter, I shall accept the truth of Mumford and Anjum's modal thesis. Accordingly, it is 
metaphysically possible for a countervailing power to be added to all token causal process. (In the 
next two chapters, however, I shall question Mumford and Anjum's support for this modal thesis.) 
 
Tugby's response concerns the idea that additive preventers can (or perhaps should) be excluded 
from the complex cause. (I shall use the terms 'additive preventers' and 'countervailing powers' 
synonymously in this context.) This strategy is termed the "Σ*-strategy" by Mumford and Anjum 
(2011, p.67). Briefly stated, the background to this term is Mumford and Anjum's (2011, pp.64–7) 
prior discussion of the "Σ-strategy". The Σ-strategy is the idea that the complex cause might be too 
small in Mumford and Anjum running example of the lighting match, which uses a four-part 
complex cause, c1–c4. "Instead of there being just four causes of the match lighting, wouldn't there 
be a great many, c1–cn, including everything that is needed?" (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.65). 
In turn, this prompts the more general thought that it is the specification of all of the causal factors 
that would necessitate the effect. Mumford and Anjum discuss Mill's (1843, §3.5) proposal that 
the philosophical concept of cause involves the totality of positive and negative causal factors, as 
well as Hobbes' (1655, §9) proposal that the "entire cause" is the totality of the accidents of all 
agents and patients (cited in Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.65). Accordingly, the Σ-strategy is a 
strategy of completeness: it is a maximally complex cause, Σ, that necessitates its effect. Mumford 
and Anjum's central response to this strategy is that it is still possible for countervailing powers to 
be added, such that a token causal process can nevertheless be subject to prevention.  
 
No matter how big Σ becomes, it still cannot exclude the possibility of prevention. There 
remains some possible ci that could prevent e even if all that is included within Σ occurs. The 
Millian strategy thus misses the point because the size of the cause is not relevant to the 
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effectiveness of the antecedent strengthening argument against necessitarianism (Mumford 
and Anjum 2011, p.66).  
 
With this in mind, the Σ*-strategy aims to exclude countervailing powers. One version of Tugby's 
strategy that Mumford and Anjum set out makes use of Armstrong's (1997; 2004) totality states of 
affairs. On this view, the Σ*-strategy states that "[T]he full cause of e, the Σ*, is the full collection 
of causal factors together with the totality fact that there no more additional causal factors than 
these. Σ* = (c1–cn, plus the totality fact T), which then necessitates e, allegedly" (Mumford and 
Anjum 2011, p.69).     
 
Mumford and Anjum have a two-fold counter-response to Tugby's proposal. In the first place, they 
claim that the Σ*-strategy assumes necessitarianism. With regard to Armstrong's totality clause, 
Mumford and Anjum state that 'c1–cn, plus the totality fact T' merely assumes that causes 
necessitate their effects, which is what their own dispositionalism denies (2011, p.69). And in the 
second place, Mumford and Anjum complain that the Σ*-strategy is a refusal to take the antecedent 
strengthening test.  
 
The very strategy is a refusal to take the test. The strategy is to exclude automatically 
anything that can be added to Σ. The strategy is thus one that precludes an antecedent 
strengthening test and is thus the very reason for our scepticism about any claims of necessity 
resulting from Σ*" (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.70). 
 
Expanding upon this second point, Mumford and Anjum speculate that the Σ*-strategy is a kind of 
admission of defeat for the necessitarian, on the basis that it is implicitly agreeing that the addition 
of suitable (countervailing) powers would prevent the effect from occurring (2011, p.70).    
 
4.5 The antecedent strengthening argument is self-refuting 
 
In this section of the chapter I shall argue that Mumford and Anjum have mishandled Tugby's 
response. I set out two arguments. The first argument concerns the use of resultant vectors in 
Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation. I argue that (i) the resultant vector is playing a 
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vital explanatory role in Mumford and Anjum's theory. Crucially, it is the basis for understanding 
manifestations qua changes, since it is the resultant vector that has to meet the threshold line if 
(this type of) causation is to occur. In addition, I argue that (ii) there is a notion of totality in the 
resultant vector. The idea behind this claim is that the operation of addition can only make sense 
if the number of operands to be added are fixed. (I am grateful to Matthew Tugby for discussion 
on this matter.) We therefore have a notion of 'these operands and no more'. On the basis of these 
two arguments, I propose that Mumford and Anjum's antecedent strengthening argument cannot 
be applied to their own vector model of causation. That is to say, there is something self-refuting 
about the application of additive prevention to complex causes that are understood in terms of 
resultant vectors. I support this claim with the observation that Mumford and Anjum's discussion 
of the antecedent strengthening argument equivocates between two understandings of 'cause'. A 
diagnosis of this situation is that Mumford and Anjum have downplayed this problematic aspect 
of their dispositionalism by presenting the issue of totality clauses as a mere strategy for saving 
necessitarianism. Totality clauses can do this, I think, but a more pressing matter is that Mumford 
and Anjum's own vector model of causation is at odds with their antecedent strengthening 
argument.  
 
The second argument that I develop concerns the charge that Mumford and Anjum direct towards 
totality clauses. Does the Σ*-strategy merely assume necessitarianism, without providing a reason 
for thinking that causes necessitate their effects? In my discussion I set out a consideration for 
thinking that totality clauses do provide a reason for thinking that a cause necessitates its effect. 
The basic idea is that a totality clause can work in conjunction with Mumford and Anjum's vector 
model of causation, such that manifestations qua changes can be explained in terms of the tokens 
of powers that are operative with regard to a subject of change. This discussion is a further 
development of part (i) of the first argument, above: if the resultant vector, which is a disguised 
totality, is indispensable for Mumford and Anjum's understanding of manifestations qua changes, 
then a totality clause had better be able to work with Mumford and Anjum's operative powers so 
as to determine whether or not a subject of change moves through its quality space. In short, the 
idea of this discussion is that totality clauses should not provide a reason as to why causes 
necessitate their effects on their own, but only in tandem with a theory concerning the different 
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parts of the complex cause. Accordingly, the necessitarian can counter Mumford and Anjum's 
reply on this issue by drawing upon their own vector model of causation.  
 
Let us begin with the first argument. A first point to be established is that the resultant vector is 
not a mere optional extra within Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation, but that, in 
contrast, its role is indispensable. We can begin by considering the role that complex causes are 
playing for Mumford and Anjum's purposes. Let us recall that the adoption of complex causes is 
Mumford and Anjum's strategy for modelling interference and prevention. These phenomena are 
not the result of specialised operations that powers are able to perform, over and above their 
standard manifestations. (This was a possible approach that we envisaged for Bird in Chapter 3: 
the view in this case was one where dispositional properties can both manifest a property and 
prevent the manifestation of a dispositional property.) In this sense Mumford and Anjum's 
approach to interference and prevention is economical. Countervailing powers—the basis for 
Mumford and Anjum's understanding of interference and prevention—come for free once we have 
the ideas of a quality space containing different types of manifestation qua change in tandem with 
multiple operative powers. For a countervailing power is simply a power that is operating, where 
its manifestation-type is distinct to that of another operating power. We have different 
manifestation-types, but the same type of action. So it is important to remember that complex 
causes, with their component operative powers, are a fundamental element of Mumford and 
Anjum's approach to the problem of how to understand interference and prevention. Saying that 
causes are complex allows Mumford and Anjum to understand different parts of the complex cause 
as pushing against one another.  
 
A next step is to see that Mumford and Anjum are making use of vector addition in their 
explanation of manifestations qua changes.  
 
The model shows what it is to be a cause, namely, to be one of the operating powers, 
represented as a vector, that disposes towards that effect. But whether, how, and to what 
extent the effect occurs will be determined polygenically: by many factors working together 




Mumford and Anjum's necessitarian language is not important in this citation. What is important, 
I think, is that Mumford and Anjum require a notion of the overall result of a multiplicity of 
operative powers. The resultant vector is the keystone for Mumford and Anjum's account of 
manifestations qua changes. We can recall that Mumford and Anjum have a pluralistic conception 
of cause and effect. The minimal understanding is that causation is occurring whenever there are 
operative powers (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.30). The more substantive understanding, 
however, is that a subject of change can move through its quality space, whereby a power or cluster 
of powers are placed upon the subject of change. As we discussed earlier in this chapter, Mumford 
and Anjum's explanation of manifestation qua change draws upon the threshold line and the 
resultant vector. Manifestation qua change is a central part of Mumford and Anjum's 
dispositionalism, since, as previously noted, the manifestations of powers or clusters of powers in 
causal processes will ultimately explain how different causal processes come to be. "Events will 
be the changes produced when powers exercise themselves. And some of these changes will then 
push other powers together" (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.2).  
 
The resultant vector contains the notion of the total number of operative powers. We can observe 
Mumford and Anjum's own discussion of the resultant vector, which straightforwardly draws upon 
the term "all" at numerous stages. 
 
At the moment all the requisite powers are assembled, they all make their contribution 
(Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.32). 
 
We can perform a simple analogical addition by placing the tail of one vector on the head of 
another ... First we add all those in the direction of F, one on top of the another, and then, 
from the point that we reach, we start subtracting all the vectors towards G in the same way, 
the tail of one connecting to the head of another. When we have added and subtracted all the 
vectors, we get the resultant R ... (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.28). 
 
At this stage, however, we can see that there is a problem with Mumford and Anjum's presumption 
that we can strengthen the antecedent of a causal conditional. Given that complex causes are being 
understood as all of the powers that are operative within a causal situation, the addition of a 
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countervailing power will fail to strengthen the same complex cause but will rather move us to a 
different complex cause. This point can easily be brought out by considering that the vector 
addition operator will provide a function from its input (i.e. all of the component vectors) to its 
output (i.e. the resultant vector). That is to say, if we fix all of the operative powers as a determinate 
input, then there will only be a single possible resultant vector. Consider the case that Mumford 
and Anjum are using. Here we have four operative powers: c1, c2, c3, and c4. Given that these 
operative powers make up the complex cause, these powers are the only powers that are operative 
within the envisaged causal situation. Accordingly, there is a function from the set {c1, c2, c3, c4} 
to the resultant vector Rc1–c4. Let us now add a new operative power, ci, which is the countervailing 
power. In what sense does this addition modify the original complex cause with the resultant vector 
Rc1–c4? According to Mumford and Anjum's own discussion, a complex cause exhausts all of the 
operative powers within a causal situation. (The above citations clearly show this.) We are forced 
to say, then, that one complex cause is being replaced by another complex cause. In short, the 
addition of ci to the set {c1, c2, c3, c4} moves us from the resultant vector Rc1–c4 to the distinct 
resultant vector Rc1–ci. Adding new operative powers cannot modify the same complex cause, then, 
but only move us to a new complex cause.  
 
If complex causes involve a sense of totality, then we should expect Mumford and Anjum's 
antecedent strengthening argument to equivocate between two understandings of 'complex cause'. 
And this, I think, is exactly what we can observe in Mumford and Anjum's discussion. Let us keep 
in mind that this problem has arisen because complex causes are thought to include all of the 
powers that are operative within a causal situation. Let us consider again the following citation, 
where I have added two markers: [1] and [2]. 
 
We cannot say that if A [1], then necessarily B, even where A is typically a cause of B. We 
can take the conditional if C1–C4, then E, and strengthen the antecedent with Ci, and produce 
a conditional that is false. C1–C4 may be the striking of the match, the presence of oxygen, 
the dryness of the wood, the flammability of the tip, and they may, when combined, succeed 
in producing fire. But now we can add more to the antecedent—there was also a gust of 
wind—and we see that this additional factor could result in the match failing to light, even 




In the first part of this citation, Mumford and Anjum are referring to the complex cause of the 
effect e. As the citation develops, we can see that it has four components: c1, c2, c3, and c4, which 
we can represent by the set {c1, c2, c3, c4}. Before the envisaged addition of ci, this set of operative 
powers is a bona fide complex cause. That is to say, the members of this set exhaust the powers 
that are operative in the causal situation. This is the totalistic understanding of 'cause' implicit at 
[1]. When we add c
i, however, we move to a new set of operative powers. It has the members: c1, 
c2, c3, c4, and ci. The problem at hand, then, is that Mumford and Anjum are moving between two 
complex causes. The first has four operative powers but the second has five operative powers. 
Given that we have added ci to the operative powers of the causal situation, the understanding of 
'cause' at [2] has to be taken not as a complex cause qua the totality of operative powers, but rather 
as a complex cause qua the subset of a superset of operative powers. In the case at hand, the set 
{c1, c2, c3, c4} is a subset of the superset {c1, c2, c3, c4, ci}. The reason why the understanding of 
'cause' at [2] cannot be taken as a complex cause qua the totality of operative powers is that this 
understanding will have to be reserved for the use of the term 'cause' at [1], where the operative 
powers c1, c2, c3, and c4 exhaust the causal situation, in line with Mumford and Anjum's official 
understanding of complex causes.  
 
In general, it is no threat to necessitarianism that a cause C does not necessitate its effect E because 
E is not the case when C is not the case. Rather, the necessitarian thesis is that if C is the case, then 
E is (necessarily) the case. A concern for necessitarianism, then, is if C is the case and E is not the 
case. But this sufficiency has not been challenged. All that Mumford and Anjum have shown is 
that we can replace (not 'modify' or 'strengthen') a totality of operative powers with a different 
totality of operative powers. This move can be shown in the two causal conditionals below. 
 
If {c1, c2, c3, c4}, then e 
If {c1, c2, c3, c4, ci}, then e 
 
The first conditional, under Mumford and Anjum's own discussion, is true. Here the four operative 
powers will give a resultant vector Rc1–c4, which, we can suppose, meets the threshold line for e. 
The second conditional is false: here we are keeping the same effect e but changing the complex 
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cause. In this case, we have the new resultant vector Rc1–ci, which, we shall assume, does not satisfy 
the threshold line for e. But this in no way shows that the 'same cause' can be expanded in such a 
way that the effect e does not occur. In fact, Mumford and Anjum's argument at this point only 
shows something trivial. It merely shows that a set of operative powers can have another set of 
operative powers as a subset. I was gesturing towards this fact above, when I said that the set {c1, 
c2, c3, c4} is a subset of the superset {c1, c2, c3, c4, ci}. This is why, I think, Mumford and Anjum 
say that the operative powers c1–c4 "remain in place" (2011, p.58). But this is of no matter when 
we are working with totalistic complex causes. Mumford and Anjum have set out a view where a 
complex cause is the totality of operative powers, and it remains to be shown why fixing a set of 
operative powers does not also fix a unique resultant vector and therefore either trigger or not 
trigger (i.e. necessitate or not necessitate) a specific manifestation qua change.   
 
As a last point on this matter, we can see that the application of the antecedent strengthening 
argument is in fact impossible for Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation. I shall use a 
simple complex cause that consists in the operative powers c1 and c2. Let us consider the 
'strengthening' of the appropriate causal conditional with the countervailing power ci. If we unpack 
what is implicit in Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation, we can see that they are 
committed to the following. (I give the form of the antecedent strengthening test before filling in 
the required content.)  
 
If A necessitates B, then:  
If A and Φ, for any value of Φ, then B 
 
If c1 and c2 necessitate e, where {c1, c2} are all of the operative powers, then: 
If c1 and c2, where {c1, c2} are all of the operative powers, and ci, where {c1, c2, ci} are all of the 
operative powers, then e   
 
The 'strengthened' conditional is logically contradictory. It has this form: 'If P and not-P, then Q'. 
This appears to mean that no countervailing power is ever a possible value of Φ. If we attempt to 
keep the complex cause of the original conditional, then the set {c1, c2} exhausts the operative 
powers. Accordingly, the addition of ci requires that the same complex cause has two different sets 
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of (exhaustive) operative powers. The only way to avoid this problem, as I said above, is to think 
of c1 and c2 in the original conditional as forming a subset of the superset {c1, c2, ci}. And this, I 
think, is to equivocate over the term 'cause' by using two notions: a totalistic cause on the one hand, 
and a mere multiplicity of operative powers (a mere subset) on the other. 
 
If this argument is sound, then I think it should be taken as a fatal blow for Mumford and Anjum's 
project. For it attempts to show that the two components of their dispositionalism are in conflict. 
The vector model of causation draws upon a totalistic conception of complex causes. As we have 
discussed, this approach is not suited to the idea of 'strengthening' the antecedent of a causal 
conditional. If we attempt to do so, then we switch between different resultant vectors and therefore 
end up with the non-problem that C does not necessitate E because C might not be the case. We 
can see by the form of Mumford and Anjum's antecedent strengthening argument, presented above, 
that we require the complex cause to retain its identity whilst the additive preventer is added; but 
this, I think, demands a metaphysics of causation and prevention whereby a cause can retain its 
identity regardless of whether or not it is in the company of the additive preventer. And this 
requirement is not provided by Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation. I conclude, 
therefore, that Mumford and Anjum's dispositionalism is fatally flawed: the application of the 
antecedent strengthening argument to a vector model of causation is self-refuting.  
 
Given that Mumford and Anjum's use of antecedent strengthening is problematic, it is interesting 
to ask why this type of argument has looked attractive to a number of other philosophers. In 
particular, Schrenk (2010) develops the antecedent strengthening approach in his criticism of 
necessitarianism, whereas Eagle (2009) uses it to undermine the dispositional actualist semantics 
for counterfactual conditionals. Let us focus on Schrenk's essay. In this context, Schrenk is using 
the antecedent strengthening argument to question Ellis' (2001, p.106) idea that there is a 
metaphysically necessary connection between a cause event C and its effect event E via the 
dispositional property D. 
 
Suppose, for the purpose of argument, that there is a disposition D to react with E in 
circumstances C ... As I read Ellis, this is to say that there is a natural kind of process: the 
process from C events to E events. Further, C events and E events are (when mediated by the 
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disposition) joined as a matter of metaphysical necessity ... The problem now is that in 
antidote cases, E does not come about even though C does occur. Yet, how can it be possible 
if C and E are, due to D, linked by metaphysical necessity? Not even an antidote should be 
able to interfere with necessary connections. The crucial point is that necessity is monotonic: 
if C necessarily leads to E, so must C plus the antidote A (Schrenk 2010, p.733; original 
italics).  
 
Let us put aside the problematic issues surrounding antidotes that we discussed in chapters 2 and 
3. Ellis' scientific essentialism differs in a key respect from Mumford and Anjum's vector model 
of causation with regard to the antecedent strengthening argument. In particular, the event C retains 
its identity whether or not it is conjoined with the envisaged antidote A. Hence, we can legitimately 
apply the antecedent strengthening argument: if necessitation is monotonic, then C should 
(incorrectly/impossibly) necessitate E despite the presence of the operative antidote. What is key 
here is that C is the same event where it is under and not under the duress of A. But this is not so 
for Mumford and Anjum. As they have constructed their correlate of 'C' as including the totality 
of operative powers (into which the operative antidote should fall), we cannot say that C is the 
same entity where A is absent as when A is present. In short: where we have the 'atomic' conception 
of causal relata (e.g. Ellis 2001; Bird 2007), the argument can be applied, but where we have the 
'holistic' conception (Mumford and Anjum 2011) it cannot. (I take this to mean that the problem 
set out above does not apply to Schrenk's antecedent strengthening argument. Nevertheless, the 
issue that I discuss in Chapter 6, which concerns the possibility claim of Mumford and Anjum's 
dispositionalism, should be extendable to deflect Schrenk's anti-necessitarian arguments in a 
different way, although I shall not argue for the details as we are concentrating upon Mumford and 
Anjum's position in this section of the thesis.)   
 
4.6 Totality clauses and threshold lines 
 
I want to move back now to consider the applicability of totality clauses to the project of 
necessitarianism. This approach was raised by Tugby but dismissed by Mumford and Anjum for 
two reasons. First, it was seen to presuppose necessitarianism. And second, it was seen to avoid 




Given the line of argument in the previous section, however, we now have a show of reason to be 
wary of Mumford and Anjum's remarks. What has emerged is that Mumford and Anjum are 
themselves covert users of totality clauses, since the resultant vector is a disguised completion. 
There is therefore a more complicated dialectic at hand, which involves Mumford and Anjum 
defending their dispositionalism by construing one of its internal tensions (i.e. the issue of totality) 
as a mere defence of their target thesis: necessitarianism. I do not want to say that this is what 
Mumford and Anjum have done purposefully, but I think that this is what they have done 
effectively. A problem, P, with their theory, T, has been downplayed by the idea that P is merely 
a defence of their antithesis A that question-beggingly refuses to engage with their argument for 
T.  
 
In fact, I think the real situation is reversed twice over. First, totality clauses do not presuppose 
necessitarianism, since they are compatible with probabilistic causation (I develop this point in 
Chapter 5). In addition, a totality clause is first and foremost a thesis concerning what is actual in 
a world, or what is actual at a time, not a thesis that concerns how causes are related to their effects. 
(I shall unpack this claim below.) And second, whilst there is something to be said for the idea that 
totality clauses are a means by which antecedent strengthening cannot get started, we cannot 
conclude from this that the necessitarian has simply avoided Mumford and Anjum's otherwise 
destructive argument, since they cannot apply it to their own theory either. We have seen that the 
antecedent strengthening argument requires that a cause, generally construed, can retain its identity 
in the face of the operative preventer. As such, the antecedent strengthening argument is applicable 
to 'atomistic' views of causal relata, but not 'holistic' ones of the kind that Mumford and Anjum 
have problematically employed. In light of this, I think a blanket application of the antecedent 
strengthening argument is dangerous. If it is only applicable to certain types of theories, then we 
should not say that the use of totality clauses avoids the antecedent strengthening argument in a 
way that is ad hoc. Perhaps the totality approach is necessitarian precisely because it does not 
allow additive prevention without dismantling the complex cause: so much the worse for 
antecedent strengthening? At this stage, we might suspect that Mumford and Anjum's vector model 
of causation moves necessarily from a cause to its effect, precisely because fixing the cause fixes 
the resultant vector (i.e. the basis for understanding manifestations qua change). Can we say that 
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Tugby's proposal is really in a poorer position? (I set about answering these questions in the next 
two chapters.) 
 
In this section of the chapter I shall explain why I think that Tugby's proposal does not disarm the 
necessitarian of a reason to think that causes necessitate their effects. I shall continue with the 
'guerrilla tactics' of the previous discussion and use Mumford and Anjum's own resources against 
themselves. My aim is that this discussion will prepare the reader for the themes of the next two 
chapters, which centre on chance, possibility, and necessitation. Let us recall the issue at hand. 
 
Why should we agree that c1–cn together with the totality fact necessitates e? And why agree 
with Mill that the consequent invariably follows? All these claims merely assume what we 
deny, namely, that a cause necessitates its effect. The match lights in all the closest worlds 
in which it is struck only if it is necessitated. What we need is some reason to think that the 
match will light in all the closest possible worlds in which it is struck, in other words some 
reason to believe that the cause necessitates the effect (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.69).        
 
In the context of this citation, Mumford and Anjum are discussing a possible interpretation of 
totality clauses in Lewis' (1986) modal realism. Briefly, the idea is that Lewis' semantics for 
counterfactual conditionals ensures a de facto consistency in the external circumstances of causal 
processes, where the only modification is the actuality of the antecedent (cf. Eagle 2009). This is 
because a genuinely counter-fact conditional is true just in case the closest possible world (where 
the antecedent is true) is one where the consequent is also true. I have not discussed this view, 
however, so I shall take from the above citation the more general idea that totality clauses in any 
form are missing explanations for necessitation. (I think that this is what Mumford and Anjum 
would have in mind.) 
 
There is a brief answer, hopefully not too simple, that we can give to Mumford and Anjum in light 
of the discussion of this chapter so far. If it is the case that their vector model is using totality 
clauses, at least in a covert form, then it should be able to provide the explanation for why a cause 
necessitates its effect. I think it is important to say here that the use of a totality clause, say in the 
context of Armstrong's (1997, p.231) necessitation theory of laws, should not be seen as providing 
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the entire explanation of why a cause necessitates its effect. In the case of Armstrong's theory, 
whilst totality clauses will have a part to play in fixing what the causal factors are, the brunt of the 
explanatory burden is carried by his theory of laws. And it is not clear that we cannot say the same 
in this context. Let us therefore say that we have the complex cause {c1, c2, c3, c4}. And let us also 
say that we have a truthmaker for why no more powers are operative in this causal situation. 
Perhaps we will require a dedicated ontological posit to do this, as Armstrong suspects, or perhaps 
the task can be performed in some way by the vector addition operation (as it requires a determinate 
number or arity for its operands). It follows by the vector model of causation that we have a unique 
resultant vector Rc1–c4. In addition, it follows that this resultant vector either meets or does not meet 
the threshold line for the manifestation types of the quality space. If it does, then we have a 
manifestation qua change. If it does not, then we have the second-class sense of causation whereby 
the operative powers are unsuccessfully pushing for a possible manifestation qua change. Looking 
at the situation in this 'necessitarian' way, there is a clear division of labour between the totality 
clause and the machinery of the vector model of causation. And more importantly, it is the latter 
that is providing the explanation for why the effect follows from the cause (in both possible senses 
of causation that Mumford and Anjum employ). We can think of the division of labour in this 
sense: the totality clause is involved in the input for the causal process. It is fixing the operating 
powers. We might think of it as placing the curly brackets around the operative powers, as above. 
But the function from this input to the output (where the output is the effect, whatever its nature) 
is being provided by Mumford and Anjum's story of vector addition, resultant vectors, and 
threshold lines. Lastly, we can note that a totality clause is first and foremost a tool for fixing that 
the entities in a given situation (e.g. the actual world, a certain time, a certain causal situation) are 
all of the entities that are in play. In light of this, it is unclear to me why Mumford and Anjum 
think that the use of totality clauses either presumes necessitarianism or renders the explanation of 
necessitation vacant. These are duties for the metaphysical theory of causation/laws to perform in 















In this chapter I introduce Mumford and Anjum's model of probabilistic powers, criticise this 
model, and provide a replacement that stays within the boundary of their vector model of causation. 
Mumford and Anjum construe the operation of probabilistic powers as multi-headed component 
vectors. The operations of probabilistic powers are directed towards two different types of change, 
where each direction has a certain magnitude. In this chapter, however, I argue that Mumford and 
Anjum's model of probabilistic powers is metaphorical, in the sense that there is no metaphysical 
explanation for how probabilistic powers can secure the possibility of different alternative 
manifestations qua change within a single causal situation. What Mumford and Anjum should 
have said, I think, is that probabilistic powers operative disjunctively, such that, in the simplest 
case, there is either a component vector directed towards change F or a component vector directed 
towards change G. The motivation for this replacement view is that it uniquely secures the 
possibility of different alternative manifestations qua change within a single causal situation. In 
addition, I propose that we have now secured a genuine notion of anti-necessitarian behaviour as 
this notion properly applies to probabilistic (and indeterministic) powers. In addition, throughout 
this chapter and the next I aim to show that Mumford and Anjum have mishandled Barker's 




A significant feature of Mumford and Anjum's dispositionalism is its alleged neutrality on the issue 
of determinism. In their replies to objections, Mumford and Anjum (2011, pp.74–5) cite Stephen 
Barker as raising the problem that their dispositionalism would rule out determinism a priori, when 
the truth or falsity of this thesis should be, at least in part, a matter a posteriori. Their reply to this 
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worry involves distinguishing two conceptions of determinism. The first conception of 
determinism draws upon causation as the "vehicle by which determinism does its business" 
(Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.75). I shall refer to this conception of determinism as the 'causal 
conception'. Mumford and Anjum claim that the causal conception lies behind Barker's problem.  
 
"In [Barker's problem] ... determinism is taken automatically to mean causal determinism, 
which then looks to be the very same as causal necessitarianism ... Isn't the reason for 
equating these two theses [determinism and causal necessitarianism] simply an assumption 
that causes necessitate and are thus the means by which determinism does its work?" 
(Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.75: my square brackets). 
 
Mumford and Anjum's response is to set out a second conception of determinism. Its starting point 
is the claim that the key notion of determinism is the fixation of the future by the past (Mumford 
and Anjum 2011, p.75). As such, Mumford and Anjum's temporal conception is non-causal. A 
candidate version is defined as follows: "the total state of the world Φ1 at time t1 dictates that only 
one state Φ2 is possible at t2" (2011, p.76; c.f. Anscombe 1981, p.142). I shall refer to this 
conception of determinism as the 'temporal conception'.  
 
Mumford and Anjum think that the temporal conception is superior to the causal conception. Their 
reasoning is that the causal conception cannot handle uncaused events. If determinism is 
understood in terms of causes necessitating their effects, then uncaused events cannot be 
determined. On this basis, Mumford and Anjum claim that a world with uncaused events cannot 
be deterministic: "we do not have a deterministic universe if there are also some events [the 
uncaused events] outside of the grip of causation" (2011, p.75: my square bracket). Mumford and 
Anjum's temporal conception, however, is thought to rule out uncaused events. In light of its non-
causal terminology, both caused and uncaused events will fall under 'states' that are to be 'dictated' 
(Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.76). Accordingly, if there are uncaused events, then either these can 
be dictated by the total state of the world Φ1 at t1, such that whilst these events are uncaused they 
are nevertheless dictated, or otherwise they cannot be dictated and so 'correctly' result in a failure 
of determinism. Given its non-causal terminology, Mumford and Anjum's temporal conception is 
thought to be orthogonal to their dispositionalism. In the first place, Mumford and Anjum think 
111 
 
that their dispositionalism can handle indeterministic and probabilistic causation (see below). 
Hence, dispositionalism is not committed to either the truth or falsity of the temporal conception 
of determinism. (That said, it is committed to the correctness of this understanding of determinism.) 
In the second place, however, Mumford and Anjum deny that their antecedent strengthening 
argument requires indeterministic and/or probabilistic causation. Taken together, this is the outline 
of Mumford and Anjum's response to Barker's concern.   
 
[T]he argument against causal necessitarianism does not rest, as Anscombe's [1981] 
argument does, on indeterministic causation being the case. Hence, it is consistent with the 
antecedent strengthening argument against necessity that if two tokens of  the same 
dispositions were placed in identical contexts—identical in every causally relevant respect 
for that disposition—they would produce identical manifestations. The argument against 
necessity required only that if something had been different, the manifestation need not have 
occurred (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.76: my square bracket).   
 
It should again be reiterated that the antecedent strengthening argument does not rest on there 
being probabilistic causation. Ours is an antecedent strengthening argument against necessity 
(Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.77). 
 
5.3 Probabilistic powers as double-headed component vectors 
 
Mumford and Anjum also make a distinction between indeterministic causation and probabilistic 
causation: the former is thought to involve complete randomness whereas the latter is thought to 
involve a weighted chance that is less than one but greater than zero. Let us outline their model of 
probabilistic powers for the purposes of the arguments of this chapter. (I shall largely ignore 
indeterministic causation for reasons that I shall explain in the next chapter.) Mumford and Anjum 
define a probabilistic disposition as one that "tends towards a certain distribution of events only; it 
never necessitates that distribution" (2011, p.78). Their discussion of probabilistic causation 
centres on a hypothetically fair coin whose toss has a 0.5 chance of landing heads and a 0.5 chance 
of landing tails. So construed, the fair coin is thought to have a single disjunctive probabilistic 
disposition, since 'landing heads' and landing tails' are the exclusive possibilities for its toss. In 
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terms of their vector model of causation, this is represented as a 'multi-directional' operative power: 
i.e. as a (single) double-headed component vector. This is shown in the diagram below, where F 
and G stand for the manifestation types 'landing heads' and 'landing tails', respectively.  
 




There are two complications for this model of probabilistic causation. Firstly, if the coin was biased 
or loaded, then the double-headed component vector would be shifted towards the F or G 
manifestation type as appropriate. For example, a loaded coin that had a 0.7 chance of landing 
heads and a 0.3 chance of landing tails would have its double-headed component vector positioned 
over the starting line such that 70% of its extent were on the F-side of the quality space and 30% 
of its extent were on the G-side of the quality space. And secondly, just as there can be quality 
spaces with more than two manifestation types in 'standard' causation, there can also be additional 
dimensions for the quality spaces of probabilistic causation; for example, Mumford and Anjum 
outline a six-dimensional quality space for the roll of a fair die (2011, pp.78–9). 
 
Mumford and Anjum's model of probabilistic causation raises a puzzle concerning 'lonely' powers, 
i.e. powers that do not have a reciprocal partner. That lonely powers are accepted for Mumford and 
Anjum's vector model of causation was a complication that I passed over in the previous chapter. 
But they are relevant for the argument of this chapter: so let us briefly consider lonely powers in 
themselves before examining the puzzle for probabilistic causation. Mumford and Anjum accept 
lonely powers in addition to 'partnered' (i.e. non-lonely) powers; in doing so they are modifying 
Martin's (2007) model of powers (2011, pp.34–8). If we recall the notion of operative powers from 
the previous chapter, we can recall that powers P1–Pn are operative just in case they are proximate 
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(i.e. suitably related) reciprocal partners. This definition is unsuitable for lonely powers, however, 
since lonely powers do not have reciprocal partners and a fortiori do not have proximity conditions. 
(In this sense it is significant that the 'coming together' of powers is understood in terms of Martin's 
terminology of reciprocal partners for mutual manifestation; that is to say, the proximity of powers 
is understood in terms of reciprocal partners being suitably related.) Mumford and Anjum are 
aware of this issue and seem to suggest that lonely powers can spontaneously operate and 
manifest—citing radioactive decay as a credible example (2011, pp.36–7). Lonely powers operate 
by pushing towards a manifestation type in the same way as partnered powers, but it is possible, 
by what has been said so far, that a lonely power can operate uniquely within a quality space. In 
other words, we could have a quality space with just one operative power. (In contrast, partnered 
powers must always operate in groups of at least two). Let us note that Mumford and Anjum's 
discussion of lonely powers suggests that non-probabilistic (and non-indeterministic) powers can 
be lonely powers (2011, pp.34–8). So we have the following taxonomy of powers. Firstly, 
partnered powers can make use of proximity conditions, since these triggering conditions are 
understood in terms of reciprocal partners coming together. As far as I can tell, Mumford and 
Anjum take all partnered powers to be non-indeterministic and non-probabilistic; that is to say, the 
partnered powers do not make use of Mumford and Anjum's double-headed component vectors. 
And secondly, we have the lonely powers, which are comprised by both standard (single-headed) 
component vectors, as well as indeterministic and probabilistic (double-headed) component 
vectors. We should also note that whilst Mumford and Anjum's lonely powers do not have 
proximity conditions, in the usual case they will nevertheless feature in quality spaces with other 
component vectors. So the idea, I take it, is that all powers (partnered and lonely) fall into groups 
of causal relevance, in virtue of which they can participate in common quality spaces for common 





(i) Partnered powers [have proximity conditions]   
 
(1.) Standard powers [single-headed component vectors] 
 
(ii) Lonely powers [do not have proximity conditions] 
 
(1.) Standard powers [single-headed component vectors] 
(2.a) Indeterministic powers [double-headed component vectors] 
(2.b) Probabilistic powers [double-headed component vectors] 
 
The connection between lonely powers and probabilistic causation has arisen, of course, because 
Mumford and Anjum's model of probabilistic causation is using singular component vectors (that 
are nevertheless double-headed) . Here is the puzzle set out for the example of a coin. On the one 
hand, where the double-headed component vector is centred upon the starting line—as it is in the 
case of the fair coin—its looks as though the two sides will cancel out, so as to leave a situation 
where nothing happens. On the other hand, however, where the coin is loaded it looks as though 
the coin could spontaneously land heads or tails (depending on the direction of its bias). Hence the 
puzzle: fair coins can land heads or tails (contra the picture that the equilibrium conjures up); and 
whilst a spontaneous manifestation might be appropriate for some examples of probabilistic 
causation, such as radioactive decay, it does not look suitable for coins and dice, which typically 
require a mechanism to toss the coin or roll the die (Mumford and Anjum 2011, pp.80–1). Mumford 
and Anjum's response to this puzzle is as follows. 
 
In all the real-world situations we encounter, this probabilistic disposition never occurs alone. 
Gravity, for instance, holds the dice down on a flat surface so even a loaded dice does not 
move without some further push. But if there were some solitary probabilistic power loaded 
in one direction, with no other powers at work, then again the response would be to say that 
it could manifest itself. It is doubtful this could ever occur, however. Both the dice and the 
coin need gravitational powers in order to land. A coin toss in zero gravity would be pointless 




So we have two aspects to the puzzle and two replies. The first aspect is that with fair probabilistic 
powers the double-headed component vector is cancelling out. The response is to say that 
additional operative powers are needed to 'tip' the fair coin or fair die into a certain manifestation 
qua change. The second aspect is that unfair probabilistic powers look to be able to spontaneously 
manifest. Mumford and Anjum's reply is to say that although this is theoretically possible, in most 
cases additional operative powers are also required (e.g. gravitational forces).  
 
5.4 Probabilistic powers as disjunctive operators 
 
Mumford and Anjum's response to this puzzle is commonsensical, but it raises a difficulty for their 
theory. In outline, the difficulty is that there is a possible equivocation over the term 'disposes 
towards' in Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation when probabilistic powers enter the 
picture. In a first sense of 'disposes towards' we are to consider Mumford and Anjum's antecedent 
strengthening argument. On the basis of this argument, Mumford and Anjum state that even a 
resultant vector does no more than 'dispose towards' a manifestation qua change (2011, pp.175–
81). In short, because causal interactions can be subject to prevention, causes do not necessitate 
their effects but only dispose towards these with a sui generis modality (I shall elaborate upon this 
aspect of their dispositionalism in the next chapter). But there is a problem here, since, as we shall 
see, Mumford and Anjum's dispositional modality (i.e. the sui generis modality) is what 'most' 
philosophers take to be distinctive of probabilistic causation, in contrast to 'standard' non-
probabilistic causation. In other words, what Mumford and Anjum have effectively done, a 'typical' 
philosopher might say, is to paint all causal processes with the modal brush of probabilistic 
causation. Accordingly, probabilistic and non-probabilistic causes alike merely dispose towards 
their effects. Why is this problematic? The reason is that for Mumford and Anjum a non-
probabilistic cause is thought to merely dispose towards its effect on the basis of antecedent 
strengthening considerations, as oppose to this distinctive modality being a consequence of the 
various components of their vector model of causation: i.e. operative powers, vector addition, and 
threshold lines. Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation is not inherently dispositional 
qua anti-necessitarian; rather, we have the idea that there could always be different operative 
powers in a causal situation; hence my worry for probabilistic causation. In this case we require a 
different reason for thinking that a cause merely disposes towards its effects. A probabilistic cause 
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does not merely dispose towards its effect because the operative powers could have been different: 
there is something 'intrinsically' anti-necessitarian about it (I use this term loosely for the moment). 
And so there is a second sense of the term 'dispose towards' that specifically concerns probabilistic 
powers. In setting out their model of probabilistic causation, however, Mumford and Anjum have 
recycled the machinery of their vector model of causation (i.e. their ideas of operative powers, 
vector addition, and threshold lines). We are told that a probabilistic power disposes towards a 
distribution of events, rather than necessitating any such distribution; but it is not clear how a 
double-headed component vector can perform this role.  
 
A brief summary of this line of thought will be useful. A first sense of 'dispose towards' is based 
upon antecedent strengthening. Importantly, the vector model of causation uses a number of posits 
that are not especially anti-necessitarian. (I think this holds for the operation of powers, the 
composition of component vectors, and the passing of a threshold line.) In contrast, however, a 
second sense of 'dispose towards' concerns bona fide probabilistic causation. The intended problem 
is that Mumford and Anjum are seeking to explain the second sense of this term on the basis of 
their vector model of causation—without the appropriate modifications. This leads me to think that 
Mumford and Anjum's model of probabilistic causation is metaphorical: the two heads of the 
double-headed component vector 'dispose towards' their manifestation types, but we have not been 
given any reason, over and above the antecedent strengthening argument, as to why this should be. 
It seems, however, that Mumford and Anjum's model of probabilistic causation should not 'piggy 
back' upon their antecedent strengthening argument. So we should ask: how exactly do 
probabilistic powers 'dispose towards' their effects? I suspect that we shall find a metaphorical 
approach and a possible equivocation on term 'dispose towards'.  
 
In developing this line of criticism I want to go back for a moment to Mumford and Anjum's notion 
of a sui generis modality. With regard to our present concern, their view is that causes are 
connected to their effects by a worldly modality that is a sui generis dispositional modality. This 
dispositional modality cannot be understood in terms of necessity or possibility without distortion. 
First and foremost, the dispositional modality is negatively construed, via its divergence from these 
standard modalities as they might be applied to causation (2011, pp.175–83). The positive 
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construal of their dispositional modality draws upon the concept of a 'selection function', whereby 
a power selects a manifestation from all possible types of manifestation. 
 
Dispositionality, it will be suggested, can be understood as a sort of selection function—a 
natural one in this case—that picks out a limited number of outcomes from all those that are 
merely possible ... There is an irreducibly dispositional connection between the powers in 
the world and the outcomes they can bring about. Solubility, for instance, selects dissolving 
as its manifestation and will sometimes succeed in bringing it about. But it irreducibly only 
disposes towards that manifestation: and similarly for each individual disposition and its 
manifestation (Mumford and Anjum 2011, pp.189–90).     
 
This notion of the selection function, however, is not developed very far. In addition, Mumford 
and Anjum do not want to analyse their sui generis dispositional modality in terms of this selection 
function; accordingly, we should conclude that the modal commitments of their dispositionalism 
are primarily negative. (In particular, my own view is that Mumford and Anjum's dispositionalism 
basically amounts to the rejection of necessitarianism.) In terms of the line of criticism at hand, the 
point that I want to establish is that the antecedent strengthening argument is the basis for Mumford 
and Anjum's sui generis dispositional modality. "The main argument against the causal 
necessitarian view was that a disposition can always be prevented or interfered with by other 
dispositions. This indicates a contrast between dispositionality and necessity" (2011, p.176). That 
being said, however, Mumford and Anjum do not disclose the other 'minor' arguments against 
necessitarianism. (Perhaps we are to take these other arguments to be the alleged advantages of 
their dispositionalism; in any case, it is fair to say that they are not given a central place in the text.) 
Interestingly, however, Mumford and Anjum do say that probabilistic causal interactions provide 
a "fine corroboration of anti-necessitarianism" (2011, p.77). Before we continue let us note a useful 
citation where Mumford and Anjum remind the reader that resultant vectors do no more than 
dispose towards their effects. 
 
It might be wondered, at this stage, whether the vector model fails to depict causation at all 
or only shows the powers. After all, on our account, even if we have a resultant vector that 
meets a certain threshold, given the lack of necessitation, we cannot guarantee that the 
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threshold will actually be met ... [the resultant vector] depicts only a resultant power, which 
still no more than disposes towards its effect (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.74: my square 
bracket).     
 
With this in mind, let us return again to the issue of probabilistic powers. We are presently 
concerned that Mumford and Anjum's understanding of probability is trading upon their antecedent 
strengthening argument, such that there is no independent ontological basis to think that a double-
headed component vector should 'dispose towards' a manifestation qua change in the required 
probabilistic sense. We can draw attention to this issue with the following consideration. Mumford 
and Anjum have responded to the puzzle of how the fair coin can land heads or tails: it must be 
subject to additional operative powers, such as gravitational forces. I note that these additional 
operative powers do not have to be probabilistic powers, according to Mumford and Anjum's 
discussion; that is to say, they can be 'single-headed' component vectors. Let us therefore consider 
the following quality space. F and G are the manifestation types, where F is landing heads and G 
is landing tails. In addition, let us take two sets of operating powers. The first set is exhausted by 
the operative power of the fair coin: a double-headed component vector that is centralised over the 
starting line. The second set includes a number of single-headed component vectors that are 
standing in for gravitational forces and the like. There are several options for these non-
probabilistic powers, but let us simply say that this second set has one or more members. Taking 
the two sets together, in terms of the direction and magnitudes of these component vectors, we can 
group of all of possibilities into two classes. The first class has a resultant vector that meets the 
threshold line of either F or G; the second class has a resultant vector that does not reach either of 
these threshold lines. 
 
What is interesting about this scenario is that the probabilistic power does not make any difference 
to the resultant vector. This is, of course, because the double-headed component vector is 
centralised over the starting line, in accordance with Mumford and Anjum's discussion of the fair 
coin. Hence its F-side head and its G-side head perfectly cancel out. But this means that the two 
possible manifestations qua change for the coin—i.e. landing heads or landing tails—are entirely 
driven by the gravitational forces etc. of the causal situation. Accordingly, Mumford and Anjum 
have not modelled a fair probabilistic power but rather a completely passive power, which is a 
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strange idea in itself. It is important to bear in mind that the fair coin is standing in for a genuinely 
probabilistic power; so the coin is not simply well-balanced, such that there is a poor chance of 
predicting how it land in simple tosses. In contrast, the landing of the coin once tossed is thought 
to be a matter of irreducible chance (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.78). We can see the difficulty 
this raises by considering that a specification of the details of the causal situation—i.e. fixing the 
members of the second set of operative powers, as well as their directions and magnitudes—only 
permits a single manifestation qua change (assuming that the resultant vector passes the threshold 
line). As such, Mumford and Anjum's ontological model of probability is flawed. I think they are 
correct to say that a probabilistic power should only tend towards a certain distribution of events, 
rather than necessitate this distribution; but this is only half of the requirement. What we also want 
a probabilistic power to do, I suggest, is to facilitate different possible changes within a single 
circumstance. By 'circumstance' I mean a given spatiotemporal arrangement of objects bearing 
powers (i.e. a complex state of affairs). I note that Mumford and Anjum say in their discussion of 
determinism that their dispositionalism can handle indeterministic causation, of which they think 
probabilistic causation is a sub-type (2011, p.76–7). More specifically: "[I]t is consistent with 
causal dispositionalism that two tokens of the same disposition could produce different 
manifestations in identical contexts, if there were irreducibly indeterministic dispositions for 
instance" (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.76). We would expect the same to hold for probabilistic 
powers, though the problem at hand suggests that this feature is not going to be secured. Staying 
with the fair coin example, what should be happening is that upon its being tossed, the coin has a 
power such that it can either land heads or tails. (In this sense the example is a little strange, since 
we do not think that coins have such probabilistic powers; but this complaint does not affect the 
problem at hand, which concerns the machinery of Mumford and Anjum's theory.) Fixing the 
members of the set of non-probabilistic powers amounts to fixing the background conditions for 
the tossing of the coin (e.g. the environment within which it is tossed, as well as the nature of the 
toss). As we have seen, however, fixing these causal factors will in fact 'determine' how the coin 
will land, since the resultant vector is unaffected by the centralised double-headed component 
vector.  
 
At this point Mumford and Anjum will object that causes do not necessitate their effects, such that 
'fixing the causal factors' cannot 'determine' how the coin will land. As I suggested above, though, 
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this response would conflate two distinct issues. What we require is a probability-based 
explanation of how the fair coin can either land heads or tails in this circumstance. Calling upon 
the idea that the operative powers could have been otherwise will not serve this task: indeed, 
specifying a new circumstance will give a new resultant vector that will in turn only allow a single 
possibility, whether this be a manifestation qua change or Mumford and Anjum's operative notion 
of causation (where a change does not occur). So we have a specific problem for fair probabilistic 
powers. Because the double-headed component vectors in question are centralised over the starting 
lines of the quality spaces, whilst we can say that the probabilistic power is operative, it will give 
no net 'push' towards either side of the quality space. Accordingly, if the threshold line of either 
manifestation type is met, this will only be due to the operation of additional powers. This generates 
the problem that fair probabilistic powers in casual interactions are making no overall contribution 
to the outcome, such that a fair coin that is tossed in exactly the same way will land exactly the 
same way each time. This is, of course, contrary to the result that Mumford and Anjum's discussion 
aims to establish.   
 
Let us briefly consider the other case, which concerns weighted probabilistic powers. Mumford 
and Anjum say that weighted lonely probabilities, whereby the double-headed component vector 
is unevenly orientated with regard to the starting line, can manifest qua change in theoretical 
conditions (2011, p.80). But it is difficult to see how this could be so according to their theoretical 
resources. Let us take a probabilistic power that has a 0.7 chance for F and a 0.3 chance for G, 
where F and G are its manifestation types. Let us also assume, in line with Mumford and Anjum's 
remarks, that no other operative powers are required for a manifestation qua change. How can the 
resultant vector, which will favour F, ever reach the threshold line of F without the use of additional 
operative powers? There is no explanation for how this could occur. A more severe problem arises 
for the G manifestation type. The resultant vector disfavours this change, but Mumford and Anjum 
will want to say that it is nevertheless possible (although less likely) that the lonely probabilistic 
power can manifest this type of change. Again, there is no explanation for how this could be so. 
What has happened in this case, I think, is that Mumford and Anjum have invested their component 
vectors with 'powers' that they do not have, so to speak. In light of the antecedent strengthening 
argument, we have the general idea that even a resultant vector does not necessitate a manifestation 
qua change. The operative powers could have been different. But we should not move from that 
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idea to the separate idea that component vectors are themselves 'sufficient grounds' for possible 
changes (I explore this idea in the next chapter). As far as I can see, it is only in this manner that 
we could say that a weighted probabilistic power could manifest qua change either of its 
manifestation types on its own. (Recall that Mumford and Anjum deny that fair probabilistic 
powers can spontaneously manifest on their own.) Accordingly, this type of case (the weighted 
probability) has the distinctive shortcoming that it does not fit into Mumford and Anjum's account 
of threshold lines; and this account, I assume, is a fundamental component of their vector model 
of causation.  
 
A short summary of both of these difficulties will be useful. Mumford and Anjum say that fair 
probabilities require additional operative powers if they are to manifest qua change. But when we 
add additional operative powers, it turns out that any manifestations qua change will be a direct 
reflection of these additional operative powers. Accordingly, we fail to secure the crucial idea that 
a probabilistic power could have affected the outcome of a causal interaction in different ways 
(with the other causal factors remaining fixed). In contrast, it is allowed as a theoretical case that 
a weighted probabilistic power could spontaneously manifest qua change. Again, this goes against 
the account of the vector model of causation, since the threshold lines cannot be met.   
 
On the basis of these observations, I think that Mumford and Anjum's account of probabilistic 
powers is metaphorical. The component vectors of probabilistic powers are being called upon for 
duties that were not secured for them in the setting out of the vector model of causation. More 
specifically, the only reason that we were given for thinking that complex causes do not necessitate 
their effects was the antecedent strengthening argument. From this argument we are intended to 
conclude that causes merely dispose towards their effects. Importantly, this mere 'disposing 
towards' is characteristic of probabilistic causation also. But the required modifications to the 
vector model of causation have not been made. The idea that probabilistic powers operate as 
multiple-headed component vectors raises new difficulties and does not secure the correct 
outcomes. As far as I can see, then, Mumford and Anjum are equivocating over the term 'disposing 
towards' in the following sense. In the vector model of causation, as it stands apart from 
probabilistic powers, operative powers dispose towards their manifestation type. Operative powers 
do not necessitate a manifestation qua change, because there is always the possibility of additional 
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countervailing powers. But probabilistic causation uses a different sense of 'disposing towards', 
which Mumford and Anjum have not secured. In this sense even a total cause that contains a 
probabilistic power will merely push towards a certain outcome without necessitation. 
Significantly, this lack of necessitation is independent of any considerations concerning antecedent 
strengthening. Let us term the first sense of this disposing towards 'disposing qua strengthening' 
and the second sense 'disposing qua probability'. The problem is that Mumford and Anjum are 
providing a model of disposing qua probability, but its ontological resources are only anti-
necessitarian in the sense of disposing qua strengthening. On this basis, I suggest that Mumford 
and Anjum will be forced to equivocate on these two senses when they say, for example, that a 
probabilistic disposition "tends towards a certain distribution of events only; it never necessitates 
that distribution" (2011, p.78). 
 
In light of these problems, I think Mumford and Anjum should have said that probabilistic powers 
can operate in disjunctive ways. Let us consider again the fair coin. When the probabilistic power 
that is responsible for the fair coin's landing heads or tails becomes operative, we should say that 
either the F-side or the G-side component vector is placed upon the quality space (exclusive 'either–
or'). This probabilistic power—let us call it 'spin' for lack of a better term—does not operate with 
a single double-headed component vector, but rather its operation involves a disjunctive 'push' for 
one of two manifestation types. Each of these 'pushes' will be a single-headed component vector. 
In line with Mumford and Anjum's propensity-based approach to probability, we can say that there 
is a 0.5 chance for spin's operation to push to the F-side and a 0.5 chance for spin's operation to 
push to the G-side. This will capture the idea that spin is responsible for the fair coin's landing 
heads or tails.  
 
It will be useful to motivate this strategy. Why should Mumford and Anjum say that probabilistic 
powers operate disjunctively? As far as I can see, this is the only strategy that will secure both of 
Mumford and Anjum's requirements on this matter. Firstly, on the basis of Mumford and Anjum's 
vector model of causation, we require the distinction between operations and manifestations qua 
change to remain in force. This means that we cannot retreat into the more standard view that a 
probabilistic dispositional property directly manifests its manifestation property qua disjunctive 
property instantiation. (I think this is how Bird and Ellis, for example, would approach the issue.) 
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Mumford and Anjum want probabilistic powers to be able to 'interact' with other operative powers 
for the purposes of complex causation and interference/prevention. Accordingly, we must 
understand the probabilistic power as operating qua component force if we are to maintain 
Mumford and Anjum's wider aims. Secondly, however, my proposal has the unique advantage over 
Mumford and Anjum's present set up in that I can properly establish the important result that a 
circumstance involving a probabilistic power can lead to different manifestations qua changes. 
That is to say, upon fixing a spatiotemporal arrangement of powers that contains a probabilistic 
power, the disjunctive operation of this probabilistic power will allow the same causal context to 
give multiple sets of component vectors and therefore multiple possible resultant vectors. (In the 
case of spin, we would have two such possibilities; but more complex probabilistic powers for 
higher dimensional quality spaces would generate more possibilities.) If we want to keep Mumford 
and Anjum's apparatus of resultant vectors and threshold lines, which I assume we do, then the 
only option is to say is that the component vectors could have been different when a probabilistic 
power becomes operative. Only in this way can we maintain that one circumstance can lead to 
multiple outcomes, which is the distinctive characteristic of causal interactions involving 
probabilistic powers. Or so I shall assume for the purposes of this chapter and the next. 
 
5.5 Calculation procedure 
 
One way to reinforce this point is to make a four-way distinction between the different 'calculation 
stages' of Mumford and Anjum's dispositionalism. A first step is to establish those powers that are 
operative. The second step is to place the appropriate component vectors of these operative powers 
upon a quality space. A third step is to calculate the resultant vector. And finally, we have to check 
if this resultant vector passes a threshold line, and 'update' the arrangement of objects bearing 
powers if this is the case.  
 
Calculation procedure for a given subject of change: 
 
(1) Check the circumstance, i.e. the spatiotemporal arrangement of propertied-objects to 
specify those powers that are operative.  
(2) Plot component vectors, such that we specify the total cause. 
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(3) Plot resultant vector of this total cause. 
(4) Check for threshold line (together with possible 'update' of the world) 
 
It is interesting to see how Mumford and Anjum's anti-necessitarian strategies are being carried 
out with regard to these conceptual distinctions. As a first remark, we can note that the antecedent 
strengthening argument is targeting stage (1). That is to say, the specification of operative powers 
does not necessitate its effect because the operative powers could have been different. Quite 
strikingly, however, we can see that stages (2), (3), and (4) are 'necessitarian' through and through. 
For consider: Mumford and Anjum have provided no argument that operative powers do not have 
to 'push' for their manifestation type (i.e. that operative powers do not require us to plot their 
component vectors)—indeed, the component vectors are identical to the operative powers. Once 
we fix the operative powers, therefore, we have fixed the component vectors of the quality space. 
(Note that this holds for Mumford and Anjum's probabilistic powers, which is generating our 
present difficulties). Hence, the move from (1) to (2) is classic necessitarianism: a given 
circumstance is sufficient for a given set of component vectors. A similar point holds for aspects 
(3) and (4), because these stages are mathematical: the resultant vector is a straightforward vector 
addition function from the component vectors, whereas the threshold line question is a simple 
subtraction. To provide a quick example of the latter: can the value of the threshold line (e.g. 10 
units) be subtracted from the value of the resultant vector (e.g. 12 units) to give either a positive 
remainder or zero? If 'yes', then the resultant passes/meets the threshold line. Taking all of this 
together, we can see that the yes/no answer of stage (4) is in fact a (more complex) function of 
stage (1). So necessitation abounds for Mumford and Anjum.  
 
With this in mind, we can diagnose Mumford and Anjum's present difficulty more clearly. What 
they have done with probabilistic powers is to collapse aspects (1) and (2). This is natural, of course, 
since the component vectors are meant to represent operative powers. As we have discussed, 
however, the approach of double-headed component vectors is too weak, such that it cannot 
generate alternative manifestations qua change from one and the same circumstance. My proposal 
is to separate stages (1) and (2) in the case of operative probabilistic powers: they can contribute 
different alternative component vectors. To clarify, the idea is that we can start with a single 
circumstance, i.e. a given spatiotemporal arrangement of propertied-objects, but end up with 
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multiple (albeit alternative) total causes. For example, if the spin property of the coin operates in 
the F-direction, then we will have one total cause, and if it operates in the G-direction, then we will 
have a different total cause (as the component vectors will be different in the two cases). We can 
see that this disjunction of possibility will trickle down the calculation stages to allow probabilistic 
powers to exert their influence in different resultant vectors and therefore in different 
manifestations qua change.    
 
5.6 Discussion on types of probabilistic power 
 
There is a difficulty that concerns the issue of indeterminism and probability in the context of 
Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation that we have so far bypassed in our discussion. 
This is that there are two main senses in which we will want to say that the operations of powers 
could be 'disjunctive'. Firstly, we can have the idea of a power that operates disjunctively in that 
when it becomes operative, the component vector that is plotted is one of alternative disjuncts. 
And secondly, we can have the idea of a type of power whose operation is non-conditional. Let us 
consider Mumford and Anjum's partnered powers, which use single-headed component vectors 
with proximity conditions. As noted, Mumford and Anjum accept that the suitable relationship (or 
'coming together') of these powers is sufficient for their operation. In other words, the satisfaction 
of the proximity requirements of these powers is sufficient for their component vectors to be 
plotted. And this is because, as we discussed in the previous chapter, such powers are operative 
just in case they are proximate to their reciprocal partners. But for some powers, we can suggest, 
there is no subjunctive sufficiency for their operation. In general, there may be some types of 
power whose operation is itself a matter of indeterministic randomness or probabilistic chance. In 
this case we would have a disjunctive operation in this sense: in a single circumstance, it might or 
might not be the case that the power operates.  
 
It is this first type of power that I have been discussing above, since in saying that probabilistic 
powers can operate disjunctively, I assumed that such powers were operative to begin with. 
(Accordingly, the disjunctive operation was a matter that concerned what the power would do, so 
to speak, not whether the power would do anything at all.) These two senses of disjunctive 
operation are connected to the different examples that Mumford and Anjum discuss when setting 
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out their notion of double-headed vectors. Consider the case of the fair probabilistic power for the 
coin. One issue that Mumford and Anjum note is that it is problematic to say that this probabilistic 
power can spontaneously manifest in either a heads-landing or a tails-landing—other component 
vectors are needed to represent the toss of the coin in a gravitational field. Let us recall that the 
theoretical motivation for this remark was to alleviate the concern that the centralised double-
headed vector would cancel out. We can make a simple connection between the fair coin example 
and the first type of case that I outlined in the previous paragraph. That is to say, we can take the 
probabilistic power of the fair coin to be a conditional power that nevertheless has a probabilistic 
outcome. Intuitively, the thought would be that, once the fair coin is tossed, it is necessary that it 
lands on one of its sides, but where we are imagining the 'spin' of this coin to be irreducibly 
probabilistic, what side it does land on will be a matter of fair chance. And we can assume that the 
coin cannot land on either of its two sides unless it has been tossed. Mumford and Anjum also 
discuss the case of radioactive decay in motivating the idea that probabilistic (and indeterministic) 
powers can spontaneously manifest in specific contexts. There is also a simple connection that we 
can make between radioactive decay and the second case of disjunctive operations, canvassed 
above. In the case of the unstable atom, whether or not the atom 'does anything' is a matter that is 
completely insensitive to external circumstances. All that we can say is that there is a certain 
probability that the atom will emit radiation during a certain time interval. I shall summarise these 
two senses below. 
 
(i) Disjunctive operations qua plotted component vectors: This sense of disjunctive 
operation concerns the second step of Mumford and Anjum's calculation procedure. Upon 
becoming operative, the power can operate with one of alternative disjuncts (perhaps with 
weighted chance). 
 
(ii) Disjunctive operations qua spontaneity of operation: This sense of disjunctive operation 
concerns the first step of Mumford and Anjum's calculation procedure. Whether or not the 
power becomes operative is itself a matter of disjunction, in the sense that the power might 




Where do these considerations leave our general discussion? I suspect that what is going on here 
is that Mumford and Anjum are aware of these distinctions, which is indeed why they have 
discussed coin tosses and radioactive decay—examples that seemingly illustrate senses (i) and (ii) 
above. But there is a problem. Although there is nothing intrinsically wrong with using a vector to 
represent, say, whether or not an atom will emit radiation, this strategy does become problematic 
within Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation. And this is because 'standard' cases of 
causation, which do not draw upon either of these two senses of disjunctive operation—hammers 
striking vases, and so forth—approach component vectors as causal factors that are 'occurently 
happening'. In other words, component vectors are primarily introduced in Mumford and Anjum's 
theory to understand causal factors that are operative qua active and actual. (In fact, we can see 
that sense (i) above, which is the modification that I introduced for Mumford and Anjum in the 
previous part of this chapter, also concerns active and actual causal factors. If 'spin' operates to the 
F-side, then this causal factor is occurently happening, and if 'spin' operates to the G-side, then this 
causal factor is occurently happening, and so on.) But we are asking the same theoretical apparatus 
to do two different things if we ask component vectors to represent both actual and active causal 
factors, on the one hand, and what we can term 'disjunctive possibilities for action', on the other—
where the latter concept concerns sense (ii) above. On this basis, I am tempted to say the following. 
If we hold sense (ii) in mind, i.e. the idea that a power might or might not become operative, then 
this 'disjunction of operation' is not something that can be understood within Mumford and Anjum's 
quality spaces as a component vector. For if we do attempt to understand it as a component vector, 
then we are collapsing together two different types of 'causal factor'. Generally speaking, and 
dropping the specific meanings of Mumford and Anjum's terms for a moment, this approach would 
collapse together 'powers that are operative' and 'powers that could be operative'.  
 
This is clearly a difficult issue, and I am unable to take it any further in this chapter. What will be 
useful, however, is to clarify the types of power that we shall require for the argument of the next 
chapter. From this point onwards I am going to assume that Mumford and Anjum's treatment of 
probabilistic causation is unworkable, on the basis of the arguments that I have presented in this 
chapter. As things stand, however, we currently have two senses of disjunctive operation that cut 
across one another, and I think this will create unnecessary complexity for the next discussion. For 
example, we could have a power whose operation/non-operation was itself a matter of chance, but 
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where the operation would lead to one of many component vectors being plotted upon its quality 
space (thereby utilising both senses above). A second complexity is whether or not it is correct to 
say that all probabilistic/indeterministic powers lack proximity conditions, which is a commitment 
that my reading of Mumford and Anjum's taxonomy of powers suggested (see §5.3). I can see the 
motivation for this idea, but our discussion of the fair probabilistic coin stands against it, since in 
this case we have disjunctive operations qua plotted component vectors but not disjunctive 
operations qua spontaneity of operation. In plain terms: once tossed the coin has to land a certain 
way but which way it does land is deemed to be a matter of weighted chance. But let us leave these 
loose ends behind and move on.  
 
The argument of the next chapter requires a distinction between three types of powers. This 
simplified taxonomy replaces the one that I charted in this chapter for the purposes of the sequel. 
Firstly, let us call Mumford and Anjum's regular partnered powers 'single-operative powers'. These 
powers shall be taken to have conditional proximity conditions and fixed component vectors: so if 
these powers are proximate (i.e. stimulated), then it is necessary that they operate with a (fixed) 
single-headed component vector. (In other words, single-operative powers do not draw upon either 
of the two senses of disjunctive operation that I have outlined above.) Next, let us accept 
'disjunction-operative' powers as a main type of probabilistic/indeterministic power. These are the 
powers that I have been working with in the main body of this chapter; we will take these powers 
to use the first sense of disjunction but not the second sense of disjunction, as outlined above. That 
is to say, disjunction-operative powers are partnered powers that have proximity conditions—so 
whether or not these powers operate is not itself a matter of weighted chance or complete 
randomness. But upon operating, we have our 'either F-side or G-side' notion. And thirdly, let us 
accept what I shall term 'spontaneous powers' as the other main representative of 
probabilistic/indeterministic powers. This species of power will draw upon the second but not the 
first sense of disjunctive operation. Hence, whether or not the power operates is a matter of 
chance/randomness; but given the operation of the power, we shall have a fixed single-headed 
component vector. These three types are summarised below. (We can note, of course, that we are 




(i) Single-operative powers: these powers have (1.) a conditionality for their operation/non-
operation and (2.) fixed component vectors. 
 
(ii) Disjunction-operative powers: these powers have (1.) a conditionality for their 
operation/non-operation and (2.) a disjunction of alternative component vectors. They are 
'partnered powers' in Mumford and Anjum's terminology. 
 
(iii) Spontaneous powers: these powers have (1.) a non-conditionality for the operation/non-
operation, i.e. they do not have proximity conditions in line with Mumford and Anjum's 
'lonely powers'. But (2.) these powers have fixed component vectors.   
 
I should again stress that this taxonomy is a simplification for the purposes of the next chapter. 
What we are doing here is separating out the two senses of disjunction that we have discussed, and 
making the simplification that they cannot cut across one another. With this in mind, the conclusion 
of the argument in the next chapter will be tacitly restricted to accommodate this simplification. 
That said, however, I shall note two points. First, this simplification does not significantly affect 
the overall thrust of the argument. And second, given that we are representing the 'main parties' as 
far as Mumford and Anjum's implicit distinctions go, I think that the conclusion of the next chapter 
could be applied to Mumford and Anjum's original taxonomy (or at least my reading of it) with a 












In this section of the thesis I want to develop a dilemma for Mumford and Anjum's dispositionalism 
that concerns determinism. I shall use it to support Barker's criticism that Mumford and Anjum's 
dispositionalism rules out determinism a priori. Let us recall that Mumford and Anjum's reply to 
Barker's criticism involved distinguishing two conceptions of determinism—a causal conception 
and a temporal conception. The causal conception was thought to lie behind Barker's criticism and 
also presuppose necessitarianism, whilst the temporal conception was thought to be orthogonal to 
the necessitarianism–dispositionalism issue. Mumford and Anjum also argued that the temporal 
conception was superior to the causal conception because the latter cannot handle uncaused events. 
To recapitulate, the temporal conception of determinism claims that if the world is deterministic, 
then the total state of the world at t1 dictates a single possible total state of the world at t2.  
 
There is another side to this topic that concerns the connection between the modal premise of the 
antecedent strengthening argument and Mumford and Anjum's neutrality on the temporal 
conception of determinism. Let us recall that the modal premise of the antecedent strengthening 
argument states that it is always possible for a causal process to be subject to additive prevention. 
(We can also recall that additive prevention involves the addition of a countervailing power to a 
complex cause—the operation of which modifies the resultant vector in question to equilibrium.) 
In the present discussion I will try to show that Mumford and Anjum cannot have additive 
prevention if the temporal conception of determinism is true. Accordingly, the modal premise of 
the antecedent strengthening argument (implicitly) rules out the temporal conception of 




An overview of this argument will be useful. The first stage is to consider the different ways in 
which Mumford and Anjum's dispositionalism might reject the temporal conception of 
determinism a posteriori. I argue that the inclusion of either (i) indeterministic causation or (ii) 
probabilistic causation would be (independently) sufficient to rule out the temporal conception of 
determinism. Mumford and Anjum's position on this matter is that their dispositionalism could 
incorporate either (i) or (ii), but that this incorporation is not necessary for their antecedent 
strengthening argument: in this way Mumford and Anjum think that they are remaining neutral on 
the issue of determinism under the temporal conception. But on this point I think Mumford and 
Anjum are mistaken. If (i) and (ii) are rejected a posteriori, then Mumford and Anjum lose the 
truth of the modal premise of the antecedent strengthening argument and therefore lose the 
soundness of the antecedent strengthening argument. Accordingly, if the modal premise is to be 
true, then it must be the case that either (i) or (ii) are incorporated into their dispositionalism. But 
this is just to say that Mumford and Anjum's dispositionalism (implicitly) rules out the temporal 
conception of determinism a priori, since the temporal conception of determinism is false if either 
(i) or (ii) are accepted.   
 
Why do Mumford and Anjum require either indeterministic or probabilistic causation for the 
modal premise of the antecedent strengthening argument? This is the second stage of my argument. 
Let us focus, for the sake of simplicity, upon probabilistic causation as oppose to indeterministic 
causation. (This does not affect the argument, since what is important is the disjunctive-operations 
that are shared by both indeterministic and probabilistic causation, not the distinction between 
complete randomness and weighted chance.) In short, the problem is as follows. The modal 
premise of the antecedent strengthening argument requires the possible addition of a 
countervailing power for all causal processes. This possibility will be a 'mere' possibility, i.e. a 
non-actual possibility. So the complex cause to which the countervailing power could have been 
added does not actually contain that countervailing power. But we should ask: where are the 
possible additive preventers for a given complex cause coming from? It is important to say at this 
point that Mumford and Anjum accept a version of dispositional actualism according to which 
'natural' possibilities are grounded by actual powers. This raises the question of whether or not we 
can account for the possibility of the additive preventers on the basis of non-probabilistic powers. 
We cannot. The additive preventers will have to be either actual powers that could have been 
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operative upon the complex cause, or otherwise non-actual powers that could have been actual (via 
a manifestation qua change) and that, in addition, could have been operative upon the complex 
cause. Problematically, however, both of these options involve mere possibilities that demand the 
disjunctive-operations of probabilistic powers. This is because both options require the actual 
spatiotemporal arrangement of powers to have been different, which is a type of mere possibility 
that is uniquely secured by probabilistic powers. I conclude that Mumford and Anjum's modal 
premise requires either indeterministic or probabilistic causation if the possibility of additive 
preventers is to be 'natural' (i.e. if it is to be grounded by the powers of the actual world).  
 
Let us consider uncaused events. Mumford and Anjum allow 'non-natural' possibilities, which are 
possibilities that are not grounded by powers—uncaused events fall into this category. Importantly, 
the a posteriori acceptance of uncaused events also constitutes a failure of the temporal conception 
of determinism. Taken together, these facts raise the question of whether or not the possible 
additive preventers could be non-natural (mere) possibilities in the form of uncaused events. In 
this third stage of the argument I argue as follows. Although this option would secure the truth of 
the modal premise, drawing upon uncaused events requires the rejection of the temporal 
conception of determinism, which is again to fall foul of Barker's criticism. Hence, if the modal 
premise is to be true, then the temporal conception of determinism cannot be true. In addition, at 
the end of this chapter I argue that there is a sense in which uncaused events are irrelevant to the 
necessitarianism–dispositionalism issue. 
 
On this basis, I suggest the following dilemma for Mumford and Anjum's dispositionalism. (This 
is the third and final stage of the argument) The first horn is that Mumford and Anjum stick to 
their guns concerning their neutrality on the temporal conception of determinism. But this allows 
us to set up a version of the actual world where there is no indeterministic causation, probabilistic 
causation, or uncaused events (so as to give a temporally deterministic world). Crucially, however, 
the modal premise of the antecedent strengthening argument would be false in such a world, pace 
Mumford and Anjum's discussion. The second horn of the dilemma is that Mumford and Anjum 
explicitly accept a world that is not temporally deterministic. In doing so, they can safeguard the 
modal premise of the antecedent strengthening argument. But there is a high cost: their 
dispositionalism is not neutral on the issue of determinism. I think this is a major drawback for 
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their dispositionalism, since it is relatively uncontroversial that indeterministic and/or probabilistic 
causes fail to necessitate their effects; accordingly, there is no distinctive argument against 
necessity from antecedent strengthening if its modal premise already requires the rejection of 
necessitation. Again, uncaused events play a slightly different role in the dilemma to 
indeterministic/probabilistic powers, and I shall explain this difference at the appropriate time. As 
a last point, I have decided to exclude spontaneous powers from the majority of this discussion so 
as to simplify the issues; but these entities will be re-introduced at the end, and their role in the 
dilemma will be explained.    
 
6.2 Stage one: how the world might be temporally indeterministic 
 
Let us begin the first stage of the argument. I shall assume in this part of my discussion that 
Mumford and Anjum could accept or reject the following theses a posteriori: (i) indeterministic 
causation, (ii) probabilistic causation, and (iii) uncaused events. By this I mean to say that their 
dispositionalism is neutral on these theses, such that, from their perspective, it would be a matter 
of science as oppose to metaphysics whether or not, for example, there is any indeterministic 
causation in the world. What I want to establish at this point is the way in which (i)–(iii) connect 
to the temporal conception of determinism. We can recall that Mumford and Anjum have 
responded to Barker's criticism by arguing that it presupposes the causal conception of 
determinism, which is a 'disguised' version of necessitarianism. Or so they claim. But it is 
important to consider how Mumford and Anjum can make sense of the causal neutrality of the 
temporal conception of determinism. How exactly is this temporal conception working? A prima 
facie concern is that the term 'dictates' has been chosen as a causally neutral alternative for 'causes' 
or 'necessitates'. We need to investigate, therefore, the sense in which Mumford and Anjum think 
that their dispositionalism could be true whilst the world is either dictating or not dictating its 
future states.  
 
Mumford and Anjum's (2011, pp.75–6) discussion of the temporal conception of determinism 
suggests that they take the acceptance of (i)–(iii) to be (independently) sufficient for its falsity. 
Hence, if indeterministic causation is the case, then the world is not temporally deterministic, and 
so on for the other two theses. Consider in the first place that immediately after discussing the 
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temporal conception of determinism, Mumford and Anjum explain that it is consistent with their 
dispositionalism that two tokens of the same type of power would produce "identical 
manifestations" if placed in identical types of context (2011, p.76). The converse is also accepted 
for the case of indeterministic causation: it is possible for two tokens of the same type of 
(indeterministic) power to be in identical context-types yet manifest in different ways. Given that 
probabilistic causation is thought to be a sub-type of indeterministic causation, this discussion 
suggests that both indeterministic and probabilistic causation would constitute a failure of the 
temporal conception of determinism. Let us bring together indeterministic and probabilistic 
causation under the term 'non-deterministic causation'. The idea, so construed, would be that the a 
posteriori acceptance of non-deterministic causation in the world is sufficient for the total state of 
the world at t1 to fail to dictate a single possible state of the world at t2. Consider in the second 
place that Mumford and Anjum have rejected the causal conception of determinism on the grounds 
that it cannot handle uncaused events. Indeed, this shortcoming is used in support of the temporal 
conception of determinism (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.75). So it looks as though the a 
posteriori acceptance of uncaused events would also be sufficient for the falsity of the temporal 
conception of determinism. If there are uncaused events, then the total state of the world at t1 
cannot dictate a single possible total state of the world at t2. This is because, we might suppose, 
any number of uncaused events can enter into the total state of the world at t2 quite independently 
of the total state at t1. A complication at this point, which arises because Mumford and Anjum have 
not explained what 'dictates' means, is that we might say that the state at t1 can dictate uncaused 
events at t2, such that fixing the former state fixes the latter state regardless of whether or not there 
are uncaused events: on this view the t1 state can dictate what caused and uncaused events there 
will be at the t2 state. That said, I think that Mumford and Anjum's discussion of uncaused events 
with regard to the causal conception of determinism suggests that they take these types of events 
to constitute a failure of determinism. The point, therefore, is that the causal conception cannot say 
that the world is non-deterministic if there are uncaused events, whereas the temporal conception 
can, which is to its merit. Taken together, then, the a posteriori acceptance of (i)–(iii) is 
(independently) sufficient for the falsity of the temporal conception of determinism. Just to note a 
final issue: when we are saying that the temporal conception can be false in the present context, 
we are not denying that this approach to determinism is false; the idea, rather, is that the temporal 
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conception is the 'right way' to think about determinism, but that the world does not satisfy the 
requirement: viz. it is temporally indeterministic.   
 
Before we consider the second stage of the argument it is useful to question how (i)–(iii) can be 
rejected a posteriori without accepting necessitarianism. For the necessitarian will propose that, 
in particular, the rejection of non-deterministic causation is sufficient to establish the thesis that 
causes necessitate their effects. Why? For this reason: if we have operative powers that can only 
give a single component vector, i.e. if we have powers that do not have disjunctive-operations, 
then it seems that fixing the cause fixes the effect. Mumford and Anjum's response to this line of 
thought, of course, is that their dispositionalism is trading upon the antecedent strengthening 
argument, which does not require non-deterministic causation but rather the modal premise that 
'things could have been otherwise'. (In general, this is why Mumford and Anjum think they can 
remain neutral on the question of determinism under the temporal conception.) But there is a 
question here. How can the world dictate its future states if it does not necessitate them? This 
question has arisen because Mumford and Anjum reject necessitation in nature but think that they 
can have a temporally deterministic world, i.e. a world where future states are dictated. How then 
is the dictation of the world's events different to their necessitation? Mumford and Anjum's reply 
to this question is to suggest that there can be non-causal forms of necessitation.  
 
The core idea in determinism is the fixity of the future by the past. This can be expressed in 
a number of ways, none of which involves the claim that causes necessitate their effects. 
There may be some necessitation involved, but causation does not have to be its modus 
operandi (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.75: original italics). 
 
Dispositionality is thus never a source of the necessity of something in the world, even if it 
exists alongside it. In the deterministic case, for instance, where it is necessary that Fa, that 
is not because there was a disposition towards it. What delivers the necessity is that, 
somehow, everything got fixed. This will include the fixedness of all the background 
conditions—including which dispositions do, and which do not, act to produce the 
necessitated outcome—but it was not those powers that necessitated the outcome (Mumford 




I think that this style of response is dangerous for two reasons. A first point, which is minor, is that 
Mumford and Anjum have not explained what this non-causal source of necessitation could be. 
Accordingly, it is not clear whether or not Mumford and Anjum have established that their 
dispositionalism is compatible with alternative forms of necessitation, e.g. the 'dictation' of the 
temporal conception of determinism, since we do not have a clear picture of the latter. A second 
point that I take to be more serious is as follows. If we consider the second citation above, we can 
see that Mumford and Anjum are allowing that the proximity of powers can be necessitated in a 
non-causal sense. (We can recall that operative powers are partnered powers that are proximate, 
i.e. suitably related.) The problem here is that Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation 
should be providing the metaphysical explanation for why objects and properties are spatially 
arranged as they are—at least where uncaused events are removed from the picture. Consider again 
this citation.  
 
Events will be produced by powers at work: at least the events that are caused will be 
(whether some events are uncaused, we leave open). Events will be the changes produced 
when powers exercise themselves. And some of these changes will then push other powers 
together. The exercising of one power may put sugar into tea, for instance. When suitable 
partnered powers are pushed together, they will in turn manifest themselves. And so it goes 
on (Mumford and Anjum 2011, pp.2–3).  
 
This citation suggests that the vector model of causation can provide a metaphysical explanation 
of the spatiotemporal pattern of events. Consider the world at a time. There will be a number of 
objects bearing powers that stand in certain spatial relations (given Mumford and Anjum's 
pandispositionalism, these spatial relations will be further powers). This arrangement, taken as a 
whole, will fix the powers that are actually operative for the various subjects of change, since a 
power is operative just in case it is suitably related to its reciprocal partners. In turn, the operation 
of these powers will result—via Mumford and Anjum's sui generis dispositional modality—in a 
new spatial arrangement of objects bearing powers at the next time. In this way, we can see that 
Mumford and Anjum's vector model of causation and its apparatus of manifestations qua changes 
encompasses a putative metaphysical explanation for the spatiotemporal patterns of events. This is 
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as it should be, since Mumford and Anjum are setting out a model of causation that is purported to 
provide a metaphysical explanation of various causal aspects of the world. And the distribution of 
objects and powers across space and time is a clear explanandum for any such theory. In order to 
remain neutral on the issue of determinism, however, Mumford and Anjum are now claiming that 
'background conditions' can be necessitated by a non-causal source. But the background conditions 
of one causal process are the effects of other causal processes (notably temporally prior causal 
processes). This admission is rather grave, therefore, since it suggests that the complete 
spatiotemporal pattern of events in the world is (or at least could be) the outcome of the non-causal 
source of necessitation. If so, then what explanatory role can the vector model of causation play in 
a temporally deterministic world? Mumford and Anjum cannot say, as they should be able to, that 
the background condition of a causal process is itself subject to metaphysical explanation insofar 
as it is produced by a set of temporally prior causal processes, since they have just admitted that 
such background conditions can be necessitated by a non-causal source. And it looks obscure to 
say that a state of affairs could be subject to a causal explanation that uses a sui generis 
dispositional modality whilst it is also subject to a non-causal explanation that uses strict 
necessitation.  
 
That said, I shall leave open whether or not this is a substantive problem for Mumford and Anjum. 
I suspect they would repeat their thesis that a dispositional type of modality can co-exist with the 
necessitation of a deterministic world. Given that we do not know what this foreign necessitation 
is, it is not clear to me that the problem can be taken any further. But our discussion so far has 
opened up a line of argument that can have more definite results. We shall now move on to the 
second stage of my discussion, which aims to show that the modal premise of the antecedent 
strengthening argument requires a world that is not temporally deterministic.  
 
6.3 Stage two: the modal premise cannot be true in a temporally deterministic world 
 
Let me begin this stage of the argument by outlining Mumford and Anjum's position on the 
connection between dispositionality and possibility. We have already noted that Mumford and 
Anjum take their dispositional modality to be sui generis, such that it cannot be analysed in terms 
of necessity or possibility; nevertheless, they do think that there is a connection between powers 
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and possibility that is relevant to our current discussion. Mumford and Anjum accept a version of 
actualism according to which 'natural' possibilities are to be grounded by actual powers. More 
precisely, all natural possibilities are the manifestations of powers, whether or not these 
manifestations are actually manifested.  
 
In the sense of natural possibility, therefore, it would actually be the case that if F is possible 
then there is a disposition towards F. No contrast is being offered, therefore, between 
dispositionality and possibility. On the contrary, the former may ground entirely what the 
latter consists in. What better candidate could there be for supplying the world with natural 
possibility than the dispositions that particular things have? (Mumford and Anjum 2011, 
p.182)  
 
Mumford and Anjum accept a sufficiency claim for (mere) natural possibilities that is shared by a 
number of philosophers in the dispositional actualist literature (e.g. Williams and Borghini 2008; 
Vetter 2010; Jacobs 2010; Pruss 2011). It states that "if something is disposed to be F, then it is 
possible that it be F (and that it not be F)" (Mumford and Anjum 2011, p.179). In this manner, for 
example, Williams and Borghini (2008, p.26) claim that "State of affairs S is possible iff there is 
some actual disposition d, the manifestation of which is (or includes) S". These sufficiency claims 
for possibility are comparable, although we can note that Mumford and Anjum's version is more 
restrictive in the sense that the possibility involves the same object that bears the power coming to 
have the manifestation of that power. (In the case of Williams and Borghini, the possible state of 
affairs S does not have to include the object that bears the disposition of which it is the 
manifestation.) Mumford and Anjum's other central principle on possibility is that "it is not the 
case that if it is possible that something is F, then it is disposed towards F" (2011, p.179). In this 
manner, Mumford and Anjum allow that there are possibilities that are not grounded by powers as 
their manifestations. These are Mumford and Anjum's 'non-natural' possibilities, which include 
uncaused events as well as logical possibilities, such as the existence of unicorns. 
 
With this in mind we can set out a problem for Mumford and Anjum. (This will be working towards 
the first horn of my envisaged dilemma.) We can develop this problem on the basis of two 
observations. Firstly, we can recall that the a posteriori rejection of either indeterministic or 
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probabilistic causation (together termed non-deterministic causation), is sufficient for the falsity 
of the temporal conception of determinism. Accordingly, we can expect Mumford and Anjum's 
dispositionalism to hold water if the actual world does not contain any non-deterministic causation, 
since they wish to remain neutral on the issue of determinism under their temporal conception. 
The second observation is that Mumford and Anjum have made a distinction between natural and 
non-natural possibility in the context of their actualist metaphysics. But the modal premise of the 
antecedent strengthening argument does not make use of either natural or non-natural possibility: 
it is not explicit about this matter either way. So in what sense—natural or non-natural—is it 
possible for all causal processes to be subject to additive prevention? Mumford and Anjum admit 
that it should be at least metaphysically possible (although perhaps not physically possible) for 
countervailing powers to be added to complex causes (2011, p.63). Mumford and Anjum's 
distinction between natural and non-natural possibility roughly maps onto the distinction between 
physical and metaphysical possibility, respectively. As we shall see below, however, this 
admission is to ignore Barker's line of criticism, where it is suggested that Mumford and Anjum's 
dispositionalism is in tension with the acceptance of determinism. In a nutshell, we shall see that 
Mumford and Anjum cannot say that it is naturally possible (i.e. physically possible) for complex 
causes to be subject to additive prevention whilst rejecting non-deterministic causation.   
 
The antecedent strengthening argument is trading upon the premise that we can always strengthen 
a complex cause with a countervailing power, such that the operation of this additive preventer 
will modify the resultant vector of the complex cause to equilibrium. The additive preventer in 
question is therefore a merely possible operative power. But we are currently concerned as to 
where these operative powers are coming from. Let us begin, therefore, by assuming that the 
additive preventers are actual powers. These actual powers will not be actually operative, but it 
should be possible that they be operative (so as to play the roles of countervailing powers for a 
given complex cause).  
 
Putting aside spontaneous powers for the time being, we can see that actual powers that are not 
actually operative could only have been operative if they could have been in a different spatial 
relation to their reciprocal partners. We can see this because Mumford and Anjum have understood 
operative powers as powers that are suitably related to their reciprocal partners, with the further 
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suggestion that this 'suitable relation' is to be understood in terms of spatial proximity. Let us 
consider a token complex cause, which is a collection of operative powers. Supposing that its 
additive preventer is some actual power, we should be able to say that at least one actual power in 
the world that is not operative for this complex cause could have been. In fact, we require that at 
least one non-operative power in the actual world that would modify the resultant vector to 
equilibrium could have been operative. Unfortunately, there is a simple argument to show that this 
requirement cannot be met without non-deterministic causation, so long as we are interested in 
Mumford and Anjum's natural conception of possibility, which is closely connected to physical 
possibility. Let us term the set of candidate actual powers for additive prevention, as canvassed 
above, 'P'. (To reiterate, the members of P are actual powers that are not operative upon the 
complex cause, but which, we are supposing, could have been.) For the reason that we are currently 
interested in natural possibility, we will need to get at least one of the members of P into spatial 
proximity with a reciprocal partner for the complex cause solely on the basis of the manifestations 
of powers. This latter requirement is arising, of course, because Mumford and Anjum's natural 
possibilities are all and only those possibilities that can be manifested by powers. (Hence, if we 
consider a firework that has not exploded, then it would be a (mere) natural possibility that it could 
explode, since this manifestation qua change is the manifestation-type of the power 'being a 
firework'.) As we noted in the previous chapter, however, it is distinctive of non-deterministic 
powers (i.e. single-operative powers) that a single circumstance can only give rise to a single 
possible 'push' or component vector. This problematises the idea that a member of P could have 
been a countervailing power for our complex cause. If we consider the history of a given member 
of P leading up to the time of the complex cause, then what we require is a causal process whereby 
this member could have travelled into spatial proximity with the reciprocal partners of the complex 
cause. But if all powers are single-operative, then no such opportunity will present itself, since all 
of the causal processes that this putative preventer is actually involved in will only have allowed 
one possible effect, be this a manifestation qua change or Mumford and Anjum's operative notion 
of effect (where no change occurs). I was motivating this idea in the previous chapter, when I 
discussed the 'calculation procedure' for Mumford and Anjum's theory. In short, if powers can only 
give one 'push' in a given circumstance, as is the case for single-operative powers, then there will 
be no degrees of freedom, so to speak, for merely possible spatial positions of powers. We can 
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conclude that Mumford and Anjum cannot get naturally possible prevention from actual powers 
whilst they are rejecting non-deterministic causation. 
 
This line of thought also applies to the view that the additive preventers of a complex cause could 
be non-actual powers (though we are still sidestepping uncaused events). The reasoning is again 
simple. If all powers are single-operative, then there will be no opportunity for non-actual powers 
to arise: it follows a fortiori that these impossible powers cannot prevent. Considering any 
circumstance (i.e. spatial arrangement of powers), there will be a single possible resultant vector 
and therefore a single possible type of effect. We can therefore say that if a power is non-actual, 
then it could not have been actual.  
 
These considerations are in line with the common idea that if the laws of nature are physically 
necessary, then there is a single physically possible temporal evolution of the world, relative to 
some background condition or initial state. But the context is different: we are currently working 
with Mumford and Anjum's actualist metaphysics and their vector model of causation. The key 
point at the moment, I think, is that we have a principled reason to think that the rejection of non-
deterministic causation will bring trouble for Mumford and Anjum's claim that it is naturally 
possible for all causal processes to be subject to additive prevention. When we unpack this claim 
we see that it collapses into the idea that non-actual spatial arrangements of powers are possible 
via the manifestations of the powers of the actual world. But it is unclear how these non-actual 
spatial arrangements could arise from causal processes that feature functional relations from actual 
spatial arrangements of powers to their effects (as is the case with causal processes that exclusively 
utilise single-operative powers.) Throughout the above discussion we should remember that 
Mumford and Anjum cannot say that the initial conditions as a whole could have been different. 
And this is because we are currently focusing upon their notion of natural possibility. So the only 
'moves' that Mumford and Anjum have open to them, so to speak, are those that 'flow' from what 





6.4 Supplement for stage two of the argument: dispositional actualism 
 
I think it will be useful to discuss a shortcoming of Mumford and Anjum's sufficiency claim for 
possibility that is arguably responsible for our present difficulty. The aspect of the claim that we 
are currently interested in concerns the idea that the instantiation of a power is sufficient for the 
possibility of the instantiating-object to have the manifestation of that power. In other words, if it 
is the case that object x has power P, where the manifestation of P is M, then x's having P is 
sufficient for the natural possibility of x's having M. I think it is important that Mumford and 
Anjum's (2011, pp.179–83) discussion of modality does not involve their distinction between 
operations and manifestations qua changes. This raises the question of whether the term 
'manifestation' in the sufficiency claim is restricted to manifestations qua changes. I assume that it 
is. But to see why this is of interest, let us adapt the sufficiency claim for operations in the following 
way: if x has P then it is possible that x is operative qua component vector C, where C is a specific 
component vector.  
 
In this adaptation I have left open what type of possibility we are dealing with. The reason for this 
is that the adapted claim is false under some understandings of possibility and true under others. 
Consider first McCall's (1969, p.427) notion of 'physical' modality, which is better introduced as 
a type of temporally-indexed modality. When we are thinking of possibility in this manner, we are 
considering what is possible at a certain time, such that we hold as fixed everything at that time. 
For example, we might say that it is temporally impossible for even a skilled builder to build at a 
certain time if she is not presently equipped with her tools and building materials. In terms of 
Mumford and Anjum's operations, we should also say that it temporally impossible for P to operate 
with C if x's being P is not suitably related to P's reciprocal partners. What is common to these two 
cases is that both the skilled builder and the power P have requirements that are unfulfilled at the 
time in question: the former requires tools and building materials that she does not have, whilst 
the latter requires (to simplify) a certain spatial relation to another power that does not obtain. That 
said, the two cases differ in that the skilled builder can choose whether or not to build when her 
requirements are met, whereas the conditionality of Mumford and Anjum's operations requires that 
a power must operate when it is proximate to its reciprocal partners. In the case of temporal 
possibility, then, the adapted sufficiency claim is false. This is because it does not mention whether 
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or not P is proximate: in terms of single-operative powers, where P is proximate it will be 
temporally necessary that it operates with C—ipso facto it will be temporally possible that it 
operate with C. In contrast, where P is not proximate, we should say that it is temporally impossible 
for P to operate with C. (We can recall that my adaptation of Mumford and Anjum's model of 
probability was to say that probabilistic powers can operate disjunctively in a single circumstance. 
With this in mind the case of a skilled builder whose requirements are met and the probabilistic 
power that is in proximity are comparable: my modification allows that probabilistic powers can 
choose what to do, as it were. We will return to this issue in a moment re spontaneous powers.)  
 
Let us stay with the adapted sufficiency claim for a moment. There are two alternative readings of 
the term 'possible' in which it is true. Firstly, we might have a metaphysical notion of possibility 
that seeks to understand what is possible for a certain entity insofar as it is a member of a certain 
ontological category. (In this connection, I discuss Lowe's (2006) form–content distinction in 
Chapter 10.) For example, we might say that it is possible for objects to instantiate properties, since 
this is how the ontological category of objects stands to that of properties. But it would be incorrect, 
we can suppose, to say that it is possible for properties to instantiate objects: that would be a 
'category mistake' with regard to the essences of objects and properties. Accordingly, we might 
construe the adapted sufficiency claim as saying that powers are the kinds of beings that can 
operate with component vectors, which is something that Mumford and Anjum do in fact say. 
Nevertheless, we can note that this metaphysical reading of the term 'possibility' matches poorly 
with C being a specific component vector, i.e. with C being a component vector with a specific 
direction (for a manifestation-type) and a specific magnitude. This is because, so we are assuming, 
there is a respectable understanding of the sufficiency claim that is poised at the level of ontological 
categories. But if we are thinking about possibility at this very broad level, then it would be less 
of a mismatch to say (more simply) that powers can operate with component vectors. Secondly, 
then, we might 'zoom in' from ontological categories to types of powers. So construed, the adapted 
sufficiency claim would link up a specific type of power with a specific type of component vector: 
if x has P then x can operate with C. Again, this is something that Mumford and Anjum require for 
their theory. We can note that it is a non-trivial claim: x's having P will not be sufficient for x's 




So far we have separated out three readings of the term 'possibility' that can plausibly be used for 
the adapted sufficiency claim. The same distinctions also hold, I believe, for Mumford and Anjum's 
regular sufficiency claim (for manifestations qua changes). In particular, there is a problem in 
saying that x's having P is sufficient for the temporal possibility of x's being M. With a temporal 
modal claim, we are thinking about what it necessary and/or possible at a specific time. For the 
reason that Mumford and Anjum's powers require proximity if they are to manifest qua change, 
the sufficiency claim incorrectly predicts that the mere instantiation of a power is sufficient for its 
manifestation qua change being possible; but what we also require is that the circumstances are 
suitable for a manifestation qua change to take place at the time in question. And this, of course, 
is a contingent matter. (I should note to the reader that we are again ignoring spontaneous powers 
for the present moment.)    
 
What is the moral of this discussion? It is problematic that Mumford and Anjum's regular 
sufficiency claim is false under the temporal reading of possibility. This is because there should 
be a close connection between dispositional actualism and the temporal understanding of modality. 
We can see this close connection by asking how a power could serve as the ground of a mere 
possibility. Why should a power be able 'support' a non-actual entity nevertheless being possible? 
Why, for example, should objects (as oppose to properties) not be able to ground mere possibilities 
in a powers ontology? Presumably the idea is that powers are the kinds of beings that have 
manifestations, such that even if a power does not manifest its manifestation it could have done so. 
This is a standard idea about powers. But if powers can have merely possible manifestations, then 
we can move, it seems, from the idea that (i) a power does not need to manifest its manifestation 
in order for this power to have a (possible) manifestation, to (ii) in those cases where powers have 
unmanifested manifestations, these unmanifested manifestations are mere possibilities. I suggest 
that this is the basic line of thought in attempting to ground mere possibility in actual powers. But 
we can notice something important. Where a power does manifest its manifestation, we have the 
idea that one entity in the actual world—the token power F—is responsible for another entity also 
being in the actual world—its token manifestation G. This is another platitude about powers that 
concerns metaphysical explanation: powers provide metaphysical explanations as to why certain 
patterns of events hold across space and time. What is significant about this metaphysical 
explanation is that it is taking place within the actual world. That is to say, both the explanans and 
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the explanandum, to use these terms, are actual entities. We might also talk of the ground and the 
grounded. On this basis, it is attractive to say that a power can only serve as the ground of a mere 
possibility insofar as the unmanifested manifestation of this power could have been a member of 
actual world. So construed, the dispositional actualist grounding of mere possibility is concerned 
with 'how things could have been otherwise' qua how the actual world itself could have been. I 
think this notion of the actual world developing in non-actual ways should capture the dispositional 
actualist conception of possibility. The contrast position would involve a power being sufficient 
for a mere possibility qua member of a different world. (I think this is how a powers theorist might 
read Armstrong's (1997) combinatorial model, where the constituents of states of affairs can be 
recombined into different maximal configurations of states of affairs. Each of these maximal 
configurations is a different possible world—a bona fide alternative to the actual world.)  
 
We can now see the close connection between dispositional actualism and the temporal 
understanding of modality. If we consider the world at a time, then the temporal possibilities will 
be those entities that could be the case relative to how things are at that time. (The non-mere 
possibilities will be those entities that could be the case and are the case; the mere possibilities will 
be those entities that could be the case and are not the case) In terms of powers, this temporal 
understanding of temporal possibility is isolating the manifestation-operation of powers. Crucially, 
the dispositional actualist view is that powers can be used as the grounds of mere possibility. If we 
are to say this, then we should be able to say that the mere possibilities in question could have been 
actual solely on the basis of what powers are able to do, i.e. solely on the basis of their 
manifestation-operation. The connection between this idea and McCall's temporal understanding 
of possibility is that when we are considering what is possible at a time, we are restricting the 
possibilities to both (i) what objects are able to do in virtue of their intrinsic natures, as well as (ii) 
what objects are able to do insofar as the requirements of these intrinsic natures are either satisfied 
or unsatisfied. (This distinction is made by Makin (2006) and Beere (2009) in their discussion of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ.) This is the point of the skilled builder example. The skilled builder is 
such that she can intrinsically build houses—she has the required knowledge. But she he is not a 
magician—she requires her tools and materials if she is to build a house. Hence, if we keep as 
fixed that these external requirements are not met, then, relative to this absence, it is impossible 
for the skilled builder to exercise her skill. And this is what is happening with Mumford and 
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Anjum's theory, I think. Spontaneous powers aside, the powers in Mumford and Anjum's theory 
use proximity requirements. Hence, if these requirements are not met, then there is a serious sense 
in which the operation of these powers and so their manifestations qua change are not possible. 
But if we now consider that the only way to get these powers into their proximity requirements is 
to modify their spatial arrangement, then the same problem arises. For the only way to modify this 
spatial arrangement of powers is to get some other powers to have acted differently (despite their 
given spatial arrangement). And so on. So the fixity of present states of affairs in the temporal 
manner of thinking about possibility invites us to think about what it possible purely on the basis 
of powers. In light of these considerations, I think that Mumford and Anjum's sufficiency claim 
for possibility is uncritical. In particular, it is fails to engage with the conditional aspect of powers.  
 
6.5 Additional supplement for stage two of the argument: spontaneous powers and 
uncaused events 
 
Let us now turn our attention to spontaneous powers and uncaused events. How do these types of 
entities affect our present discussion? Well, the a posteriori acceptance of either spontaneous 
powers or uncaused events is (individually) sufficient for the failure of temporal determinism. (I 
should note that we have already discussed uncaused events and their connection to temporal 
determinism above, but let us reconsider the issue briefly.) The main consideration is simply that 
both spontaneous powers and uncaused events replace the conditionality aspect of Mumford and 
Anjum's single-operative and disjunction-operative powers with a spontaneous aspect. In 
particular, spontaneous powers can spontaneously operate with a component vector and uncaused 
events can spontaneously enter spacetime. As such, it would be most obscure to say that the 
relevant changes (e.g. the manifestation qua change that arises via a spontaneous power, or the 
insertion into spacetime of an uncaused event) could be 'dictated' by the state of the world at a 
given time. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, Mumford and Anjum appear to hold their temporal 
conception of determinism precisely because (pace the causal conception) it can register the 
activity of uncaused events as sufficient grounds for non-determinism. 
 
At this point, however, we can see that Mumford and Anjum are in fact required to take either 
spontaneous powers or uncaused events to uphold the premise that it is always possible for there 
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to be additive prevention. Well, more carefully, they are required to take one of these two types of 
entity if they are already rejecting non-deterministic causation (as we understood this term in the 
above discussion). For there are no other sources for the merely possible preventers. To this end, 
it is useful to see how spontaneous powers and uncaused events could provide the merely possible 
preventers. In the case of spontaneous powers, we have the idea that whilst a token spontaneous 
power did not manifest at a given time in the actual world, it could have done, such that there could 
have been (via its manifestation qua operation) a different arrangement of component vectors. The 
case for the uncaused events is basically the same; the only difference between the two cases is 
that we are not thinking of uncased events as being the manifestations of actual powers. So we can 
just take a state of affairs, a's being F, to enter into the world without being the result of any 
manifestation, generally construed. It is clear to see that such changes to the world's content could 
given different operative powers and therefore additive prevention as Mumford and Anjum require. 
But the same strategy can be run as before. If Mumford and Anjum are to remain neutral on the 
issue of determinism, then I am permitted to require their modal premise to be true even in the 
context of a temporally deterministic world. So we can again require that the world does not in 
fact contain any spontaneous powers or uncaused events. If this is the case, however, then in light 
of Mumford and Anjum's (hypothesised) rejection of non-deterministic causation, we can see that 
they will not have any merely possible additive preventers. And so their argument against causal 
necessitation will be unsound, since the modal premise will be false. As far as I can see, then, if 
Mumford and Anjum are to avoid this problem they must be tacitly assuming that there are either 
spontaneous powers or uncaused events (relative to the above hypothesised rejection of non-
deterministic causation). But this means that they are tacitly assuming that temporal determinism 
is false, i.e. that the world is temporally indeterministic, which is out of phase with their supposed 
neutrality on this issue.  
 
6.6 Stage three: dilemma for possible prevention 
 
We can now pose our dilemma for Mumford and Anjum. The first horn of the dilemma is that 
Mumford and Anjum stick to their guns concerning determinism. As we have now seen, this lets 
us insist that Mumford and Anjum's modal premise should hold true even in a world where there 
is no breach of their temporal determinism (which might be this world, doxastically speaking). In 
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general, however, it is not true that it is always possible for there to be additive prevention if there 
is no (i) non-deterministic causation, nor (ii) either spontaneous powers or uncaused events. The 
second horn of the dilemma is that if Mumford and Anjum explicitly build temporal indeterminism 
into their theory, then they forfeit the non-triviality of the antecedent strengthening argument. To 
see how this aspect of the dilemma works, however, we need to consider a final issue.  
 
In our discussion above, I presented the following as routes through which the world could be 
temporally indeterministic: (i) indeterministic causation, (ii) probabilistic causation, (iii) 
spontaneous powers, and (iv) uncaused events. I grouped (i) and (ii) together as 'non-deterministic 
causation' and argued in the last chapter that Mumford and Anjum need to approach these types of 
causal processes as involving disjunction-operative powers. At this stage we can note that (i), (ii), 
and (iii) are sources of physical or 'natural' modality under Mumford and Anjum's discussion. In 
particular, given Mumford and Anjum's dispositional actualism, they will suggest that these three 
types of powers are the ontological grounds of mere possibilities (along with regular single-
operative powers). We can recall that the basic scheme in question is that the instantiation of a 
power P is sufficient for the mere possibility of its manifestation M. (As we noted, however, there 
is some uncertainty over whether the possible manifestation is the component vector, or the 
manifestation qua change, or both.) It may also be useful to note that (iii) (i.e. spontaneous powers) 
are giving physical modality as oppose to Mumford and Anjum's metaphysical (or 'non-natural') 
modality. Why is this? Well, despite lonely powers not drawing upon a conditionality aspect (and 
this distinguishes them from single-operative powers and non-deterministic powers) they are still 
powers 'in the world' and so satisfy the restraints of dispositional actualism. Interestingly, we can 
say that spontaneous powers, which are able to spontaneously manifest, are the only types of 
powers that really satisfy the dispositional actualist sufficiency claim. And this is because the 
conditionality requirement, which is not respected by the sufficiency claim, is not applicable to 
spontaneous powers. Lastly, we have Mumford and Anjum's metaphysical possibilities, which are 
here represented by uncaused events.  
 
With this in mind we can notice the following. If Mumford and Anjum explicitly accept either (i) 
indeterministic powers, (ii) probabilistic powers, or (iii) spontaneous powers, in any combination, 
then they will have their notion of merely possible preventers. The problem here, however, is that 
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we now have a more direct argument for the conclusion that causes do not necessitate their effects. 
With regard to (i) and (ii), the argument will be that these types of powers can operate disjunctively, 
such that, in one and the same circumstance, i.e. spatiotemporal arrangement of powers, we can 
get different sets of component vectors and therefore different possibilities for manifestations qua 
change. And so, in general, it will be false that a specific arrangement of powers necessitates some 
effect, since the effect that is produced (if indeed one is produced) will depend upon how the non-
deterministic powers 'fire' their component vectors. With regard to (iii), the spontaneous powers, 
we have the same general line of thought. But here the point is that if a spontaneous power is a 
part of a complex cause, then it might fire its component vector or it might not; and this is also a 
feature of the world that will undercut the thesis that complex causes necessitate their effects. 
Taken together, then, Mumford and Anjum's explicit acceptance of (i), (ii), or (iii), whereby any 
combination of these types of powers are built into their theory, will result in the antecedent 
strengthening argument being superfluous, since we have a more basic reason as to why causes do 
not necessitate their effects: viz. there are types of powers in the world whose 'basic actions' are 
either probabilistic, indeterministic, or spontaneous.   
 
The case of uncaused events is a little more problematic. Let us firstly restrict the dilemma to 
uncaused events, thereby putting aside (i)–(iii) above. The first horn of the dilemma would be that 
Mumford and Anjum keep their view that the antecedent strengthening argument is neutral on the 
topic of determinism. Our arguments in this chapter have suggested, however, that the modal 
premise of the antecedent strengthening argument would be false if there were no uncaused events 
in the world. And so the world must be temporally indeterministic. I suggest, therefore, that 
Mumford and Anjum would be faced with the second horn of the dilemma, which is that their 
strategy against necessitation presupposes that necessitation is false via some more basic reason 
(such as the acceptance of disjunction-operative powers, as above). But in the case of uncaused 
events, I think Mumford and Anjum might say that whilst the acceptance of uncaused events does 
entail that the world is temporally indeterministic, pace their original discussion, we can at least 
avoid the issue that causation is 'already' anti-necessitarian, as is the case with (i)–(iii) above. In 
other words, because uncaused events are not caused events, their merely possible insertion into 
spacetime so as to act as merely possible preventers does not involve agreeing in the first place 
that causation is 'intrinsically' anti-necessitarian. We can recall that this was the issue with 
150 
 
Mumford and Anjum's treatment of probabilistic powers: I suggested that there should be 
something intrinsically anti-necessitarian about the way that such powers behave (that goes beyond 
the argument from antecedent strengthening).  
 
6.7 Uncaused events 
 
I think that this is a difficult problem, but my inclination is to handle it in the following way. We 
might propose that Mumford and Anjum's distinction between causal and temporal determinism 
can also be used by the necessitarian. More specifically, I suggest that complex causes can 
necessitate their effects such that the world is causally deterministic. Alongside this, however, the 
world can be temporally indeterministic via uncaused events. I shall explain how I think these 
conceptions cooperate for the necessitarian before saying why this is of relevance for Mumford 
and Anjum. In the previous chapter we discussed a 'calculation procedure' for Mumford and 
Anjum's theory. The basic idea, to recapitulate, was that we firstly fix upon the causal circumstance, 
i.e. the arrangement of powers, before moving on to plot the component vectors. Afterwards, we 
decide upon the resultant vector and check to see if the threshold line for a manifestation qua 
change is met. This is to put the matter in practical terms, but the metaphysical point was that the 
different components of Mumford and Anjum's theory are not especially anti-necessitarian. 
(Rather, this feature is provided by the antecedent strengthening argument.) Well, with this in mind, 
I think the necessitarian should say that if there is any combination of (i) probabilistic powers, (ii) 
indeterministic powers, or (iii) spontaneous powers, then causes do not necessitate their effects. 
And this, of course, is because there is something intrinsically anti-necessitarian about these kinds 
of powers. So (i)–(iii) above constitute a failure of causal determinism. I also think that they 
constitute a failure of temporal determinism. But uncaused events, (iv), constitute a failure of 
temporal determinism only: they are non-applicable to the issue of causal determinism. Mumford 
and Anjum agree with this last point at least. After all, as we have noted, one of their reasons for 
preferring the temporal conception of determinism over its causal correlate is that only the former 
can correctly deem a world with uncaused events to be indeterministic. But this raises a question. 
If uncaused events are orthogonal to the question of causal determinism, then how can they be 
relevant to the question of causal necessitation? In the end, I do not think that uncaused events are 
relevant. Recalling Mumford and Anjum's calculation procedure, we can see that we require first 
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and foremost a determinate (i.e. non-vague) arrangement of powers. I say this because the 
composition principle is set up to give a resultant vector. Accordingly, there can be no vagueness 
in the spatiotemporal arrangement of powers, since, if there were, then there would be a vagueness 
in the component vectors that are to be summed. As we might put this thought, if the complex 
cause were vague, then there would be a 'flickering' between different resultant vectors. It might 
be objected at this point that this is effectively what Mumford and Anjum are saying, since they 
have suggested, in a way, that complex causes are always 'revisable'. But we can bypass this point 
by simply saying that there should at least not be any flickering (or vagueness) as we keep within 
one complex cause in the actual world (we are thereby ignoring the addition of merely possible 
preventers at the moment). The relevance of this for uncaused events, I suggest, is that we should 
be agreeing upon what events are relevant to a given causal situation before we start the calculation 
procedure, whether or not these events are caused. In other words, if uncaused events want to be 
involved in the calculation procedure, then they have to be 'entered' in the beginning, when we 
specify what the causal situation is, i.e. when we specify those powers that are proximate for a 
given subject of change. 
 
Let us now consider Mumford and Anjum's model of temporal determinism with the assumption 
that (i)–(iii) above are not the case. Two options are before us. First, there are no uncaused events. 
In this case we would have the following set up. Taking into account the total arrangement of 
powers of the world at a given time, we would be led to a large set of manifestations qua change 
via the calculation procedure. (I should stress that the 'calculation procedure' is really just a way 
of understanding how the apparatus of Mumford and Anjum's theory is working; or rather, it is a 
way of understanding how I think it is working.) Let us call set of manifestations qua change C*. 
And let us call the state of the world before these changes S1 and the state of the world after these 
changes, at the next time, S2. I propose that if there are no uncaused events, then the difference 
between S1 and S2 is given by C*. In other words, C*, the set of all of the manifestations qua 
change, is what is required to move the world from S1 to S2. What this means, of course, is that if 
there are no uncaused events, then there is both a function from each complex cause to its effect 
and a function (though a demanding one) from the world at the prior time to the world at the latter 
time. And in this case we have both of our conceptions of determinism. Firstly, causes are 
necessitating their effects, since fixing the causal factors for a subject of change is sufficient to fix 
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a manifestation qua change (or not as the case may be); secondly, the state of the world at a time 
'dictates' the state of the world at the next time; or, as we can put the matter, only one future is 
possible given this envisaged present. So how does this differ if there are uncaused events in the 
picture? I suggest the following. We will still have causal necessitation, since whatever uncaused 
events did actually enter spacetime at the first time will be 'plugged in' to the calculation procedure. 
But we will forgo the temporal determinism. For let there be some arbitrary uncaused events at the 
latter time. All this amounts to, I think, is that the difference between S1 and S2 will not be given 
by C*, but rather by C* and U*, where U* is the set of uncaused events that we have added at the 
latter time. If this is a good picture, then we can have causal necessitation with uncaused events. 
In this special case of cooperation, what is happening is that a proper part of the second time, to 
put the issue this way, is a result of the causal necessitation, whilst the remainder part is due to any 
uncaused events that spontaneously enter spacetime. If we were to run this same calculation 
procedure over and over, then we would find that the necessitated aspect of the second time is 
invariant, whilst, we can suppose, the spontaneous aspect would be variable.  
 
At this point I imagine that Mumford and Anjum would protest that the real issue is that the 
uncaused events at each time could have been different. But here I want to insist on our principle 
of non-vagueness. If the calculation procedure for Mumford and Anjum's theory is requiring a 
definite causal situation as its starting point, then we can suggest, in line with Chapter 4, that 
strengthening the 'same' complex cause with a different uncaused event will in fact move us 
between different causes. But in this case the argument will be subtly different. We can recall that 
in Chapter 4 the basic idea was that Mumford and Anjum cannot strengthen sets of component 
vectors with an additional component vector because they are using a resultant vector, which is, I 
think, to draw upon a notion of a totality of component vectors. In this case the thought is that 
Mumford and Anjum will have to make their complex causes precise: agreeing at the beginning 
of the calculation procedure what powers are and are not in operation. And this will include, of 
course, any powers that uncaused events might bring along with them. The current line of thought 
differs from the argument of Chapter 4 in the following sense. When we discussed antecedent 
strengthening in Chapter 4, the issue was that adding a component vector to a complex cause would 
switch between different totalities of component vectors. Importantly, this would disallow a 
disjunctive operator from contributing towards the resultant vector with a different component 
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vector (as the set of component vectors would be different). And the argument of Chapter 4 would 
also disallow a spontaneous power from manifesting its component vector in one case but not in 
another as we attempt to stay within a single complex cause (as the number of component vectors 
would be different and so the resultant vector would again be different). But the thought at the 
moment is simply that the causal situation needs to be precise, i.e. that the powers that are 
proximate for a given subject of change need to be determinate and non-vague. And as my 
discussion of the calculation procedure in Chapter 5 will suggest, this insistence will allow for the 
disjunctive possibilities that are associated with probabilistic and indeterministic powers to take 
effect, as well as for the spontaneous action of spontaneous powers. Cutting to the chase, then, 
what is secured by the proposal that Mumford and Anjum's complex causes must be determinate, 
in the sense that we fix upon a precise spatiotemporal arrangement of proximate powers? Well, on 
the one hand, uncaused events that are causally relevant to a subject of change will have to declare 
themselves, so to speak, at the outset. So we are trying to secure the idea that modifying the 
uncaused events will modify the complex cause, again with the intention of blocking Mumford 
and Anjum's proposal that causes do not necessitate their effects because additional prevention is 
always possible. To this end, we can agree that those uncaused events that are inserted into 
spacetime could have been different at each time, such that what uncaused events are actualised at 
a time is a contingent matter, but we can disagree with the thought that we can strengthen the same 
cause with different uncaused events. On the other hand, however, pace the discussion in Chapter 
4, probabilistic powers, indeterministic powers, and spontaneous powers can give rise to different 
resultant vectors. And this is because we are requiring that Mumford and Anjum keep fixed 
proximate powers, not a set of component vectors. To clarify, we can think about 'complex causes' 
either as spatiotemporal arrangements of powers, which provide proximity for powers, or 
otherwise as sets of component vectors; it is the former concept that is relevant for this argument. 
In this general way I would attempt to downplay the relevance of uncaused events for the question 
of causal necessitation, whilst allowing one and the same causal situation to give rise to different 
sets of component vectors and thereby to alternative manifestations qua change. 
 


















The aim of this chapter is to set the scene for the last section of the thesis. In this final section we 
will be focusing upon a challenge that Barker has raised in his (2013) essay The Emperor's New 
Metaphysics of Powers. The basic idea of this essay is that the four central articulations of 
dispositional essentialism are either incoherent or otherwise disguised versions of a foil position 
that Barker terms 'brute modalism'. Brute modalism is the view that it is a brute or primitive fact 
about a world that its categorical properties stand in metaphysically necessary connections. It is a 
'foil position' insofar as it denies the anti-Humean a metaphysical explanation for these necessary 
connections. In addition, Barker argues that the necessitation theory (ironically) draws upon the 
resources of dispositional essentialism, since the only tenable understanding of the necessitation 
relation is that it has a second-order dispositional essence. Given that the project of dispositional 
essentialism is in crisis, however, Barker concludes that both of the central versions of anti-
Humeanism—i.e. the necessitation theory and dispositional essentialism—are illusionary 
metaphysics. Accordingly, there are two main choices for the properties and laws debate: neo-
Humeanism and brute modalism—the latter of which is a non-standard version of anti-Humeanism.  
 
I agree with Barker's arguments concerning the necessitation theory and dispositional essentialism. 
In this section of the thesis, therefore, I set out the key aspects of a position that I term 'temporal 
essentialism'. Temporal essentialism is a two-category ontology of objects and Platonic universals 
that is explicitly aligned to a dynamic conception of time, in this case the growing block theory. 
With regard to Barker's essay, this position is of interest insofar as it does not attempt to secure a 
governing role for properties, which is a difficulty that Barker raises for Bird's dispositional 
monism (see also Barker and Smart 2012). In contrast, the governing role for temporal essentialism 
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is understood in terms of the structure of dynamic time; temporal essentialism seeks to provide a 
time-based metaphysical explanation for necessary connections and lawful regularities. In short, 
my strategy is to build a sensitivity towards physical modality into the structure of dynamic time, 
such that the 'output' of the process of temporal becoming (i.e. the actualisation of states of affairs) 
is a function of present states of affairs via laws. But let us discuss this proposal at length in the 
following chapters. Dialectically speaking, I will present temporal essentialism as a second non-
standard version of anti-Humeanism that does not collapse into Barker's brute modalism.  
 
Accordingly, in this chapter I shall discuss Barker's brute modalism and his critique of anti-
Humeanism. To limit the scope of this chapter, I shall concentrate upon his arguments against 
Armstrong's necessitation theory and Bird's dispositional monism. 
 
7.2 Three degrees of physical modal involvement and brute modalism 
 
Barker's essay begins by setting out a three-part taxonomy of degrees of physical modal 
involvement. This encompasses "three degrees of involvement that physical modality might have 
in relation to reality at large" (Barker 2013, p.606). We can understand this notion of 'degrees of 
physical modal involvement' in terms of different options for the metaphysical grounding of facts 
of physical modality. The phrase 'facts of physical modality' is taken in the present context to mean 
those facts that concern the associated notions of causation, law, disposition, counterfactual, and 
chance, as well as those of physical necessity and possibility. (The fact that it is a law that all Fs 
are Gs, such that the co-instantiation of these properties is physically necessary, is a paradigmatic 
fact of physical modality.) In outline, Barker's three-part taxonomy of degrees of physical modal 
involvement (henceforth 'Barker's three-part taxonomy' or 'Barker's three degrees') is as follows. 
The first degree is the view that worlds as a whole (either the actual world by itself or a number of 
actual and/or possible worlds) are the metaphysical grounds of physical modality. Barker cities 
Lewis' (1986) modal realism as the paradigm first-degree position in the contemporary debate. 
According to Lewis' theory of physical modality, a possible world as a whole is the metaphysical 
ground for its laws via his best-systems theory; in turn, these laws are used to fix facts of 
comparative similarity and thereby counterfactual truths. The second degree is the view that 
second-order relations are the metaphysical ground of physical modality. Armstrong's (1983) 
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necessitation theory is the mainstream second-degree position. According to this degree of 
physical modal involvement, second-order relations necessitate (or 'make probable') co-
instantiations of first-order properties. Barker's second degree is therefore more fine-grained than 
the first degree, since we are focusing upon relations as oppose to worlds. According to Barker's 
third degree, however, first-order properties on their own are the metaphysical ground of physical 
modality. Dispositional essentialism is the third-degree. 
 
Barker's three-part taxonomy draws upon his preferred understanding of several key concepts in 
the properties and laws debate: necessary connection, distinct existence, real possibility, and 
quidditism. We shall begin with a brief survey of Barker's approach to these notions.  
 
The concept of necessary connection is understood in a standard way using metaphysically 
possible worlds. Barker states: "A necessary connection holds between A and B if and only if for 
every metaphysically possible world, if A exists, then B exists" (2013, p.609). So construed, the 
existence of A is sufficient for the existence of B across metaphysically possible worlds. The 
notion of distinct existence, however, is approached with the use of a notion of 'containment', 
which concerns ontological dependence. A is said to contain B if and only if A ontologically 
depends upon B (2013, p.609). (Note that A's ontological dependence upon B is understood in the 
present context to consist in the real definition of A making reference to the real definition of B. 
Hence, where the real definition of a whole makes reference to the real definition of one of its 
parts, the whole is said to ontologically depend upon this part; in Barker's terminology the whole 
'contains' the part.) Taken together, then, A and B are distinct existences if and only if A does not 
contain B and B does not contain A.  
 
These two concepts (necessary connection and distinct existence) lead to Barker's version of the 
neo-Humean principle that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences: "If A 
does not contain B, then it is metaphysically possible for A to exist without B" (2013, p.609). The 
motivation for Barker's approach to the concept of distinct existence, which uses a notion of 
containment, is that the intuitive understanding of distinct existence in terms of non-identical 
entities results, straightforwardly, in a false principle. Or so Barker argues. For example, whilst a 
whole is non-identical with its parts, there is, plausibly, a necessary connection that holds between 
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a whole w and one of its parts p, such that all w-worlds are p-worlds (2013, p.609). Accordingly, 
a standard thesis of mereology—i.e. that a whole is non-identical to its parts—provides a simple 
counterexample to the neo-Humean principle that there are no necessary connections between 
distinct existences (distinct qua non-identical). In light of this counterexample, the neo-Humean 
might reject the standard thesis of mereology, but Barker bypasses this issue with the requirement 
that distinct existences are distinct qua non-containing as oppose to distinct qua non-identical. To 
summarise his version of the neo-Humean principle that there are no necessary connections 
between distinct existences, then, where A does not contain B (i.e. where A does not ontologically 
depend upon B, such that the real definition of A does not make reference to the real definition of 
B), it is metaphysically possible for A to exist without B. (I shall refer to this principle henceforth 
as the 'neo-Humean principle'.) 
 
According to Lewis' modal realism and his approach to the concept of real possibility, there cannot 
be violations of the neo-Humean principle. Barker takes Lewis to reduce possible worlds to 
combinations of distinct existences (distinct qua non-containing). So construed, combinations of 
distinct existences are basic ontology whereas possible worlds are "derivative ontology" (Barker 
2013, p.611). In line with Lewis' principle of recombination, whereby "patching together parts of 
different possible worlds yields another possible world" (1986, pp.87–8), distinct existences A and 
B co-exist and fail to co-exist across possible worlds. Lewis' principle of recombination is used to 
articulate a thesis of plenitude, according to which, roughly speaking, all logical space is occupied 
by the plurality of possible worlds (1986, p.86). In light of this liberal approach to the concept of 
real possibility, a necessary connection between properties F and G will be restricted to a subset 
of the metaphysically possible worlds (i.e. restricted to the subset of metaphysically possible 
worlds where all Fs are Gs). And so Lewis' system cannot violate the neo-Humean principle: the 
remainder set will contain metaphysically possible worlds where not all Fs are Gs.  
 
In contrast, brute modalism is designed to violate the neo-Humean principle. It uses a basic 
ontology of possible worlds, such that properties stand in metaphysically unexplainable necessary 
connections. This is, of course, a non-combinatorial approach to the concept of real possibility. 
According to brute modalism, the primitive natures of possible worlds are distributions of objects 
instantiating properties. (Note that objects in this context might be assayed as bundles of 
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categorical properties; as far as I am aware, Barker does not discuss this detail.) As such, there is 
no metaphysical explanation of 'lawful' or 'non-accidental' regularities; possible worlds and their 
primitive natures are accepted as brute modalism's basic ontology. It is distinctive of brute 
modalism that properties are quiddistic but nevertheless stand in necessary connections. 
 
Call brute-modalism the view that it is a basic fact about worlds that regularities ... obtain. 
Given brute-modalism, the properties in regularities ... are quiddities whose instantiations 
have necessary connections to other quality-instantiations, which just reflect the primitive 
nature of possible worlds themselves ... If brute-modalism is correct, then necessary 
connections are brute facts about worlds. Each world is just a mosaic of local matters of fact 
involving qualities. Unlike combinatorialism—which reduces possibility to combination of 
distinct existences—brute-modalism treats possible world as primitive. This may be 
unattractive, but there's no contradiction involved (Barker, 2013, p.612: original italics).  
 
Barker's approach to the concept of quidditism is used to bypass the straightforward objection that 
necessary connections cannot hold between quiddistic properties. A 'permute' thesis, according to 
which a property is quiddistic if and only if it has different modal roles across different possible 
worlds, is rejected. In its place, the concept of quidditism is approached in terms of identity and 
essence. Barker states: "A property F is quiddistic if and only if its identity is fixed by features that 
in themselves are non-modal. Its real definition involves only these features" (2013, p.611: original 
italics). This point is in line with Kit Fine's (1994) Essence and Modality, since Barker thinks that 
the essence of a quiddistic property is not "simply what's necessary to that [property]", but rather 
"that which grounds the identity of [that property]" (Barker 2013, p.612: original italics, my square 
brackets). According to Barker, brute modalism is a "coherent hypothesis" that shows that "a thesis 
about what's essential to properties—what fixes their identity—cannot merely be captured by facts 
about what's necessary" (2013, p.612). 
 
Brute modalism is upgraded from a thesis concerning real possibility to first-degree theory of 
physical modality in the guise of Barker's 'transworld Humeanism'. This position takes brute 
modalism as its starting point, but supplements it with the claim that laws are regularities holding 
across possible worlds. Hence, in light of the distribution of objects instantiating properties (i.e. in 
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light of the primitive natures of possible worlds), transworld Humeanism takes laws to be 
metaphysically necessary regularities that are nevertheless metaphysically unexplainable. To 
clarify, brute modalism is the thesis that (i) possible worlds are basic ontology; (ii) these possible 
worlds have primitive natures; (iii) these basic natures are distributions of objects instantiating 
properties; and (iv) properties are quiddistic. Transworld Humeanism is the additional thesis that 
(v) laws are regularities holding between possible worlds (Barker 2013, p.615). Transworld 
Humeanism qualifies as a first-degree approach to physical modality as it is worlds as a whole that 
metaphysically ground facts of physical modality. In particular, possible worlds are basic ontology 
and laws are construed as general regularities that hold across possible worlds.  
 
7.3 Armstrong's necessitation theory 
 
In this part of the chapter I shall set out Barker's treatment of Armstrong's necessitation theory. 
We can recall that Barker's overall strategy is to argue that the second and third degrees are 
untenable, such that their representative theories are either internally inconsistent or otherwise 
disguised versions of brute modalism (or transworld Humeanism). Let us begin with Barker's 
discussion of Armstrong's necessitation theory, in which he argues that the only tenable 
understanding of the necessitation relation is that it has a second-order dispositional essence.  
 
The starting point for Barker's discussion of Armstrong's necessitation theory draws upon Bird's 
(2005c; 2007) regress argument; see also van Fraassen (1989). According to Armstrong, laws are 
second-order states of affairs that have the form N(F,G). N is a second-order relation that holds 
between the first-order properties F and G, such that—in the deterministic case—N necessitates 
the co-instantiation of F and G. We can capture this with the following 'fact of necessitation'. If it 
is the case that N(F,G) at metaphysically possible world w, then it is the case that R(F,G) at w 
(Barker and Smart 2012, p.715). Note that R(F,G) symbolises a second-order relation R of 
extensional inclusion that holds between F and G if and only if '∀x(Fx→Gx)'.  
 
The prima facie problem for explaining the physical necessitation of N is Armstrong's thesis of 
categoricalism, which states that the identities of properties and relations are determined 
independently of their causal/lawful profiles. So construed, the essences of properties and relations 
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are qualitative or otherwise non-modal (in a physical sense of modal, i.e. modal qua causal/lawful). 
In general, categorical properties and relations have no (non-trivial) necessary connections to 
distinct entities. As such, it is not a part of the identity of F or G that N(F,G) is the case. In addition, 
it is not a part of the identity of N(F,G) that R(F,G) is the case—prima facie, at least. The point 
here is that N(F,G) does not have the (complex) first-order state of affairs 'all Fs are Gs' as a 
mereological part, such that there is a straightforward necessary connection between the former 
and the latter (Bird 2007, pp.94–6). Because of this, N(F,G) is a distinct existence (distinct qua 
non-containing, as Barker would say) re the general regularity that all Fs are Gs. In light of 
Armstrong's thesis of categoricalism, Bird (2005c; 2007, pp.92–4) argues that there is a single 
principled answer to the question: why is the fact of necessitation true? This is to draw upon a 
third-order necessitation relation N* that holds between N and R such that N* necessitates the co-
existence at possible worlds of N(F,G) and R(F,G). This can be displayed with a higher-order fact 
of necessitation: If it is the case that N*(N,R) at metaphysically possible world w, then, if it is the 
case that N(F,G), then it is the case that R(F,G). And so on. Bird argues that the regress is vicious, 
since the necessitation of Nn is explained by the necessitation of Nn+1. As we will discuss below, 
Barker (2013, p.628) argues that Bird's dispositional monism faces a parallel problem, since there 
is a structural similarity between Bird's and Armstrong's theories of laws (see also Barker and 
Smart 2012, pp.719–20).  
 
Barker (2013, pp.616–9) develops this line of criticism by outlining four different ways in which 
we might explain Armstrong's physical necessitation. The first strategy is to say that it is a "brute 
fact" that if it is the case that N(F,G), then it is the case that all Fs are Gs (Barker 2013, pp.617–8). 
So construed, however, Barker claims that Armstrong's necessitation theory is effectively a 
second-order version of transworld Humeanism, whereby it is "just a brute fact about worlds" that 
the law N(F,G) co-exists with the general regularity all Fs are Gs. Barker's line of thought is that 
if it is taken as primitive that N(F,G) co-exists with R(F,G) across metaphysically possible worlds, 
then N is not a "source" of necessitation; "The necessitation would be, on the contrary, just a brute 
fact about the worlds at large" (Barker 2013, p.618). Given that the first degree is distinguished 
from the second degree in that the former uses worlds as a whole whereas the latter uses second-
order necessitation relations, this strategy is thought to collapse into brute modalism, such that it 
is a basic fact about worlds that N(F,G) and R(F,G) are necessarily connected. (According to 
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Barker (2012, p.716), Bird overlooks this option due to his overlooking brute modalism.) The 
second strategy is to use a third-order necessitation relation, in line with Bird's regress argument. 
For the reason that, prima facie, this strategy does not draw upon worlds as a whole, it is not at 
risk of collapsing into the first degree. Nevertheless, as Bird's regress argument shows, there is a 
failure of explanation for the necessitation at each level. On this basis, Barker discounts this 
strategy. In addition, he notes that if it is taken as primitive that N* forces the co-existence of N(F,G) 
and R(F,G), then we have retreated to a third-order version of the previous strategy. Hence, we 
will have a third-order version of transworld Humeanism where it is a brute fact about worlds that 
if it is the case that N*(N,R), then, if it is the case that N(F,G), then it is the case that R(F,G) 
(Barker 2013, p.618). A third strategy concerns Barker's concept of 'world-making' (pp.612–3). 
This type of approach to the properties and laws debate is also thought to collapse into a version 
of brute modalism. I shall delay our discussion of world-making until the last chapter of this thesis, 
since temporal essentialism draws upon this concept. And lastly, a fourth strategy for explaining 
the physical necessitation of Armstrong-style laws is to take N to be "inherently powerful" (Barker 
2013, p.618). The thought is that N has a type of dispositional essence that forces the co-
instantiation of F and G. In this way, Barker concludes that the second degree, represented in this 
case by Armstrong's model of laws, is hostage to the fortunes of dispositional essentialism. Here 
is a useful citation from Barker's essay that shows the present dialectic. (Note that T is a version 
of Armstrong's N relation for probabilistic laws.)  
 
If there is to be a second degree at all, then second-order facts like N[F,G] have to constrain 
or govern first-order facts of natural property instantiation. But as we have seen, that requires 
that N[F,G] necessitates lower order facts by virtue of the inherent nature of N. But this 
means N has to be powerful in a way analogous to the third-degreer’s powerful natural 
properties. Thus, the second degree needs something like a powers view of N and T, 
otherwise it collapses into brute-modalism. If the second degree affirms brute-modality for 
N, then it ceases to be a second-degree view. It is just a variation on transworld Humeanism; 
physical modality is fixed by worlds-at-large. If the powers view proves to be an illusion, 
brute-modalism and quidditism are unavoidable, then, the only real views of physical 




7.4 Bird's dispositional monism 
 
Let us move on and consider Barker's criticism of Bird's dispositional monism. This theory is 
discussed in two of Barker's four central articulations of dispositional essentialism. The first 
articulation is a method of relational constitution for dispositional properties; the second 
articulation is a graph-theoretic approach. Within this chapter I want to focus upon Barker's 
distinction between constitution and governing roles, which is a prelude to Barker's discussion of 
relational constitution (see also Barker and Smart 2012, p.720).  
 
The basic idea of relational constitution as a way of articulating dispositional essentialism is that 
the "identities of natural properties are fixed by their entry into certain second-order modal 
relations with each other" (Barker 2013, p.623–4). This approach is attributed to Bird (2007) and 
Mumford (2004). As we discussed in Chapter 2, Bird's SM-relations designate that triplets of 
dispositional properties play the relative roles of 'disposition', 'stimulus', and 'manifestation'. 
Barker characterises such relations as second-order relations "whose instantiation by properties 
explains why events featuring those properties enter into certain patterns of physical necessitation 
and causation" (2013, p.624).  
 
At this point it will be useful to consider Barker's (2009) essay, Dispositional monism, relational 
constitution and quiddities. In this essay Barker agrees with Bird that the graph-theoretic approach 
to property individuation can bypass Lowe's (2006) regress problem. This problem targets the 
dispositional monist set up where the identity of a dispositional property is provided by non-
identical dispositional properties: "[N]o property can get its identity fixed, because each property 
owes its identity to another, which in turn owes its identity to yet another—and so on and on, in a 
way that, very plausibly, generates either a vicious regress or a vicious circle" (Lowe 2006, p.138: 
original italics). As noted, Barker agrees that Bird successfully responds to Lowe's problem 
(Barker 2009, p.243). Bird's response is to deny that the identity of a dispositional property D is 
provided by non-identical dispositional properties S and M; in contrast, the identity of D, S, and 
M is provided by the network of SM-relations meeting a graph-theoretic asymmetry G. That said, 
however, Barker argues that the status of Bird's SM-relations is problematic. In short, Barker 




Barker construes Bird's SM-relations as internal in two senses (2009, pp.246–7). First, the SM-
relation is thought to be internal qua constituting its relata. This is the identity-fixing aspect of 
Bird's graph-theoretic approach: although D's identity is not provided by S and M qua dispositional 
properties, the network of SM-relations holding between dispositional properties wholly 
constitutes—via structural differentiation—the identities of these relata. And second, the SM-
relation is thought to be internal qua the mere existence of its relata entailing its instantiation. The 
line of thought, I think, is that if Bird's dispositional properties are relationally constituted in the 
above sense, then his dispositional properties cannot exist without the instantiation of their SM-
relations; in contrast, the constituting relations and the constituted relata 'stand and fall' together. 
Hence, the mere existence of a set of dispositional properties entails the instantiation of (a relevant) 
set of SM-relations. Crucially, however, Barker denies that Bird's SM-relations, so construed, are 
supervenient qua 'ontological free lunches'. That is, Bird's SM-relations are "ontologically 
substantial" (Barker 2009, p.247). As such, the SM-relation is opposed to a Leibniz-style 
conception of internality, which is defined as follows. "A relation R is internal iff R's instantiation 
by relata holds in virtue of monadic features of these relata" (Barker 2009, p.247).  
 
With regard to the quiddistic status of Bird's dispositional properties, Barker argues that a 
categoricalist construal is the only possibility after exhausting two alternatives. The first alternative 
is that the SM-relation is itself a power; this option is discarded on the basis of regress difficulties 
and a proposed contradiction (2009, pp.244–6). The second alternative is that the SM-relation is a 
non-mereological tie. This option is also rejected, since, briefly stated, Barker argues that the SM-
relation requires a directionality that a non-mereological tie cannot provide (2009, pp.247–8). All 
in all, then, why are Bird's SM-relations problematic? In short, the basic idea is that both the 
necessitation theory and Bird's dispositional monism are setting forth the same sort of metaphysical 
position. 
 
It seems no advance has been made in relation to the fundamental question about the nature 
of physical modality: what is causation? What is physical necessitation? What is chance? 
Both [dispositional monism] and the non-humean quidditists [i.e. Armstrong] give the same 
answer: physical modality has its source in a primitive higher-order, quiddistic, relation 
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instantiated by natural properties (Barker 2009, p.249: my square brackets) 
 
7.5 The governing role and Bird's dispositional monism 
 
With this in mind, Let us return to Barker's (2013) essay. At this point he claims that the relational 
constitution approach has a structural similarity to the second degree, since the latter also takes 
facts of physical modality to be fixed by second-order relations. In both cases second-order 
relations are forcing the co-instantiation of first-order properties (Barker 2013, p.624). As we have 
discussed, Bird's SM-relations are analogous to Armstrong's necessitation relations in that both 
posits are second-order categorical entities. In addition, both posits are 'ontologically substantial'. 
On this basis, Barker thinks that both Bird and Armstrong are drawing upon a governing role. 
Using 'X' as a neutral second-order relation, Barker's scheme for the governing role is as follows. 
 
Governing Role: "X holding of F and G determines that if F is instantiated by object x, then 
G will be instantiated, (or will tend to be), by x or something related to x" (Barker 2013, 
p.625).  
 
This governing role is distinguished from a constitution role, which is given the following scheme.  
 
Constitution role: "X holding of F and G enters into constitution of F and G. The identities 
of F and G are fixed by their entering into X relations" (Barker 2013, p.625).  
 
According to Barker, the second-degree is drawing upon the governing role, whereas the third 
degree, at least under the relational constitution approach, is drawing upon both the governing role 
and the constitution role. This difference re the constitution role has arisen because Bird's SM-
relations are internal qua constituting, whereas Armstrong's necessitation relations are external.  
 
At this point it may seem obvious that the third-degreer's X-relations—the stimulus-response 
and the mutual-manifestation-partner relation—are just the second-degreer's N- or T-
relations in so far as they play both governing and constitution roles. So the difference 
between the second degree and the third-degree relationalist is simply this: the second-
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degreer thinks the N- and T-relations play only one role, and the relationalist thinks they play 
both. This is what I think is the case. But the third-degreer cannot welcome this conclusion 
(Barker 2013, pp.625–6).     
 
Why is the conclusion unwelcoming? The conclusion of Barker's argument against Armstrong was 
that the necessitation relation requires a type of second-order dispositional essence if it is to 
necessitate patterns of property co-instantiation. In making this conclusion he discarded three 
alternatives: brute modalism, a regress of necessitation relations, and a world-making conception 
of physical modality (yet to be discussed). Given that Bird's dispositional monism has a structural 
similarity to Armstrong's theory, however, Barker is able to claim that Bird's position also requires 
third-order relations (although in this case the higher-order relations will be internal, in line with 
Barker's discussion of Bird's SM-relations). In other words, Bird's regress argument affects his 
own dispositional monism (see also Barker and Smart 2012). In this connection, Barker says the 
following: "According to relationalists [e.g. Bird, Mumford] if X is powerful, then that can only 
be because X is relationally constituted through a higher-order relation R that is powerful, in the 
sense that it governs X's behaviour" (Barker 2013, p.626: my square bracket). Barker goes on to 
say that there are two ways for the relational constitution approach to avoid this regress. The first 
is to accept brute modalism and claim that it is a brute fact that if it is the case that X(F,G), then it 
is the case that all Fs are Gs. (With regard to Bird's scheme, of course, the claim would be that it 
is a brute fact that if it is the case that SM(P1, P2, P3), then it is the case that all P1&P2s are P3s; and 
so on for Mumford's (2004) model of dispositional properties.)  
 
But then, X ceases to constrain. Relationalism collapses into the first-degreer's brute-
modalism, just as the second degree does ... The only difference is that quiddities have 
structural essences—as in [the constitution role]. But merely affirming structural quiddities 
is not a powers view. The structures also have to constrain natural property instantiation, but 
that is the issue that is at stake here (Barker 2013, p.626).  
 
The second alternative, Barker explains, is to use a different conception of the "powerfulness of 
properties that can be applied to X". This alternative gets into Barker's discussion of the other three 
articulations of dispositional essentialism, since the view at hand is that the relational constitution 
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approach has to be supplemented by a different approach to dispositional essences. Unfortunately, 
it is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider these additional arguments. 
 
At this stage it is useful to note three points that concern this restriction of scope. Firstly, let us 
recall that the above material concerning governing and constitution roles is a prelude to Barker's 
discussion on the relational constitution approach. In fact, the central task of this section of Barker's 
essay is to argue that several proposals for understanding how dispositional properties can be 
relationally constituted turn out to be illusionary, which is to say that these proposals are internally 
contradictory and metaphysically impossible (2013, pp.627–34). As such, this section of Barker's 
essay goes over and above the problem that Armstrong and Bird cannot deliver a governing role 
from properties; the section at hand concerns constitution roles for properties. Secondly, and 
relatedly, the other criticism in Barker's essay that affects Bird's dispositional monism—viz. his 
discussion of graph-theoretical approaches—concludes, very roughly, that there is a confusion in 
this strategy with regard to the type–token distinction. The overall picture is that graph-theory is 
unsuitable for articulating dispositional properties. Note that this argument goes beyond Barker's 
(2009) essay, where he is willing to agree that Bird's graph-theoretic approach can respond to 
Lowe's regress problem. In a similar way, however, I read Barker's (2013) attack on graph theory 
as further investigating the constitution aspect of dispositional essentialism. Why is this? The basic 
reason is that if Bird's SM-relations qua constituting relations cannot provide a governing role, 
then I find it difficult to see how a thesis concerning structural differentiation could do any better: 
both approaches use relations/relationships, generally construed. And thirdly, even if Bird's 
dispositional monism could be salvaged with the supplementation of resources from either of the 
other two articulations of dispositional essentialism—viz. functional roles and powerful 
qualities—this would entail a major revision of Bird's position. With this in mind, I suggest that 
we are ready to move on with a substantive problem for Bird's dispositional monism in hand: 
Barker's problem of the governing role.  
 
That being the case, however, I think it will be useful to briefly run through the central point that 
Barker and Smart make in their (2012) essay, The ultimate argument against dispositionalist 
monist accounts of laws. In this essay Barker and Smart are arguing that Bird is subject to his own 
regress argument (the (2005c) argument that he pitched against Armstrong's necessitation theory). 
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After setting out the distinction between governing and constitution roles, Barker and Smart claim 
that the governing role is responsible for the regress problem. The line of thought is that this role 
captures the following fact of necessitation: 'If SM(P1, P2, P3) obtains in any metaphysically 
possible world w, then every x that is P1&P2 in w, is (or will tend to be) P3 in w' (adapted from 
Barker and Smart 2012, p.719). In addition, Barker and Smart propose that the governing role 
should be the basis for Bird's constitution role. 
 
We can put our point this way: The governing role is basic to SR [i.e. the SM-relation] and 
its constituting role is secondary. It's because natural properties enter into SR-relations with 
each other, and SR has the governing role, that natural properties get to have an essential 
modal profile. SR does not get its governing role by entering into relational constitution of 
properties. If that's right, we are left to explain the necessitation implicit in the governing 
role (Barker and smart, 2012, p.720: original italics).  
 
At this point Barker and Smart consider a reply for Bird: could he not say that the fact of 
necessitation, i.e. the governing role, is essential to his SM-relation? In response, Barker and Smart 
(2012, pp.720–21) set out a dilemma for Bird. It asks for the nature of the connection between the 
second-order state of affairs SM(P1, P2, P3) and a fact of necessitation 'NEC'. NEC states: In every 
possible world in which an object x P1&P2, x is P3 (adapted from Barker and Smart 2012, p.721). 
The first horn of the dilemma is a disjunction: either the second-order state of affairs SM(P1, P2, 
P3) is identical to NEC, or it is not. With regard to the first disjunct, Barker and Smart argue as 
follows. 
 
[SM(P1, P2, P3) is identical to NEC]. But if that is right, then there is no stimulus–response 
relation. Rather, there is just a fact about possible worlds, [NEC]. But if that is the view, 
why is it distinct from the idea that there are brute necessary connections between 
categorical properties [P1, P2, and P3]? Since there is no relation in [NEC], we lose the 
relational constitution that is meant to make natural properties essentially modal (Barker 
and Smart 2012, p.721: my square brackets).  
 




[SM(P1, P2, P3) is not identical to NEC]. If so, [SM(P1, P2, P3) and NEC] are distinct 
existences. But then we have to explain what their connection is. Why is it that because 
[SM(P1, P2, P3)] obtains [NEC] obtains. If Bird claims that it is just a brute fact then more 
or less the same line is open to Armstrong, i.e. that it's a brute necessary connection that 
links N[F,G] with to its necessitation role (Barker and Smart 2012, p.721: original italics, 
my square brackets).    
 
The second horn of the dilemma is Barker's (2009) argument that Bird's SM-relation is a second-
order quiddistic relation. As we have noted, this line of attack challenges the separation of Bird's 
dispositional monism from a second-order approach such as Armstrong's.  
 
With all of this in mind, Barker and Smart conclude that Bird either faces his own regress problem, 
which is to say that there is no explanation for the governing role of the SM-relation, or he accepts 
brute necessary connections (2012, p.721). In the latter case, as Barker's (2013) goes on to argue, 
Bird's dispositional monism is a first-degree approach: viz. there is no governing role as such; there 
is no metaphysical explanation for lawful regularities; and the primary focus re physical modality 
concerns worlds as a whole. (As a final point, to acknowledge Ben Smart's work in his (2012) 
essay with Barker, I shall henceforth term the problem of the governing role 'Barker and Smart's 
governing role'.)  
 
7.6 A note on temporal essentialism 
 
At this stage I am going to assume that Barker's attack on the two central versions of anti-
Humeanism—i.e. the necessitation theory and dispositional essentialism—is successful. I have 
outlined Barker's criticism towards Armstrong and Bird, as well as Barker and Smart's earlier 
difficulty for Bird's dispositional monism. But the general line of thought in Barker's The 
Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers is that there are two main choices for the properties and 
laws debate: neo-Humeanism and brute modalism—the latter of which is a non-standard version 




I agree with Barker's line of thought; but I also want to be more optimistic about the prospects of 
anti-Humeanism. I should note, of course, that Barker's (2013) essay does not attempt to undermine 
all versions of anti-Humeanism. Indeed, brute modalism is a non-standard version of this approach, 
and Barker restricts his discussion to four articulations of dispositional essentialism. More 
importantly, however, Barker does not criticise anti-Humean positions that take laws to be 
primitive (Barker 2013, p.608/fn.6). Maudlin's (2007) book, The Metaphysics Within Physics, is 
representative of this strategy. Roughly speaking, Maudlin's first essay in this book, A Modest 
Proposal concerning Laws, Counterfactuals, and Explanations, takes a 'two-posit' theory of (i) 
laws and (ii) the world. In addition, he characterises the world as having a primitive temporal 
direction, in virtue of which laws can "constrain" the temporal evolution of physical states (2007, 
p.21). As we shall see, temporal essentialism also focuses upon diachronic regularities; in addition, 
the passage of time plays a key role in my metaphysical explanation of diachronic regularities. But 
temporal essentialism does not take laws to be primitive: in contrast, I analyse laws as second-
order categorical relations. In this way, I hope that temporal essentialism is of interest to the 
readership of The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers, since, although I am not in direct 
disagreement with its author, at the end of this thesis I shall take an optimistic stance on the 
prospects of anti-Humean metaphysical explanations.   
 
It will be useful at this point to reconsider the overview of temporal essentialism that I provided in 
the introduction to this thesis. Temporal essentialism is a two-category ontology of objects and 
(categorical) Platonic universals. I analyse laws as second-order relations that hold between first-
order properties, in line with the necessitation theory. That said, however, I do not call upon these 
entities to provide a governing role. In contrast, the duty of these second-order relations is to 
provide a function (in the sense of a unique mapping) from their first place to their second place. 
With this in mind, I term these second-order relations 'selection relations' as oppose to 
'necessitation relations'. I symbolise a selection relation as '$', and where it is the case that $(F,G), 
fixing upon F as the input fixes upon G as the output. The central concept in temporal essentialism 
is that Platonic universals can provide this 'selection role', and that a candidate for Barker's 
governing role is the cooperation of laws qua selection relations with what I term a 'formal 
ontological operation' (see below). I think that a source of difficulty for the necessitation theory 
and dispositional essentialism is that these positions have asked properties/relations to carry the 
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burden of a governing role on their own. The proposal at hand, however, is that the selection 
relations provide a set of instructions, so to speak, that are acted upon by a different actor; and as 
the title of my position suggests, this actor is time. Time is called upon to play a role of 
'actualisation'.  
 
This proposal involves two main steps. In the first place, I draw upon Tooley's (1997) growing 
block model, which is a dynamic theory of time whereby past and present states of affairs are 
actual whereas future states of affairs are non-actual. According to Tooley, necessitation relations 
govern patterns of property instantiation across time; in addition, Tooley suggests that his 
necessitation relations provide a metaphysical explanation for the passage of time: viz. states of 
affairs are actualised via the governing role of laws. In the second place, however, temporal 
essentialism construes the passage of time as the performance of a formal ontological operation, 
pace Tooley's necessitation theory. I can introduce a formal ontological operations as a 
development of Lowe's (2006) formal ontological relationships. According to Lowe, formal 
ontological relationships (e.g. instantiation) are not themselves entities, or 'elements of being'. 
Nevertheless, these posits are thought to set out the possible ways that different types of entities 
can stand to one another in virtue of their real essences. Formal ontological operations are formal 
in this sense, but their structure is non-relational. More specifically, I take formal ontological 
operations to be a type of operation that is performed by the ontology in all and only those cases 
where its condition is true. In short, formal ontological operations are the 'ontological correlates' 
of imperative sentences qua if–then commands. Roughly speaking, formal ontological operations 
have the following structure.  
 
If [condition] is true, then perform [operation] 
If [condition] is not true, then do not perform [operation] 
 
How can we understand the passage of time as the performance of a formal ontological operation? 
In line with Tooley's growing block model, the performable operation modifies the temporally-
variable aspects of temporal essentialism: viz. objects and (first-order) states of affairs. The domain 
of objects and first-order states of affairs is temporally-variable in the sense that (i) those objects 
that are actual and (ii) those first-order states that are actual vary with the passage of time. This is 
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the central concept of a dynamic theory of time (in the context of a states of affairs ontology). Pace 
Tooley's necessitation theory, however, the actualisation of states of affairs in temporal 
essentialism is construed as the iterated performace of a formal posit (contrast entity—i.e. contrast 
necessitation relation or dispositional property). I term the formal operation in question the 
'temporal imperative'. Simplifying, it has the following structure.   
 
 If object x is present, and x instantiates first-order property X, such that $(X,Y), then 
actualise! state of affairs y's being Y at the next present moment, where Y is a function of 
X via $.  
 
In this way, the condition–operation structure of the temporal imperative is modifying the 
temporally-variable aspects of temporal essentialism, such that this modification is sensitive to 
laws, construed as second-order relations (selection relations). In short, I argue that this is a time-
based metaphysical explanation of lawful regularities. The line of thought is that dynamic 
temporality is built into the form of the ontology, and that, so construed, the form of the ontology 
is active. In addition, the content of the ontology is self-regulating if this activity is 'instructed' by 







Temporal Essentialism I 
 
 
8.1 Overview of temporal essentialism 
 
My aim in this chapter is to set out the core elements of temporal essentialism. As we noted in the 
previous chapter, temporal essentialism is a version of anti-Humeanism that seeks to provide a 
time-based metaphysical explanation for lawful regularities. The basic idea of this position is that 
we can understand Barker and Smart's governing role in terms of the structure of dynamic time. It 
will be useful to begin by setting out a survey of temporal essentialism. 
 
Temporal essentialism is a two-category ontology of objects and properties, where the latter are 
construed as Platonic universals. My position also uses a second-order relation that holds between 
first-order properties. In contrast to the necessitation theory, however, I do not call upon this 
second-order relation to provide a governing role. Instead, its duty is to provide a function (in the 
sense of a unique mapping) from its first place to its second place. Hence, where $ is a dyadic 
second-order relation that holds asymmetrically between the first-order properties F and G, there 
is a unique mapping from the property that stands in the first place of the relation (i.e. F) to the 
property that stands in the second place of the relation (i.e. G). I term this second-order relation 
the 'selection relation' to signal its distinction from the 'necessitation relation' of the necessitation 
theory (I am grateful to Matthew Tugby for this suggestion). In addition, all Platonic universals 
are categorical entities. I take it to be unproblematic that my selection relation qua categorical 
entity can provide a function from its first place to its second place.  
 
Given that the governing role for the second-order relation is rejected, temporal essentialism seeks 
to provide a metaphysical explanation for lawful regularities in terms of its explicit allegiance to a 
dynamic theory of time—in this case Tooley's (1997) growing block model. According to Tooley's 
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growing block model, states of affairs that are past and present are actual whereas states of affairs 
that are future are non-actual. In addition, actual states of affairs are (dynamically) indexed to 
times, such that future states of affairs are actualised with the passage of time. With this in mind, 
the basic idea of my metaphysical explanation for lawful regularities is that the actualisation of 
future states of affairs is a 'formal operation' that is sensitive to physical modality. I term this 
formal operation the 'temporal imperative'. It can be modelled using the following imperative 
sentence, which we shall discuss at length in this chapter and the next two chapters. (Note that 
$ and B are constants, whereas x, y, X, and Y are variables.) 
 
Temporal imperative: If object x is present and x instantiates property X, where X stands in 
the first place of the selection relation $, then actualise! object y, such that x instantiates the 
B-series earlier–later relation B to y, and such that y instantiates property Y, where Y stands 
in the second place of $ as a function of X. 
 
Let me begin by explaining the status of the temporal imperative as a formal ontological operation. 
The first step of temporal essentialism is to accept Lowe's (2006, pp.34–51) use of formal posits 
(formal qua ontological form). A good example of these formal posits is the 'characterisation 
relationship' in Lowe's four-category ontology, whereby a substance is characterised by a mode, 
i.e. a particular property. According to Lowe, the characterisation relationship is not itself a 
material entity—that is to say, it is not itself a member of the ontological category of relations, 
whether particular or universal. In contrast, Lowe claims that the characterisation relationship does 
not exist, but that it is nevertheless a formal way that kinds of beings can "combine" (2006, p.48). 
These 'formal ways of combination' are thought to reflect the real essences of entities within 
Lowe's four-category ontology. For example, the real essences of substances and modes are such 
that these kinds of beings can combine in accordance with the scheme 'substance s is characterised 
by mode m'. If two entities combine in accordance with the characterisation relationship, then these 
entities stand in dependence relationships that are distinctive of characterisation (viz. if a substance 
s is characterised by a mode m, then m depends upon s for its existence and identity.) In short, we 
can think of Lowe's formal relationships as "transcendental ties" that set out the possible ways that 
kinds of beings can stand to one another in virtue of their real essences (Schneider 2013, p.420; 




The temporal imperative is a formal posit in this sense: it is a 'transcendental tie' that sets out the 
possible ways that kinds of beings can stand to one another in virtue of their real essences. But the 
second step of temporal essentialism is to suggest that we can posit a formal operation in addition 
to Lowe's formal relationships. Accordingly, the temporal imperative is a transcendental tie that 
has the structure of a performable operation as oppose to the structure of a relationship. In saying 
that the temporal imperative has the structure of a performable operation, I mean to say that the 
temporal imperative is a type of operation that is performed by the ontology in all and only those 
cases where its condition is true. (First and foremost, temporal essentialism is a realism of 
performable operations.) If we consider the imperative sentence 'If it is raining, then put up your 
umbrella', its meaning should be taken as 'If P is true, then do Q; if P is not true, then do not do 
Q—at least not in response to this imperative sentence'. The temporal imperative is analogous. If 
the condition in its antecedent is true, then the operation in its consequent is performed. The 
temporal imperative, then, has the following basic structure. 
 
If [condition] is true, then perform [operation] 
If [condition] is not true, then do not perform [operation] 
 
At this point I shall introduce the basic elements of the temporal imperative. If we consider the 
antecedent of the temporal imperative, then we can see that it utilises a complex condition that 
contains two conjuncts: (i) object x being present, and (ii) object x instantiating property X such 
that X stands in the selection relation $ as the first place of $. I have placed these conjuncts in 
square brackets.  
 
Temporal imperative antecedent: If [object x is present] and [x instantiates property X, where 
X is the first place of the selection relation $] ... 
 
If both of these conjuncts are true, then the complex condition is true, and the operation is 
performed; if either conjunct is false, then the complex condition is false, and the operation is not 
performed. (Note that the second conjunct of the complex condition is itself conjunctive, since it 
requires that object x instantiates property X and that X stands in the first place of the selection 
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relation $.)  
 
With this in mind, the basic idea of the temporal imperative is as follows. Where we have the 
selection relation $ holding between the first-order properties F and G, the property that stands in 
the first place of $ (i.e. F) is the 'cause' property and the property that stands in the second place of 
$ (i.e. G) is the 'effect' property.  
 
_1$_2  
_Cause property$_Effect property  
 
The temporal imperative will 'check' to see if there are any present objects that instantiate a 'cause' 
property. Let us therefore say that it is the case that (i) object a is present and that (ii) a instantiates 
property F such that $(F,G). The condition in the antecedent of the temporal imperative is true and 
its operation is performed. At this stage it is important to say that the temporal imperative is 
controlling what states of affairs will be actualised in the future. (This is why I have a clause for 
object x being present—I only want the present to instruct the temporal imperative what states of 
affairs to actualise). 
 
Let us move on to consider the consequent of the temporal imperative, which is its performable 
operation.  
 
Temporal imperative consequent: ... then actualise! object y, such that x instantiates the B-
series earlier–later relation B to y, and such that y instantiates property Y, where Y stands in 
the second place of $ as a function of X. 
 
The performable operation is to introduce a token entity into the ontological category of objects, 
such that this newly-introduced object instantiates the B-series earlier–later relation (henceforth 
the 'B-relation') to the object that instantiates the relevant 'cause' property, and such that this newly-
introduced object instantiates the relevant 'effect' property. I use the phrase 'actualise!' to signal 
that the consequent of the temporal imperative is a performable operation, as oppose to a 




The standard model of laws for temporal essentialism can be defined as a material conditional.  
 
It is a law that 'All Fs are Gs' = df If at time t
n object x is F, then at time tn+1 object y is G. 
 
This is a simple diachronic model of laws that is discussed by Tooley (1997, pp.107–11), 
Armstrong (1997, pp.223–30), and McCall (1994, p.69). Let us note that the 'cause' and 'effect' 
objects are distinct: in a token sequence we would have object a being F at t1 and object b being G 
at t2. In the version of temporal essentialism that I shall set out in this thesis, these distinct objects 
are required for a perdurance theory of persistence, whereby objects persist through time by having 
distinct temporal parts at distinct times (Tooley 1997, p.262; Armstrong 1997, pp.99–103). So the 
standard model of laws for temporal essentialism involves necessary connections holding between 
distinct temporal parts, where the prior temporal part instantiates a property that stands in the first 
place of the selection relation, which 'triggers' the temporal imperative to actualise the posterior 
temporal part, such that this posterior temporal part instantiates the property that stands in the 
second place of the selection relation as a function of its first place.  
 
I require that the B-relation holds between the 'cause' object and the 'effect' object so as to model 
temporal sequence. As we shall discuss below, I define present objects to be all and only those 
objects that stand in the second place of the B-relation without standing in its first place. 
(Intuitively, the B-relation is instantiated by temporal parts so as to compose multiple 'chains' of 
temporal parts; the present objects are all and only those objects that are at the 'end' of these chains.) 
In the version of temporal essentialism that I shall set out in this thesis, the B-relation is the only 
first-order relation that temporal essentialism will recognise. It is dyadic, asymmetric, and 
categorical (in line with the selection relation).  
 
At this stage I want to depict the overall picture of my temporal essentialism. On the one hand, we 
have a two-category ontology of objects and Platonic universals. On the other hand, however, we 
have a dynamic theory of time—Tooley's (1997) growing block model. My line of thought for 
temporal essentialism is as follows. (I should emphasise to the reader that the themes of this survey, 




First, the structure of time in the growing block model is that the past and present are actual, 
whereas the future is non-actual. Given that the growing block model is a dynamic theory of time, 
actual states of affairs are (dynamically) indexed to times, such that future states of affairs are 
actualised with the passage of time. In short, as time passes the past 'grows' and the present is the 
latest 'growth' at each moment of time.  
 
Second, it is distinctive to a dynamic theory of time that a single world, i.e. the actual world, has 
a different totality of states of affairs at different times. In terms of Lowe's (2006, pp.34–51) form–
content distinction for ontology, which is the basis for his formal posits, we can construe a 
temporally dynamic world as a system of ontological categories in which the total content of these 
ontological categories is different at different times. That is to say, in a temporally dynamic world 
we can construe ontological categories as having a different totality of members at different times.  
 
And so, third, why not propose that the content of these ontological categories is to be controlled 
by the form of the ontology? In other words, why not propose that the membership of ontological 
categories is to be controlled by the formal ways that kinds of beings can diachronically 'combine'? 
Temporal essentialism takes this stance by modifying Lowe's formal posits, such that we also have 
a mechanism for controlling both the content of a designated ontological category (i.e. objects), as 
well as the formal relationships that hold between objects and Platonic universals (i.e. 
instantiation). Simply speaking, then, temporal essentialism is the position that it is 'built into' a 
system of ontology that it dynamically 'adds' new entities to its ontological categories and 
'constructs' states of affairs in a lawful way. More specifically, the states of affairs that are 
actualised as time passes are a function of present states of affairs in tandem with laws, where the 
latter are construed as the selection relation holding between pairs of first-order properties.  
 
Fourth, the 'price of purchase' for such a formal posit is, as far as I can see, two-fold. A first 
requirement is that the mechanism for control is properly aligned to the dynamic theory of time in 
question. This is important, because it is the dynamic theory of time that is supporting the notion 
that the ontological category of objects has a different totality of members at different times; 
accordingly, it is the dynamic theory of time that is supporting the proposal that the members of 
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the ontological category of objects could be controlled by the form of the ontology. Temporal 
essentialism aims to satisfy this requirement by using the dynamic actualisation of Tooley's 
growing block model as the outcome of the temporal imperative's performable operation. In this 
way, the dynamic theory of time and the formal ontological operation are properly aligned, since 
they both concern actualisation. A second requirement is that if the temporal imperative is to be 
postulated as a formal device, then it should be understood in terms of the real essences of objects 
and/or Platonic universals. This is also important, because Lowe's motivation for construing 
relationships such as characterisation as formal is that these posits reflect the ways that kinds of 
beings can combine in virtue of their real essences. With regard to this requirement, my strategy 
is two-fold. In the first place, I propose that we can distinguish between neo-Humean and anti-
Humean structures within the context of a growing block model. Briefly stated, the former 
structure involves the actualisation of 'random' states of affairs at each moment, whereby states of 
affairs are actualised in analogy with Lewis' principle of recombination; in contrast, however, the 
latter structure involves the actualisation of states of affairs that is sensitive to previously actualised 
states of affairs as well as laws, generally construed. (I'll discuss what I mean by a general construal 
of 'laws' in Chapter 10; at this stage we can note that I will not be using a governing role for 
properties/relations.) And secondly, I propose that if a version of the anti-Humean structure is 
accepted, then it should be essential to the temporal entities in the ontology they have their required 
roles in this structure. In short, I propose that (i) it is metaphysically possible that dynamic time 
has a structure that is sensitive to physical modality (pace the neo-Humean structure), such that (ii) 
this structure should be essential to its 'host' ontology—in this case, that this structure should be 
essential to objects, which are the temporal entities of this system. On this basis, temporal 
essentialism proposes that objects have temporal essences.        
 
At this stage in the chapter I have provided a survey of temporal essentialism. To supplement this 
overview, it will be useful to provide a list of the different ontological categories and formal posits 





8.2 Ontological categories and formal posits in temporal essentialism 
 
(i) Ontological categories 
 
(1.) Objects (constants: a, b, c, ...) (variables: x, y)  
(2.) Platonic universals [categorical] 
(2.a) First-order monadic properties (constants: F, G, H, ...) (variables: X, Y) 
(2.b) A first-order B-series earlier–later relation (_1B_2) [dyadic and asymmetric] 
(2.c) A second-order selection relation (_1$_2) [dyadic and asymmetric] 
 
(ii) Formal posits 
 
(1.) The instantiation relationship [a formal ontological relationship that holds between 
objects and first-order Platonic universals; e.g. a is F, a's having B to b] 
(2.) The characterisation relationship [a formal ontological relationship that holds between 
first-order properties and the second-order selection relation; e.g. $(F,G)] 
(3.) Temporal imperative: If object x is present and x instantiates property X, where X stands 
in the first place of the selection relation $, then actualise! object y, such that x instantiates 
the B-series earlier–later relation B to y, and such that y instantiates property Y, where Y 
stands in the second place of $ as a function of X. [a formal ontological operation] 
(4.) Presentness = df Object x is present if and only if either x stands in the second place of 
the B-relation without standing in its first place, or x does not stand in any place of the B-
relation. (inclusive 'either–or') [a formal ontological predicate]  
 
8.3 Basic ontology 
 
In the remainder of this chapter I want to develop the themes that I have introduced so far by 
discussing the basic ontology of temporal essentialism. There are a number of issues on which 
temporal essentialism is neutral; with regard to these issues I have chosen a set up that I think is 




In the introduction to this chapter I said that temporal essentialism is a two-category ontology of 
objects and Platonic universals. But it is more accurate to say that temporal essentialism makes 
use of four ontological categories, since it recognises four kinds of beings that stand to one another 
in distinct ways. That said, these four kinds of beings are separated out, first and foremost, by a 
distinction between objects and Platonic universals—so it is useful, rather than misleading, to say 
that temporal essentialism is a two-category ontology of objects and Platonic universals. The 
ontological category of Platonic universals encompasses first-order properties, the (first-order) B-
relation, and the (second-order) selection relation. I envisage that these three ontological categories 
can all be understood as types of Platonic universal, since these three kinds of beings are unified 
by their transcendent existence. In this way, I suggest that whilst temporal essentialism makes use 
of four ontological categories, my position only requires two fundamental ontological categories—
viz. objects and Platonic universals.   
 
8.4 Platonic universals 
 
My reason for accepting Platonic universals is that there is a difficulty for understanding the 
diachronic model of laws in terms of Aristotelian universals. Let us recall that the standard model 
of laws for temporal essentialism is diachronic, such that if a temporal part that is present 
instantiates a property that stands in the first place of the selection relation, then the temporal 
imperative actualises, at the next moment, a temporal part that instantiates the property that stands 
in the second place of the selection relation. We can represent this scheme as follows. (I have 
omitted the B-relation, which is used to define present objects, for simplicity.) 
 
Actual at t1: a is F  
Actual at t2: a is F and b is G  
 
According to temporal essentialism, this token sequence of states of affairs is a lawful regularity, 
since it is necessitated by the temporal imperative in line with object a's being present, the first-
order state of affairs a's being F, and the second-order state of affairs $(F,G). The temporal 
imperative will 'check' to see if there are any present objects that instantiate a 'cause' property; if 
this is the case, then the temporal imperative will actualise a new object that instantiates the 
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relevant 'effect' property. The difficulty for Aristotelian universals is that, at t1, a's being F is the 
only actual state of affairs. Hence, the future state of affairs, b's being G, which will be actual at 
the next moment, t2, is not actual at t1. As such, the first-order property G is not instantiated at t1, 
since there is no actual state of affairs x's being G (at t1). According to the Aristotelian conception 
of universals, however, if the first-order property G is not instantiated, then it does not exist. This 
problematises the role of the selection relation: if the 'effect' property does not exist, then the 
selection relation cannot provide a function to this property. So temporal essentialism requires 
first-order Platonic universals. In all those cases where a temporally-emergent first-order property 
is to be actualised, the temporal imperative requires that this first-order property can exist 
uninstantiated. We can see that this difficulty is arising via the combination of two theses. The first 
is Tooley's growing block model, which claims that past and present states of affairs are actual 
whereas future states of affairs are non-actual. And the second is the standard model of laws for 
temporal essentialism; so construed, it is present states of affairs that are lawfully necessitating 
future states of affairs. (More specifically, when a 'cause' object is present, such that it is relevant 
to the temporal imperative, this object is actual at a time tn. But the actualisation of the 'effect' 
object takes place at the next moment, i.e. tn+1. Therefore the actuality of the 'effect' property at tn 
is not guaranteed.) Given this requirement for first-order Platonic universals, I also construe the 
B-relation and the selection relation as Platonic universals. 
 
This difficulty is related to Tooley's (1977, p.669; 1987, p.72) argument concerning uninstantiated 
laws, which aims to support his Platonic version of the necessitation theory. The basic idea of this 
argument is that it is plausible that there are physical modal facts concerning uninstantiated laws. 
Tooley's thought experiment involves ten types of particles that can collide with themselves and 
each other. This gives fifty-five different types of particle interaction, which can be construed as 
laws qua the necessitation theory. In his thought experiment, Tooley imagines that two of these 
ten types of particles will never interact, on the basis of inappropriate boundary conditions. As 
such, the antecedent of the law, which is a structural universal (e.g. 'x is F, y is G, and x's having 
R to y'), is uninstantiated. Tooley claims, however, that it is rational to assume on the basis of the 
other types of particle interaction that there is a physical modal fact concerning the uninstantiated 
law, despite its unknown nature. He concludes from this thought experiment that Platonic 
universals are required if the necessitation theory is to provide truthmakers for uninstantiated laws. 
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Armstrong's response to this argument is to 'bite the bullet' and claim that there are no 
uninstantiated laws. In doing so, he claims that a number of counterfactuals, e.g. probabilistic 
counterfactuals, have indeterminate consequents, such that the counterfactual 'if it were the case 
that particle type F collided with particle type G, then it would be the case that event X' can also 
be indeterminate. So construed, the counterfactual in question is indeterminate, in the sense that 
although it may be true to say that some event would occur in the collision, there is no fact of the 
matter as to what type of event this would be (Armstrong 1973, pp.123–6; Armstrong 1997, p.253).  
 
As noted, the difficulty concerning diachronic laws is related to Tooley's argument concerning 
uninstantiated laws. But there is also a difference. In my case, the 'cause' property of the selection 
relation is instantiated at a time when the 'effect' property is uninstantiated. With Tooley's case, 
however, the antecedent of the law for particle interaction, which is analogous to the 'cause' 
property in temporal essentialism, is uninstantiated. (Note that Tooley's argument is neutral on 
whether or not the consequent of the law, i.e. 'event X' above, is instantiated.) I do not think that 
temporal essentialism can accept that first-order properties are Aristotelian universals; 
nevertheless, it is useful to note what is required if we adopt Armstrong's 'bullet-biting' response 
for temporal essentialism's difficulty concerning diachronic laws. In short, we would require that, 
for all lawful regularities, the 'effect' property of the selection relation is instantiated in the past, 
relative to the 'cause' property. The simplest modification of the above scheme is as follows.  
 
Actual at t1: a is F and c is G  
Actual at t2: a is F and c is G and b is G  
 
With the addition of the otherwise irrelevant state of affairs c's being G, both the 'cause' and 'effect' 
properties of the selection relation are actual for the purposes of the temporal imperative. But this 
restriction would rule out temporally-emergent first-order properties. Given that the standard 
model of laws for temporal essentialism is diachronic, I would require this restriction to be upheld 
for all lawful regularities. For example, if five different 'cause' objects are present at a time, tn, then 
I would require that all of their 'effect' properties are instantiated in the past of tn. I see this as a 




That said, however, Armstrong (1997, p.239) argues that although a Platonic version of the 
necessitation theory is advantageous in providing truthmakers for uninstantiated laws, his 
Aristotelian version is, in the final analysis, to be preferred, since it does not entail the rejection of 
naturalism. With regard to this issue, my response is two-fold. Firstly, the overall aim of temporal 
essentialism is to show that there is a version of anti-Humeanism that does not collapse into 
Barker's brute modalism. Given that anti-Humeanism as a whole is at stake in Barker's The 
Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers, if temporal essentialism is a distinctive version of anti-
Humeanism, then this position is of dialectical interest whether or not it requires the rejection of 
naturalism. Hence, even if the Platonic conception of universals is found wanting, I will have 
shown—or at least I hope to show—that a distinctive version of anti-Humeanism is closely 
connected to this theory, which I take to be, in itself, a useful development of the properties and 
laws debate. Secondly, however, the advantage that Tooley's necessitation theory holds over 
Armstrong's necessitation theory translates for temporal essentialism. That is to say, in those cases 
where a 'cause' property is not instantiated at any time, temporal essentialism can provide a 
truthmaker for this uninstantaited law. More specifically, I can say that, in virtue of the temporal 
essences of objects, the state of affairs $(F,G) is a truthmaker for the counterfactual conditional 'If 
at time tn object x were to be F, then at time tn+1 object y would be G'. Accordingly, if Armstrong's 
strategy of indeterminate counterfactuals is found wanting, then temporal essentialism will be no 
worse off than Tooley's necessitation theory. All in all, then, I consider the Platonic universals of 
temporal essentialism to be a possible disadvantage of my position—given the desirability of 
naturalism—that is nevertheless non-fatal. I note with regard to this issue that Bird (2007, pp.50–
9) and Fales (1990, pp.216–20) have also attacked Aristotelian versions of anti-Humeanism for 
failing to provide truthmakers for uninstantiated laws. So there is a degree of controversy in the 
properties and laws debate over the relative importance of accepting Platonic universals as 
truthmakers for uninstantaited laws versus the rejection of these entities for the sake of naturalism.           
 
More importantly, however, Tugby (2013) has recently argued that dispositional essentialism 
requires Platonic universals as oppose to tropes or Aristotelian universals. If sound, his argument 
shows that the central version of anti-Humeanism in the properties and laws debate (i.e. 
dispositional essentialism) entails the rejection of naturalism. It follows, I think, that the above 
concern is diminished. If dispositional essentialism requires Platonic universals, then—
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Aristotelian necessitation theories aside—it cannot be a comparative disadvantage of temporal 
essentialism that it also requires these entities. The basic idea of Tugby's argument is two-fold. In 
the first part, he investigates the question of how different ontologies can understand the 
dispositional essentialist principle that a dispositional property is individuated in terms of its 
manifestation property. A first line of thought draws upon manifestation relations, such that a 'real' 
second-order relation necessarily holds between a dispositional property and its manifestation 
property. Briefly stated, Tugby argues that the trope ontology suffers a disadvantage of parsimony 
in comparison to the ontologies of Aristotelian and Platonic universals, since the former approach 
requires a distinct second-order relation for each dispositional property—given that that 
dispositional properties and second-order relations qua tropes are particulars—whereas the latter 
approaches can posit a single second-order relation. In addition, however, drawing upon either 
tropes or Aristotelian universals gives rise to a special difficulty where the manifestation property 
is unmanifested. More specifically, given that tropes and Aristotelian universals cannot exist 
uninstantiated, if the manifestation property is unmanifested, then the second-order relation lacks 
its second relatum, which problematizes its status as a 'real relation'.  
 
At this point, Tugby notes that trope ontologies have typically rejected the 'manifestation relation 
approach'. In contrast, Heil (2003, p.80) and Martin (2007, p.29) have sought to understand 
dispositional properties in terms of 'directedness'. Tugby argues, however, that this approach fails 
to engage with Armstrong's (1997, p.79) 'Meinongian problem' of how (actual) dispositional 
properties can 'point beyond themselves' to their (merely possible) unmanifested manifestation 
properties. In short, Tugby complains, justifiably in my opinion, that neither Heil nor Martin 'cash 
out' the directedness approach. (I note that a parallel criticism is raised, in effect, by Bird (2007, 
pp.118–26) with regard to Molnar's proposal that dispositional properties are directed towards their 
manifestation properties with a 'physical intentionality'). In addition, Tugby dismisses the 
alternative view that the unmanifestated manifestation property is a 'possible existence'. This 
appeal to 'possibilia' is made by Bird (2007, pp.111–14). As we discussed in Chapter 3, Bird 
accepts a version of Linsky and Zalta's (1994) and Williamson's (1998) thesis that all metaphysical 
possibilities are actual, such that some of these possibilities are 'contingently concrete' whereas the 
rest are 'contingently abstract'. With regard to tropes and Aristotelian universals, this alternative 
view would provide a second relata for the manifestation relation in the case of unmanifested 
186 
 
manifestation properties. But it is dismissed by Tugby on the grounds that a central advantage of 
dispositional properties—viz. that these entities can serve as actual truthmakers for modal truths—
is no longer utilised, since actualism, at least as it is standardly construed, is abandoned. As we 
shall discuss in the next chapter, temporal essentialism is a 'strict' version of actualism that does 
not involve 'possible existences' or 'contingently abstract' actual entities. So construed, Platonic 
universals are actual entities that are essentially non-spatiotemporal. (I am grateful for discussion 
with Matthew Tugby on this matter.) 
 
The second part of Tugby's argument aims to show that two "platitudes" of dispositions cannot be 
upheld without the use of Platonic universals. The first platitude is that objects can instantiate 
unmanifested dispositions; the second platitude is that a number of dispositions are instantiated by 
objects intrinsically. Briefly stated, Tugby sets out a thought experiment whereby the external 
circumstances of a putative intrinsic disposition, D, which is instantiated by a given object, a, are 
modified such that the world contains no manifestations of D. As we noted above, Tugby argues 
that the ontologies of Aristotelian universals and Platonic universals share the advantage—over 
the ontology of tropes—that a single second-order relation can account for the identity of a 
dispositional property. In this thought experiment, however, the Aristotelian ontology cannot posit 
a second-order relation, since the manifestation property is uninstantiated and therefore does not 
exist. Accordingly, the Aristotelian version of dispositional essentialism cannot accept the two 
platitudes of dispositions: the second-order relation requires that the external circumstances of 
dispositional properties are such that there is at least one manifestation property. I agree with 
Tugby's arguments against the trope ontologies and the 'relational approach' for the Aristotelian 
ontologies.  
 
8.5 The four kinds of being in temporal essentialism 
 
For these reasons, I shall set out a simple system of ontological categories that approximates 
Tooley's (1987, pp.118–22) 'Platonic factualism' to the extent that the requirements of temporal 
essentialism permit. The basic idea of Tooley's Platonic factualism is that we should recognise 
objects and Platonic universals as contingently existing entities, whilst rejecting the 'strict' 
factualist thesis that these kinds of beings are 'mere abstractions' from states of affairs. This 
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position is based upon the thesis that only entities with 'intrinsic natures' can exist independently. 
The motivation for Tooley's Platonic factualism is as follows. Firstly, in line with the Platonic 
thesis that universals are transcendent, these entities are thought to have intrinsic natures (qua 
qualitative natures) in virtue of their categorical status. In this way, Platonic universals can exist 
independently. Secondly, however, Tooley aims to secure the idea that objects cannot exist as 
'bare' objects. The above thesis is also thought to support this idea, since he takes first-order 
properties to provide objects with intrinsic natures in light of their categorical status. So all objects 
are required to instantiate at least one first-order property if they are to independently exist as 
'substances'. And in the third place, Tooley aims to secure the idea that objects cannot exist as 
'bare' objects, even if these entities stand in first-order relations. (The reasoning is that objects 
would not have intrinsic natures if they did not instantiate first-order properties.) He claims that it 
is difficult to motivate this third idea on the basis of a 'strict' reading of factualism, since, in this 
context, properties are standardly construed as 'one-place' relations. So construed, however, the 
two states of affairs a's being F and b's having R to c are unified in that they both feature 'relations 
holding between objects'. For these reasons, Tooley rejects a 'strict' reading of factualism and 
proposes that we should recognise objects and Platonic universals as entities that can contingently 
combine into states of affairs (Tooley 1987, pp.118–9). Given that I agree with these ideas, 
Tooley's Platonic factualism is a good starting point for temporal essentialism; furthermore, the 
adoption of his position aligns well with my focus upon his growing block model of time.  
 
I shall now describe the different kinds of beings in the basic ontology of temporal essentialism. 
Let us begin with objects, first-order properties, and the B-relation. The instantiation of a first-
order property (or B-relation) by a given object (or objects) is termed a first-order state of affairs.  
 
(i) x is X [a given object instantiating a given first-order monadic universal] 
(ii) x's having B to y [a given pair of objects instantiating the B-relation] 
 
In addition, I shall construe instantiation as a formal ontological relationship, in line with Lowe's 
formal posits. We shall discuss Lowe's form–content distinction in Chapter 10, but we can recall 
from the introduction that a formal ontological relationship is a way that kinds of being can 
combine in virtue of their real essences. At this stage there are two possible ways of combination 
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with regard to objects and Platonic universals. Firstly, one member of the ontological category of 
objects can combine with one member of the ontological category of Platonic universals to give a 
monadic state of affairs, as per (i) above. And secondly, two members of the ontological category 
of objects can combine with one member of the ontological category of Platonic universals to give 
a dyadic state of affairs, as per (ii). Given that first-order properties and the B-relation have these 
different possible ways of combination, I think that the clearest strategy is to break up first-order 
Platonic universals into two ontological categories: monadic properties and the dyadic B-relation. 
In short, I want to rule out the following types of states of affairs without accepting the factualist 
thesis that objects and properties/relations are 'mere abstractions' from states of affairs.  
 
(iii) x is B [a given object instantiating the B-relation] 
(iv) x's having X to y [a given pair of objects instantiating a given first-order monadic property] 
 
With this in mind, I propose that it is essential to objects and first-order properties that they can 
combine as per (i), whereas it is essential to objects and the B-relation that they can combine as 
per (ii).  
 
I also propose that there are no 'bare' objects: all objects instantiate at least one first-order property. 
I shall understand this requirement in terms of Lowe's 'non-rigid' existential dependence 
relationships. As we shall discuss in Chapter 10, these dependence relationships are formal 
ontological relationships that are 'constituted' by other (more fundamental) formal ontological 
relationships—in this case instantiation. At this stage, however, we can say that each object 
depends for its existence upon the instantiation of some first-order property, without the object 
depending for its existence upon the instantiation of a specific first-order property (cf. Lowe 2006, 
p.36). So construed, objects have a non-rigid existential dependence upon first-order properties. 
Simply speaking, then, as we examine the members of the ontological category of objects, we will 
see that every object stands in the instantiation relationship to at least one first-order property.  
 
With regard to the B-relation, I do not require a parallel existential dependence. That is to say, 
objects in temporal essentialism do not have to stand in this first-order relation. My motivation is 
as follows. A simple cosmology for temporal essentialism is that there is a first time, whereby a 
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contingent arrangement of states of affairs are actualised. Given this contingent arrangement, the 
temporal imperative will actualise states of affairs with the passage of time, as we have described. 
At this first time, however, there will be no earlier or later times and so there will be insufficient 
objects for the places for the B-relation. 
 
To summarise. At this point I have proposed that objects can instantiate first-order properties and 
the B-relation, such that these kinds of being can combine into first-order states of affairs. I have 
also proposed that there are no 'bare' objects: each object depends for its existence upon the 
instantiation of some first-order property, without depending for its existence upon the 
instantiation of a specific first-order property. And lastly, I proposed that objects do not have a 
non-rigid existential dependence upon the places of the B-relation. 
 
We can see that these three proposals distinguish three ontological categories in the following way. 
Firstly, there is a distinction between objects and Platonic universals: the former can only exist 
dependently whereas the latter can exist independently. Hence, if we examine the members of the 
ontological category of Platonic universals, it is not required that every Platonic universal is 
instantiated. Secondly, however, there a distinction between first-order properties and the B-
relation, since combinations of the former kinds of being involve pairs of entities (e.g. a is F), 
whilst combinations of the latter kinds of being involve triples of entities (e.g. a's having B to b).  
 
With regard to the fourth kind of being—i.e. the selection relation, I use a distinct formal 
ontological relationship, which I term 'characterisation' (this use of the term is  unrelated to Lowe's 
formal posit). The selection relation can characterise first-order properties but not (i) objects or (ii) 
the B-relation. Let us term this type of combination a second-order state of affairs.  
 
(v) $(X,Y) [The selection relation characterising a given pair of first-order properties]   
 
My motivation for using a distinct formal ontological relationship is two-fold. Firstly, as we have 
noted, this basic ontology is not a version of the 'strict' factualist thesis that properties/relations are 
'mere abstractions' from states of affairs. As such, the line of thought that second-order relations 
can be instantiated by first-order properties, such that these relata are 'second-order objects' relative 
190 
 
to the second-order relation, is unavailable. According to this simple system of ontological 
categories, objects are existentially dependent entities, not merely the possible relata of relations. 
To clarify, objects are existentially dependent entities, whilst all Platonic universals—including 
first-order properties—are existentially independent. (Note that this entails that it is not necessary 
that the first-order properties stand in either place of the selection relation.) In addition, as we shall 
discuss in the next chapter, first-order states of affairs are actualised by the temporal imperative as 
time passes. Briefly stated, if it is the case that object a is present and that a instantiates property 
F where it is also the case that $(F,G), then the temporal imperative will actualise two states of 
affairs at the next present moment: a's having B to b and b's being G. In contrast, however, second-
order states of affairs are not actualised as time passes, because these states of affairs concern first-
order Platonic properties standing in a second-order Platonic relation (i.e. because these states of 
affairs concern essentially non-spatiotemporal entities). As the temporal status of first-order and 
second-order states of affairs is different, I think that the clearest strategy is to posit a distinctive 
formal ontological relationship—viz. characterisation—for second-order states of affairs. Simply 
stated: the holding of the instantiation relationship is temporal and changeable, whereas the 












In this chapter I want to continue our discussion of temporal essentialism. I shall discuss Tooley's 
growing block model and explain the use of this theory of time in temporal essentialism.  
 
9.2 Tooley's growing block model 
 
In his (1997) book Time, Tense, and Causation, Tooley sets out his version of the 'no-future' theory 
of time (cf. Broad 1923). The basic idea of Tooley's growing block model is that past and present 
states of affairs are actual whereas future states of affairs are non-actual; in addition, actual states 
of affairs are (dynamically) indexed to times, such that states of affairs are actualised at the present 
moment with the passage of time. Tooley's central argument for his growing block model draws 
upon a thesis concerning singular causation and probability. The overall picture is that states of 
affairs can only be causally related in a world that approximates—to a significant degree—the 
growing block model. In addition, Tooley claims that his growing block model can avoid 
McTaggart's paradox and the argument from special relativity, which are two principle dangers 
for a dynamic theory of time (1997, pp.303–73). 
 
First and foremost, Tooley's growing block model is a non-standard tensed theory of time. In his 
discussion, Tooley proposes that the standard way of distinguishing between tenseless and tensed 
theories of time is to draw out their opposing stances on the relative priority of tenseless versus 
tensed concepts/states of affairs. Roughly speaking, tensed concepts involve, either directly or 
indirectly, McTaggart's A-series predicates. For example, the proposition 'Event E took place five 
minutes ago' is a tensed proposition, since it indirectly draws upon the concept of the present: the 
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qualifier 'took place five minutes ago' signifies that E is five minutes past (relative to the present). 
And correspondingly, tensed states of affairs make use of the ontological correlates of McTaggart's 
A-series predicates—e.g. object x is present qua the state of affairs x's having the property of 
presentness. With this in mind, a tenseless theory of time will standardly take tenseless concepts 
to be semantically prior to tensed concepts, such that the truth conditions for a tensed proposition 
can be specified via propositions that only contain tenseless concepts. In addition, the truthmaker 
for the proposition 'Event E took place five minutes ago' will be a tenseless state of affairs, i.e. the 
state of affairs that E stands in a (tenseless) relation of 'five minutes later than' to the proposition 
in question (Tooley 1997, p.17).  
 
In contrast, however, a tensed theory of time will standardly take tensed concepts to be 
semantically prior to tenseless concepts. Hence, a tenseless proposition—e.g. 'There are 
(tenselessly) dinosaurs'—will be analysed into the tensed proposition 'Either there were dinosaurs, 
or there are (now) dinosaurs, or there will be dinosaurs'. In addition, a tensed theory of time will 
take the truthmaker for the tenseless proposition 'There are (tenselessly) dinosaurs' to be a 
disjunction of tensed states of affairs—i.e. either dinosaurs are past, or dinosaurs are present, or 
dinosaurs are future (Tooley 1997, p.18).  
 
According to Tooley, the relative priority of tenseless versus tensed concepts/states of affairs is 
the standard way of distinguishing between tenseless and tensed theories of time. But a second 
way of distinguishing between these theories concerns whether the world is static or dynamic. 
Briefly stated, a theory of time is static if the totality of states of affairs are temporally fixed; in 
contrast, a theory of time is dynamic if the totality of states of affairs are different at different times 
(Tooley 1997, p.13–20). At this point Tooley argues that if tensed concepts are semantically basic 
and tensed states of affairs are ontologically basic, in accordance with a standard tensed theory of 
time, then the world must be dynamic. In other words, a tensed theory of time, as standardly 
construed, requires a dynamic conception of reality whereby the totality of states of affairs are 
different at different times. In outline, his argument is that, given a tensed theory of time, two 
tokens of the utterance 'Event E is present' that are uttered at different times will express the same 
(primitively tensed) proposition. But if the totality of states of affairs are temporally fixed in line 
with a static conception of reality, then the token utterances will either both be true or both be false 
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(Tooley 1997, pp.18–9). Crucially, however, Tooley argues that if tenseless concepts are 
semantically basic and tenseless states of affairs are ontologically basic, in accordance with a 
standard tenseless theory of time, then the world can be either static or dynamic. Confusingly, 
perhaps, Tooley's growing block model is a non-standard tensed theory of time in the sense that it 
combines a tenseless approach to semantics and ontology with a dynamic conception of reality. 
All in all, then, Tooley is breaking apart the 'standard' pairing of (i) tenseless approaches to 
semantics/ontology with a static framework and (ii) tensed approaches to semantics/ontology with 
a dynamic framework. (Tooley's term for his growing block model as a 'tensed' theory of time 
suggests that he takes the second way of distinguishing between tenseless and tensed theories of 
time, i.e. via the static–dynamic distinction, to be a more important method of distinction than the 
question of the relative priority of tenseless versus tensed concepts/states of affairs.) 
 
If tenseless temporal concepts, such as temporal priority, are semantically basic, does it 
follow that the world is a static one? It is hard to see why it does. In order for the world to be 
a dynamic one, all that is required is that the [totality] facts that are actual as of one time 
differ from the [totality of] facts that are actual as of some other time. There is no need for 
that difference to be a difference with respect to irreducible tensed facts. It may simply be a 
matter of change, over time, with respect to what tenseless states of affairs have become 
actual (Tooley 1997, p.19: my square brackets—see below).   
 
With regard to the static–dynamic distinction, Tooley suggests that the "most fundamental 
question in the philosophy of time is whether a static or dynamic conception of the world is correct" 
(1997, p.13). We can think of this issue in the following way. In a four-dimensional Minkowski 
space-time, which is a standard model for the static conception, there can be different states of 
affairs at different times. That is to say, the states of affairs in one three-dimensional cross-section 
can be different from the states of affairs in another three-dimensional cross-section. But if we 
think of the totality of states of affairs—i.e. the states of affairs at all spatiotemporal locations—
then it would be a mistake to say that this totality could be different at different times, since, 
according to the Minkowski model, these different times, or at least their contents, make up the 
totality of states of affairs in question (McCall 2001, p.14). According to the dynamic conception, 
however, the world as a whole can be different at different times. Below is a useful citation from 
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Tooley that explains his distinction between the static and dynamic conceptions with regard to 
change. 
 
[T]he difference between a static conception of the world and a dynamic one comes to this. 
According to a static conception, what states of affairs there are does not depend upon what 
time it is. Change, consequently, cannot be a matter of a change, over time, in what states of 
affairs exist. It must be a matter simply of the possession, by an object, or by the world as a 
whole, of different intrinsic properties at different times. According to a dynamic conception 
of the world, by contrast, what states of affairs exist does depend upon what time it is. As a 
consequence, the totality of monadic states of affairs which exist as of one time, and which 
involve a given object, may differ from the totality that exists of some other time, and it is 
precisely such a difference that constitutes change in an object, rather than merely the 
possession by an object of different properties at different times. Similarly, change in the 
world as a whole is a matter of a difference in the totality of states of affairs that exist as of 
different times, and not merely a matter of the possession of different properties by different 
temporal slices of the world (Tooley 1997, p.16).     
 
On this basis, Tooley introduces his concept of 'actuality at a time' in opposition to the concept of 
'actual simpliciter' (1997, pp.39–42). The concept of actuality at a time is a temporally-indexed 
concept of actuality. Given that a state of affairs can be actual at a time, as oppose to actual 
simpliciter, it can be non-actual at different times. This is the primary purpose of the concept of 
actual at a time. On the basis of Tooley's growing block model, whereby past and present states of 
affairs are actual but future states of affairs are non-actual, if a state of affairs is actual at a time, 
then it will be actual at all later times. (In contrast, a version of classical presentism may take a 
state of affairs to be non-actual at a time tn, actual at a time tn+1, and non-actual at time tn+2 as the 
state of affairs moves from the future to the past via the present) Simply speaking, as time passes 
in Tooley's growing block model, the past 'grows' and the present is the latest 'growth' at each 
moment of time. Accordingly, if a state of affairs is actualised at a present moment, then it will 
remain actual at the next present moment, although it will be a past state of affairs. 
 
Tooley accepts his concept of actual at a time as primitive. In addition, he argues that the opposing 
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concept of actual simpliciter, which is drawn upon by static theories of time, also has to be taken 
as primitive, such that there is no comparative disadvantage for his growing block model and its 
concept of actual at a time. In short, Tooley's argument is that the analysis of the concept of actual 
simpliciter via the concept of tenseless existence is uninformative, since existential quantification 
and the range of the existential quantifier stand in need of analysis (Tooley 1997; pp.37–9; Tooley 
2001, p.47). That said, however, Tooley also accepts the concept of actual simpliciter as primitive. 
Accordingly, he accepts both the concepts of actual at a time and actual simpliciter as primitive. 
There are two central reasons for Tooley's acceptance of the concept of actual simpliciter. The first 
reason is that this concept is required for non-temporal entities; in particular, Tooley construes 
propositions and Platonic universals as non-temporal entities (1997, p.40). To say that a Platonic 
universal is actual simpliciter is to say that the actuality of this entity cannot be indexed to a time, 
which is line with the view that Platonic universals are essentially non-spatiotemporal entities (cf. 
Smith 2001, p.22). The second reason is that Tooley argues that his dynamic theory of time can 
make sense of the concept of future (non-actual) states of affairs, as well as the totality of what is 
actual at a given time. Tooley draws upon the concept of actual simpliciter for these roles. This is 
a controversial move, which is criticised by Oaklander (2001, p.10), Smith (2001, p.22), and Sider 
(2001, p.23–5). The citation below is, I think, the clearest presentation of Tooley's line of thought. 
 
To make sense of the idea of a dynamic world, one needs the idea of states of affairs that are 
actual at a time. But suppose that the time in question is later than the present—such as 
January 1, 2010. Can one make sense of the idea of states of affairs that are actual as of 
January 1, 2010? To argue that someone who accepts the view that the world is dynamic 
cannot make sense of the idea of states of affairs that are actual as of January 1, 2010, it 
would seem that one must argue that such a person can make no sense of the idea of times 
that are later than the present, and I see no reason to accept that claim. But suppose, then, 
that one can make sense of the idea of states of affairs that are actual as of January 1, 2010. 
Surely one can also make sense, in that case, of the idea of states of affairs such that there is 
some time t such that the states of affairs are actual as of time t. Can one then form the 
mereological union of all such states of affairs? ... [I]f there are no intrinsic tensed properties, 
then states of affairs that are actual as of one time will be consistent with states of affairs that 
are actual as of any other time, and so one will have a consistent whole that consists of all 
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and only states of affairs that are actual as of one time or another (Tooley 2001, p.43: original 
italics). 
 
In this way, Tooley draws upon the concept of actual simpliciter to make sense of a "total" dynamic 
(1997, p.40). A total dynamic world stands in contrast to a dynamic world at a given time, which 
trades upon the concept of actual at a time. In other words, concrete states of affairs that are actual 
as of 'some time t' are actual simpliciter. Given that Tooley's concrete states of affairs are 
tenseless—note that his abstract states of affairs, i.e. his laws, are also tenseless—the mereological 
whole of concrete states of affairs that are actual simpliciter is "consistent" (Tooley, 2001, p.42). 
Simply speaking, the 'content' of Tooley's growing block model, to use Lowe's term, 'fits together'. 
This is a point of importance, since a theory of time that uses tensed states of affairs—e.g. Smith's 
(2002) 'degree presentism' or Lowe's (1998) and Dummett's (2003) 'moving tense' theories—
would not facilitate a consistent mereological whole of states of affairs that are acutal simpliciter: 
there would be McTaggart-style contradictions for the A-series properties. So the rejection of 
tensed states of affairs and the acceptance of the concept of actual simpliciter are closely connected.    
 
9.3 Tooley's argument for his growing block model 
 
As we noted above, Tooley's central argument for his growing block model draws upon a thesis 
concerning singular causation and the transmission of probability. This is a complex argument that 
is connected to Tooley's (1987) Causation: A Realist Approach. Stated briefly, however, the two 
stages of the argument run as follows.  
 
In the first stage, Tooley develops a theory of causation and laws that trades upon three theses. The 
first thesis is that a realist approach to causation is correct. To this end, Tooley rejects reductive 
approaches to causation, whereby causal relations logically supervene upon the non-causal 
properties and/or relations of objects. (Note that Tooley also distinguishes a 'weaker' version of 
causal reductionism according to which causal relations logically supervene upon the non-causal 
properties and/or relations of objects together with causal laws. He rejects both the 'strong' and 




Tooley sets out three arguments against causal reductionism. By way of illustration, the first 
argument concerns the issue of the direction of causation. Tooley notes that the actual 
spatiotemporal distribution of events is standardly called upon by causal reductionists to explain 
the direction of causation. In particular, Reichenbach (1956, pp.117–43: cited in Tooley 1997, p.86) 
makes use of entropic increase to understand the direction of causation. With this in mind, Tooley 
outlines a "possible causal world" in which a single particle causes successive temporal parts of 
itself (1997, p.86). Given that there is no entropic change in this counterexample, however, Tooley 
concludes that the causal reductionist (in this case Reichenbach) is forced to take a realist stance 
towards the direction of time. The line of thought is that, in response to this counterexample, the 
causal reductionist can only understand the direction of causation in terms of the direction of time, 
since the 'spatiotemporal distribution of events' in unsuitable for reductively explaining the 
direction of causation. According to Tooley, however, this escape route is multiply problematic. 
The basic issue is that Tooley defends a causal theory of time, whereby the direction of time is 
understood in terms of the direction of causation (1997, pp.254–300). This leads Tooley to reject 
a number of ways in which the causal reductionist might attempt to understand the direction of 
causation in terms of the direction of time. For example, he rejects the view that the asymmetry of 
a B-series earlier–later relation can account for the direction of time, since the asymmetry of this 
relation does not, in itself, distinguish between the past–future direction as oppose to the future–
past direction (Tooley 1997, p.86). On the basis of these considerations, Tooley proposes that there 
is a prima facie motivation for rejecting causal reductionism in favour of causal realism. In addition, 
however, he argues that the causal relation is unobservable. And so it is suggested—on traditional 
empiricist grounds—that a realist theory of causation requires a successful analysis of the meaning 
of the term 'causal relation' (where the entity denoted by this term is construed as a theoretical 
posit). Given that Tooley believes that he can set out the required postulates to successfully analyse 
the causal relation (see below), he proposes that causal realism is a defendable thesis in the 
philosophy of causation (1997, p.99).   
 
At this point Tooley develops the second thesis of his theory of causation and laws—viz. a 
singularist theory of causation. Tooley discusses a number of postulates for a singularist theory of 
causation that could disclose the "crucial analytical connections" for the causal relation (1997, 
p.99). Given the context of a singularist theory of causation, Tooley's examines postulates that do 
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not refer to causal laws. For this reason, Hume's approach of combining the postulates of temporal 
priority and spatial contiguity with a postulate of constant conjunction is rejected, since drawing 
upon general regularities, Tooley notes, is to draw upon causal laws. His preferred alternative is 
to indirectly describe the relation of causation. "Causation is that unique relation between events 
or states of affairs such that, if there are laws involving that relation, those laws must satisfy ... a 
certain set of postulates" (Tooley 1997, p.101). This line of thought draws upon the following steps. 
In the first place, Tooley makes a two-fold assumption: (i) states of affairs can stand in the causal 
relation without falling under a causal law, and (ii) it is logically possible that there are both causal 
and non-causal laws. In the second place, he reasons from these assumptions that the general 
concept of a law should be analysed without making use of causal concepts. In the third place, 
Tooley suggests that causal laws can be defined as those laws that "involve the relation of 
causation" (1997, p.100). And in the fourth place, he proposes that causal laws may be 
distinguished from non-causal laws not only in that the former uniquely involve the relation of 
causation, but also via a necessary truth. The necessary truth in question is that causal laws, as 
oppose to non-causal laws, satisfy a set of postulates. In short: "The idea is that if a law satisfies 
those postulates then it is a causal law, and if it is a causal law then it involves a causal relation" 
(Oaklander 2001, p.5). The third thesis of Tooley's theory of causation and laws, then, is that it is 
a necessary truth that causal laws satisfy his set of postulates.  
 
What is the set of postulates? There are four postulates in question, which are discussed in Tooley's 
Causation: A Realist Approach (1987, pp.291–6). They are termed '(C1), (C2), (C3), and (C4)'. 
These postulates concern the 'transmission of probabilities' from causes to effects. According to 
(C1)–(C4), the logical relation between 'prior probabilities' and 'posterior probabilities' is different 
for the causes than it is for effects (Tooley 1997, p.61). The set of postulates are designed for two 
states of affairs, x's being P and y's being Q—henceforth P and Q, respectively—where P is 
causally sufficient for Q. With this in mind, the prior probability of a state of affairs is construed, 
roughly speaking, as the logical probability of that state of affairs in isolation from the information 
that P is causally sufficient for Q. And correspondingly, the posterior probability of a state of 
affairs is construed as the logical probability of that state of affairs where the information that P is 
causally sufficient for Q is taken into account. The central postulates are (C1) and (C4). According 
to (C4), "the posterior probability of an effect depends upon the prior probability of the cause" 
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(Tooley 1997, p.107). In contrast, however, (C1) states that "the posterior probability of a cause 
does not depend upon the prior probability of its effect" (Tooley 1997, p.108).  
 
... [C]ausal laws must satisfy postulates (C1) through (C4)—postulates which entail that, if a 
type of event with a very low prior probability turns out to be caused by a type of event with 
a much higher prior probability, then the former type of event must be assigned a posterior 
probability that is at least as high as the prior (and also posterior) probability of the type of 
event that is its cause. So if ... the existence of two electrons a mile apart [relatively likely] 
is causally sufficient to bring about the existence of a solar system in a very precise and 
complex state [relatively unlikely], the latter state of affairs is no longer astronomically 
improbable; on the contrary, its probability is quite high (Tooley 1997, pp.105–6: my square 
brackets).       
  
On the bais of (C1)–(C4), the second stage of Tooley's argument aims to show that this form of 
explanation for otherwise improbable states of affairs presupposes his growing block model, or at 
least a theory of time that approximates it to a significant degree. In the first step of the argument, 
Tooley set out his diachronic model of laws. According to this diachronic model, P is causally 
sufficient for Q in that P at tn is causally sufficient for Q at tn+1. And in the second step of the 
argument, Tooley investigates the question of how different theories of time can explain his 
postulates—in particular his central postulates of (C1) and (C4). At this point Tooley draws upon 
a view of the necessitation theory that is set up for his growing block model. 
 
How can there be causal laws that conform to postulates (C1) through (C4)? The basic answer 
that I am proposing is this. Causal laws are not merely patterns that events exhibit, for, as I 
argued earlier, a reductionist account of causation is untenable. Causal laws, rather than being 
merely regularities in the history of the world, control the course of history; they underlie, and 
account for, any patterns that the world may exhibit over time. But how is this control to be 
understood? One way—and, I think, the only satisfactory way—is if causal laws, in conjunction 
with what is actual as of a given time, determine what states of affairs are then added to what is 





 I shall term this view 'Tooley's dynamic necessitation theory'. With regard to the central postulates 
of (C1) and (C4), Tooley argues that his dynamic necessitation theory can explain why the 
transmission of probabilities is different for causes than it is for effects. Let us recall that P and Q 
both have prior probabilities—i.e. logical probabilities that are isolated from the information that 
P is causally sufficient for Q. With this in mind, Tooley sets out the following scenario.  
 
P is actual at tn 
Q is non-actual at tn+1 
 
In this scenario, the causal law that P is causally sufficient for Q is non-actual—i.e. the second-
order state of affairs N(P,Q) is non-actual. The basic idea of Tooley's discussion, however, is to 
investigate the question of how to modify this scenario in order to accomodate the assumption that 
the causal law that P is causally sufficient for Q is actual. 
 
On the basis of his dynamic necessitation theory, whereby causal laws together with present states 
of affairs actualise states of affairs at the next present moment, Tooley argues that he can explain 
why, if the causal law that P is causally sufficient for Q were actual, then the posterior probability 
of Q at at tn+1 would be dependent upon the prior probability of P at tn. This is in line with postulate 
(C4). The explanation is that, given his dynamic necessitation theory, the causal law N(P,Q) 
actualises Q in response to P. In other words, for the reasons that P is present and that it is the case 
that N(P,Q), Tooley's dynamic necessitation theory rules that Q should be added to the world at 
the next present moment, such that the prior probability of P is 'transmitted' to the posterior 
probability of Q. This is important, Tooley argues, since the alternative modification, which also 
makes this scenario consistent with the assumption that N(P,Q) is actual, is to remove P from the 
world. So construed, both P at tn and Q at tn+1 are non-actual. Problematically, however, this 
modification is to violate postulate (C1). This is because removing P from the world is to modify 
the scenario so that the posterior probability of a cause depends upon the prior probability of its 
effect. More specifically, it is to modify the scenario so that " ... the posterior probability of the 
non-occurrence of a cause depends upon the prior probability of the non-occurrence of an effect ... 
" (Tooley 1997, p.109). With this in mind, Tooley argues that the two modifications are equally 
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legitimate for both static theories of time and versions of presentism (1997, p.108).  
 
According to his dynamic necessitation theory, however, there is a two-fold explanation as to why 
the first modification—i.e. the addition of Q to the world—is uniquely legitimate. Firstly, if future 
states of affairs are non-actual, in line with the growing block model, then at tn the only state of 
affairs that is actual is x's being P. It follows, Tooley argues, that the non-occurrence of the state 
of affairs y's being Q is non-actual at tn. (As such, there is a principled reason for not removing P 
to modify the scenario.) And secondly, as noted above, if past states of affairs are actual, then the 
state of affairs x's being P is actual at tn+1. Accordingly, if tn+1 is the present moment, then the causal 
law N(P,Q) actualises the state of affairs y's being Q in response to the past state of affairs x's being 
P. All in all, then, the basic idea of this discussion is that Tooley's dynamic necessitation theory 
can explain why the 'transmission of probabilities' is different for causes than it is for effects in 
light of its concept of actual at a time and the 'actualisation role' of causal laws.     
 
9.4 Temporal essentialism and Tooley's growing block model 
 
In this section of the chapter I shall explain the use of Tooley's growing block model in temporal 
essentialism. Let us recall that the basic idea of temporal essentialism is that the temporal 
imperative provides a time-based metaphysical explanation for lawful regularities. More 
specifically, the 'leading actor' of temporal essentialism—viz. the temporal imperative—is a formal 
ontological operation that is sensitive to physical modality. In addition, let us recall that the 
temporal imperative can be modelled using the following imperative sentence. (Note that $ and B 
are constants, whereas x, y, X, and Y are variables.) 
 
Temporal imperative: If object x is present and x instantiates property X, where X stands in 
the first place of the selection relation $, then actualise! object y, such that x instantiates the 
B-series earlier–later relation B to y, and such that y instantiates property Y, where Y stands 
in the second place of $ as a function of X. 
 
Simply speaking, temporal essentialism is the position that it is 'built into' a system of ontology 
that it dynamically 'constructs' states of affairs in a lawful way. More specifically, the states of 
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affairs that are actualised as time passes are a function of present states of affairs in tandem with 
laws, where the latter are construed as the selection relation holding between pairs of first-order 
properties.  
 
With this mind, both objects and first-order states of affairs draw upon Tooley's concept of actual 
at a time. Let us consider a token object, a, that is present—i.e. a token object that stands in the 
second place of the B-relation without standing in its first place. (Let us disregard, for the sake of 
simplicity, the complication for this model that concerns a possible first time.) If this token object 
instantiates a first-order property that stands in the first place of the selection relation, then the 
temporal imperative actualises two states of affairs: a's having B to y and y's being Y. Given the 
structure of time in temporal essentialism, whereby 'chains' of temporal parts are composed from 
the B-relation, if object a is present, then object a is the latest 'growth' in the growing block of 
states of affairs. Let us therefore say that the state of affairs a's being F is actual at t1 and that t1 is 
the present moment. We can think about this scenario in the following way. (As we shall discuss, 
the asterisked entities and states of affairs draw upon Tooley's concept of actual at a time. In 
addition, I use the elipsis to denote arbitrary objects.)   
 
Members of ontological categories:  
Objects* (t1): a, ... 
First-order properties: F, G 
The first-order relation: B 
The second-order relation: $ 
 
States of affairs:  
Monadic first-order states of affairs* (t1): a is F 
Dyadic first-order states of affairs* (t1): ...'s having B to a 
Second-order states of affairs: $(F,G) 
 
Given the assumption that a is present (i.e. given the actuality of the state of affairs ...'s having B 
to a and the non-actuality of the state of affairs a's having B to ...), together with the assumption 
that it is both the case that a is F and $(F,G), the condition of the temporal imperative is true. 
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Accordingly, its performable operation is 'triggered'. As noted, this performable operation is to 
actualise two states of affairs: a's having B to y and y's being Y. (Given that it is the case that 
$(F,G), Y = G). These states of affairs are actualised in the following way. Firstly, a token entity, 
b, is added to the ontological category of objects. And secondly, two 'ways' of combinations for 
objects and Platonic universals, i.e. two first-order states of affairs, are constructed: (i) B is 
instantiated on a and b, and (ii) the second place of $ (i.e. G) is instantiated on object b. The 
outcome of the performable operation is shown below.   
 
Members of ontological categories:  
Objects* (t2): a, b, ... 
First-order properties: F, G 
The first-order relation: B 
The second-order relation: $ 
 
States of affairs:  
Monadic first-order states of affairs* (t2): a is F, b is G 
Dyadic first-order states of affairs* (t2): ...'s having B to a, a's having B to b 
Second-order states of affairs: $(F,G) 
 
At this stage it is important to note two points. Firstly, let us recall that the temporal imperative is 
making use of variables for both objects and first-order properties. This is important, because I 
want the temporal imperative to actualise multiple states of affairs at a single present moment in 
response to multiple 'cause' objects. Let us term a synchronic actualisation of states of affairs in 
virtue of the temporal imperative a 'content update' (see below). With this in mind, if there are n 
'cause' objects that are present, then the temporal imperative will actualise 2n states of affairs at 
the next present moment. More specifically, for each 'cause' object, the temporal imperative will 
introduce a token entity into the ontological category of objects, instantiate the B-relation on each 
cause 'object' and these newly-introduced objects, and instantiate the relevant 'effect' property on 
each newly-introduced object. (This is why I call upon the selection relation to provide a function 
(in the sense of a unique mapping) from its first place to its second place: given that the selection 
relation is a universal, a single second-order relation can provide the 'instructions' for multiple 
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diachronic regularities). All in all, then, each content update is the actualisation of 2n states of 
affairs for n 'cause' objects. In addition, although the standard model of laws for temporal 
essentialism is diachronic, we can nevertheless say that a content update is a synchronic 
actualisation of multiple states of affairs. This is because all of the states of affairs that are 
actualised by the temporal imperative in a single 'performance' of its operation are actualised at a 
single time—viz. at the present moment.   
  
And secondly, I should clarify how the present moment is understood in temporal essentialism. 
My line of thought is that each content update assigns a new temporal index to both the ontological 
category of objects and the first-order states of affairs. We can think about this proposal in the 
following way. Firstly, let us say that objects and first-order states of affairs can be actual at a time. 
Given that first-order states of affairs are ways that objects and Platonic universals can combine, 
this is to say that a given combination of these entities can be actual at a time. (Let us recall that 
first-order states of affairs are concrete states of affairs, since these types of combination involve 
objects.) Secondly, for the reason that Tooley's concept of actual at a time is a temporally-indexed 
concept of actuality, we can say that objects and first-order states of affairs are indexed to a positive 
integer, i.e. a value of the temporal index. Hence, the state of affairs x's being X is actual at a time, 
tn, where the value of the temporal index, n, is a positive integer. As noted, both objects and first-
order states of affairs are actual at a time (see asterisks). 
 
Ontological categories:  
Objects* (tn) 
First-order properties 
The first-order relation 
The second-order relation 
 
States of affairs:  
Monadic first-order states of affairs* (tn) 
Dyadic first-order states of affairs* (tn) 




And thirdly, I propose that each 'performance' of the temporal imperative modifies the value of the 
temporal index, such that tn = tn+1. In this way, we can avoid the temporal imperative giving rise 
to the contradiction that a different totality of objects and states of affairs are actual at a single 
time. By illustration, let us return to the above scenario, where the temporal index is t1.  
 
Members of ontological categories:  
Objects* (t1): a, ... 
First-order properties: F, G 
The first-order relation: B 
The second-order relation: $ 
 
States of affairs:  
Monadic first-order states of affairs* (t1): a is F 
Dyadic first-order states of affairs* (t1): ...'s having B to a 
Second-order states of affairs: $(F,G) 
  
The condition of the temporal imperative is true. In light of our current concern with the present 
moment in temporal essentialism, we can say that the complete algorithm for the temporal 
imperative is as follows. I use the phrases 'add!', 'construct!', and modify!' for the sub-operations 




(i) Modify! the temporal index for objects and first-order states of affairs such that tn = 
tn+1. (In virtue of this stage, time has passed by a single unit, such that we can modify the 
domain of entities for temporal essentialism without giving rise to contradictions. The 
present moment is now t2. So construed, object a and the first-order states of affairs a's 
being F and ...'s having B to a are actual at t2.) 
(ii) For all objects, x, that satisfy the condition of the temporal imperative, add! a new 
token entity, y, into the ontological category of objects.  
(iii) For all objects, x and y, construct! a dyadic state of affairs x's having B to y. (In virtue 
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of this stage, object a loses its present status, since it stands in the first place of the B-
relation, pace my definition of presentness. In addition, object b, the newly-introduced 
token, gains its present status, since it stands in the second place of the B-relation without 
standing in its first place.  
(iv) For all objects, y, construct! a monadic state of affairs y's being Y. (Given that it is 
the case that $(F,G), Y = G. Hence the monadic state of affairs in the above scenario is 
b's being G.  
 
End Operation   
 
I take this four-part operation to replace the single operation that I described in the imperative 
sentence. Let us recall its consequent.  
 
... then actualise! object y, such that x instantiates the B-series earlier–later relation B to y, 
and such that y instantiates property Y, where Y stands in the second place of $ as a function 
of X.  
 
In this imperative sentence, there is a single operation to perform—viz. the actualisation of a new 
object, such that this object is a 'constituent' of two states of affairs. Given that this single operation 
can be broken down into three sub-operations, however, I think that the clearest strategy is to take 
the above algorithm to be the complex performable operation of the temporal imperative. Let us 
note that the first stage of the algotithm is presupposed by the second, third, and fourth stages. This 
is because a modification to the domain of temporal essentialism—via the addition of token entities 
to the ontological category of objects and the construction of first-order states of affairs—requires 
a transition from a time prior to the modification to a time posterior to the modification (so as to 
avoid the temporal imperative giving rise to a contradiction). In addition, the second stage of the 
algorithm is presupposed by the third and fourth stages, since the construction of first-order states 
of affairs requires that the 'constituents' of these states of affairs are actual. (Although the 'effect' 
property and the B-relation are actual simpliciter, the 'effect' object, i.e. b, is not actual at the time 
prior to the modification.) With this in mind, I shall continue to speak for the sake of simplicity of 
'the performable operation' of the temporal imperative, taking this phrase to capture the four-part 
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operation that I have described.  
 
On the basis of this discussion we can see that the outcome of the temporal imperative's 
performable operation is a basic growing block model. More specifically, we can say that the 
present moment is a given 'content specification' for the domain of temporal essentialism. In other 
words, by fixing upon a given value of the temporal index, n, we are fixing (i) those objects that 
are actual at this time, and (ii) those concrete states of affairs that are actual at this time. Hence, 
fixing upon a time fixes the 'temporally-variant' content of temporal essentialism. In addition, we 
can see that the content of a given present moment will encompass the content updates of previous 
times, plus the content update of that present moment. My aim is that this will mirror the general 
idea of a growing block model, whereby the world at a given time differs from the world at the 
immediate past by a single synchronic actualisation of states of affairs.  
 
In contrast to objects and first-order states of affairs, Platonic universals and second-order states 
of affairs are not actual at a time. In the first place, given that Platonic universals are non-temporal 
entities, it does not make sense to say that they can be actual at a time. And in the second place, 
given that second-order states of affairs—whereby pairs of first-order properties are characterised 
by the selection relation—exclusively involve non-temporal entities, these 'ways of combination' 
cannot be actual at a time. Taken together, then, Platonic universals and second-order states of 
affairs are the 'temporally-invariant' content of temporal essentialism. The population of Platonic 
universals and second-order states of affairs cannot change over time. In addition, we can recall 
that Tooley uses his concept of actual simpliciter to make sense of the concept of future (non-
actual) states of affairs, as well as the totality of what is actual at a given time. In this thesis, 












In this chapter of the thesis I think it will be useful to discuss Lowe's form–content distinction for 
ontology in more detail. This will allow me to explain the sense in which the temporal imperative 
is a formal ontological operation. It will also allow me to explain the sense in which I take objects 
to have temporal essences.  
 
10.2 Lowe's form–content distinction 
 
Let us begin, therefore, with Lowe's form–content distinction for ontology. In the third chapter of 
his (2006) The Four-Category Ontology, which is titled Some Formal Ontological Relationships, 
Lowe discusses the nature of ontological categories and formal ontological relationships. The basic 
idea of this discussion is that neither ontological categories nor formal ontological relationships 
are entities. Note that Lowe uses the term 'entity' synonymously with the term 'being' and the 
phrase 'elements of being' (2006, p.45). The intended point is that neither ontological categories 
nor formal ontological relationships are to be "included in an exhaustive inventory of what there 
is" (Lowe 2006, p.43). That said, however, Lowe argues that these formal posits are crucial tools 
for the ontologist, since they allow her to set out various distinctions and connections, generally 
speaking, that pertain to kinds of beings in virtue of their real essences.  
 
Before we consider Lowe's discussion, it will be useful to set out his four-category ontology (2006; 
see also Lowe 2009a). This is a hierarchical system. The top-most ontological category is that of 
'entities'. Lowe states that "anything whatever" is a member of the ontological category of entities 
(2006, p.38). As we move down to the next level of the hierarchy, there is a distinction between 
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universals and particulars. Lowe defines this distinction in terms of instantiation qua instancing: 
universals are entities that do or can have instances, whereas particulars are entities that cannot 
have instances. Let us note that Lowe's Aristotelianism commits him to the view that there are no 
uninstantiated universals. So construed, all universals have instances. Nevertheless, as I understand 
this discussion, the universal–particular distinction is designed to be of sufficient generality so as 
to accomodate Platonic ontologies (hence the clause that universals are types of entities that are at 
least able to have instances: it is not required that Platonic universals do have instances). This 
distinction is exhaustive and exclusive, such that all entities are either universals or particulars 
(Lowe 2006, p.38). Moving down to the next level of distinction, there are four ontological 
categories. Firstly, the ontological category of universals divides into (a) 'kinds' (i.e. object 
universals, such as 'trees') as well as (b) 'attributes' (i.e. property/relation universals, such as 
'greenness'). And secondly, the ontological category of particulars divides into (c) 'objects' (i.e. 
particular objects, such as 'a tree') as well as (d) 'modes' (i.e. particular properties qua tropes, such 
as 'this greenness'). In addition, the ontological category of objects divides into (ci) substantial 
objects and (cii) non-substantial objects (examples of the latter are piles and heaps). Although this 
system draws upon more than four ontological categories, Lowe proposes that there are only four 
fundamental ontological categories—viz. kinds, attributes, objects, and modes. The ontological 
categories of entities, universals and particulars are thought to be "mere abstractions and do no 
serious ontological work on their own account" (Lowe 2006, p.39).  
 
Within this framework, Lowe recognises seven types of formal ontological relationship: identity, 
instantiation, characterisation, exemplification, constitution, composition, and dependence. (More 
specifically, there is a number of formal ontological relationships concerning dependence, such as 
'rigid' and 'non-rigid' existential dependence, as well as identity dependence.) For the purposes of 
this outline, it will be sufficient to concentrate upon instantiation and characterisation. Recalling 
that Lowe defines the distinction between universals and particulars in terms of instantiation, he 
suggests that objects instantiate kinds whereas modes instantiate attributes. Hence, a particular tree, 
taken as an object, instantiates the kind 'trees'. And likewise, the particular greenness of this tree, 
taken as a mode, instantiates the attribute 'greenness'. In addition, Lowe proposes that kinds are 
characterised by attributes, such that, in this case, the kind 'trees' is characterised by the attribute 




According to Lowe, less fundamental formal ontological relationships can be 'constituted' by more 
fundamental ontological relationships. Let us consider modes in the four-category ontology. Lowe 
says that modes depend for their identity and existence upon the objects that they characterise. 
Hence, if a given object, a, is characterised by a given mode, F, then the identity of F is determined 
by a. The line of thought is that we cannot say that the 'very same' mode, F, could have 
characterised an object b that is non-identical to a. This is identity dependence—applied in this 
case to the 'non-transferability' of modes. Lowe thinks that identity dependence entails 'rigid' 
existential dependence, such that a necessary condition of F's existence is the existence of a (Lowe 
2006, pp.34–5). With this in mind, where we have object a's being characterised by mode F, there 
will be a formal ontological relationship of characterisation holding between these two entities. 
Lowe proposes that this formal ontological relationship 'constitutes' the relevant formal ontological 
relationships of identity and rigid existential dependence. (We can recall that constitution is itself 
a formal ontological relationship.) 
 
[A]ll dependence relations between entities will be constituted by certain other formal 
ontological relations in which those entities stand to one another, so that these other formal 
ontological relations will always be, in a certain sense, more fundamental than the various 
dependence relations that they constitute in various different cases (Lowe 2006, p.37)  
 
We shall return to this issue below. At this stage I want to outline Lowe's discussion of the nature 
of ontological categories and formal ontological relationships. Why are these posits not to be 
construed as entities? Lowe provides three arguments as to why ontological categories are not 
entities (2006, pp.40–4). More specifically, he argues that ontological categories cannot be 
universals, higher-order universals, or particulars. These three arguments draw upon the same 
strategy, which is to show that the four-category ontology gives rise to contradictions if ontological 
categories are construed in terms of the aforementioned entities. By way of illustration, Lowe's 
argument against the construal of ontological categories as universals trades upon his universal–
particular distinction. In light of this distinction, if ontological categories are universals, then these 
entities should at least be able to have instances. Lowe argues that this proposal gives rise to a 
contradiction if we consider the ontological category of kinds. This is because the only plausible 
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candidates for the instances of this ontological category are the specific kinds, i.e. the different 
object universals, such as 'trees' and 'planets'. So construed, however, these specific kinds would 
be particulars, since they would be instances of the ontological category of kinds. In this way, the 
four-category ontology contradicts itself. We cannot say that entities exclusively divide into 
universals and particulars, since we have just allocated the specific kinds to the ontological 
category of particulars, which is problematic as they were originally thought to be universals 
(Lowe 2006, p.41). After ruling out the construal of ontological categories as higher-order 
universals and particulars as well, Lowe decides against ontological categories having entity-status.  
 
As far as I can see, the only acceptable thing to say, in view of all the preceding difficulties, 
is that the ontological categories are not themselves entities and are thus not to be included 
in an exhaustive inventory of what there is. There are, quite literally, no such things as 
ontological categories ... One can be a realist concerning the distinctions that are captured by 
a system of ontological categories without having to maintain that the categories themselves 
are elements of being. An object is different from a property or mode in virtue of the intrinsic 
natures of these entities, quite independently of us and our ways of describing or thinking of 
things (Lowe 2006, pp.43–4).   
 
In addition, Lowe provides three arguments as to why formal ontological relationships are not 
entities. More specifically, he argues that neither characterisation nor instantiation can be 
construed as 'real relations' qua attributes. In addition, he argues that formal ontological 
relationships cannot be internal relations (Lowe 2006, pp.44–51). With regard to the first argument, 
Lowe draws upon his distinction between universals and particulars again. If characterisation is a 
'real relation' (i.e. a relational attribute), he says, then it must have instances where pairs of objects 
and modes combine into states of affairs. (Note that Lowe uses the term 'states of affairs' for the 
'coming together' of different kinds of beings—see below.) So where object a is characteried by 
mode F, we will have an instance, c, of the (putative) relational attribute of characterisation. Given 
the setup of the four-category ontology, however, this will again lead to a contradiction. This is 
because the instances of attributes (whether properties or relations) are modes, and modes are 
defined as entities that characterise objects (a single object in the case of property modes and 
multiple objects in the case of relational modes). In this situation, however, the instance of 
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characterisation, c, is (i) thought to be a mode, and is (ii) thought to hold between two kinds of 
beings, viz. the object a and the mode F. It is therefore a non-standard entity that the four-category 
ontology cannot understand (Lowe 2006, pp.44–5). We can see that this argument has a similar 
strategy to Lowe's arguments against the construal of ontological categories as entities: viz. the 
four-category ontology cannot accomodate the proposal.  
 
Lowe's argument against the construal of formal ontological relations as internal relations is 
different, however. In this case the strategy is to say that internal relations are insufficient for 
capturing the explanatory role of formal ontological relationships. To use Lowe's example, the 
basic idea to be rejected is that a particular dog, Fido, instantiates the kind 'doghood' purely in 
virtue of the intrinsic natures of these two entities. In this sense, the formal ontological relationship 
of instantiation would be comparable to the classic internal relation of 'taller than', which, we may 
suppose, supervenes upon the different heights of two objects. At this point Lowe says that there 
is something attractive about this proposal, since it moves away from construing formal ontological 
relationships as entities (and we have seen that Lowe is opposed to this method of construal for his 
formal posits). But the present suggestion falls short of the requirements of the formal ontological 
relationships, Lowe argues. More specifically, he says the following: "We want to say that there is 
a 'real connection' between Fido and doghood ... which is absent between the objects of different 
heights ... After all, each of the latter objects could have existed, just as it is, in the absence of the 
other—but Fido could not have existed in the absence of doghood" (2006, p.47). On this basis, 
Lowe sets out his form–content distinction for ontology. 
 
Instantiation and characterization clearly have something to do with being—they are, after 
all, ontological relations—and yet, for the reasons given earlier, it seems that we cannot 
regard them as beings, or entities. The lesson, no doubt, is that there is more to the business 
of ontology than just saying what there is, or even what there could be. There is also the 
matter of saying how things are, both in themselves and with respect to one another. One 
might have thought that this was just a matter of saying what the properties of beings are and 
what relations beings stand in to one another. But now we know that that can't be right, 
because this leaves out of account such matters as the having of properties ... We have 
established, for example, that the having of properties is not itself an element of being—a 
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relational entity in which two other beings may stand to one another, the being that has a 
property and the property that is had by it ... What, then, is it about formal ontological 
relations that not only requires but permits us to regard them as having to do with how things 
are but not with what things are. Surely, it is above all their formal character. But what does 
'formal' mean in this context? The proper contrast here is between form and content ... Beings, 
or entities, we may say, provide ontological content. But all beings also have ontological 
form. The ontological form of an entity is provided by its place in the system of categories, 
for it is in virtue of a being's category that it is suited or unsuited to combine in various ways 
with other beings of the same or different categories (Lowe 2006, p.47–8: original italics).   
 
10.3 Lowe on general essences and formal ontological posits 
 
At this point I shall introduce Lowe's understanding of real essence. This is a Finean understanding. 
In his (2012) essay What is the Source of our Knowledge of Modal Truths?, Lowe explains that he 
accepts Fine's (1994) argument against the modal theory of essence. According to this theory, a 
property F is an essential property of an object, a, just in case a is F across all metaphysically 
possible worlds in which a exists (or just in case a counterpart of a, a', is F across all metaphysically 
possible worlds in which a' exists). And correspondingly, the essence of a is thought to be the set 
of those properties that accompany a across all metaphysically possible worlds. The central idea 
of Fine's (1994) argument, however, is that the modal theory of essence confuses merely necessary 
properties with essential properties. Lowe explains that he accepts the conclusion of this argument 
and with it Fine's proposal that we should reverse the strategy and attempt to understand modality 
(i.e. metaphysical necessity and possibility) in terms of essence (Lowe 2012, p.934). And so Lowe 
sets out an Aristotelian theory of essence, according to which the essence of some entity x is what 
x is (or at least what x would be, in those cases where x does not actually exist). In developing this 
position, Lowe adopts Fine's notion of a 'real definition', which is thought to be the definition of 
an entity, as oppose to the 'verbal definition' of a word/phrase. Taken together, then, a real essence 
is a proposition that discloses what some entity is or would be (Lowe 2012, p.935). In parallel to 
Lowe's treatment of formal posits, he denies that essences are themselves entities; rather, essences 
are 'what' entities are (or could be), as oppose to entities: " ... an entity's essence is just what that 
entity is, as revealed by its real definition. But what E is [i.e. what the entity E is] is not some entity 
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distinct from E. It is either identical with E (and some scholars think that this was Aristotle's view) 
or else it is no entity at all: and the latter is my own view" (Lowe 2012, p.941: original italics; my 
square bracket).  
 
It will be useful to conclude this section of the chapter by attempting to bring together the different 
concepts that we have discussed so far. In particular, it may be queried at this point how Lowe's 
concept of real essence is related to his concepts of formal ontological categories and formal 
ontological relationships. In this thesis I shall settle for a reconstruction of how I think Lowe's line 
of thought is proceeding. I propose that this reconstruction is more or less accurate, but I submit 
that Lowe's form–content distinction is intrinsically difficult. With this in mind, I think that a good 
starting point to Lowe's view is his general idea of a hierarchical ontology. A methodological 
approach to ontology that Lowe wants to reject is what he terms a "no-category ontology" (2006, 
p.47). This strategy of ontology is attributed to Quine (1961), and we can gloss it for present 
purposes as the view that the purpose of ontology is to say what entities exist. The basic idea of 
the phrase 'no-category ontology' is that, crucially, this approach to the subject does not involve 
seriously suggesting that there are different kinds of beings: " ... all things, on this view, belong to 
the same category, or—what amounts to the same thing—to no category at all" (Lowe 2006, p.47). 
In short, the distinctive feature of the no-category ontology is that it conceives of existence as a 
collection of entities, where there is no ontological demarcation between, for example, those 
entities that are more fundamental than others, or those entities that depend for their existence 
and/or identity in one way as oppose to another. Schaffer (2009, p.354–6) has this approach to 
ontology in mind when he speaks of a "flat ontology". In this essay, which is titled On What 
Grounds What, Schaffer takes the 'Quinean question' of ontology to be answered by deciding upon 
a domain of quantification. He contrasts this approach to his neo-Aristotelain model, which does 
not merely tackle the problem of what exists, but also seeks to provide the domain of quantification 
with a structure. Schaffer terms his approach the 'ordered ontology'. More specifically, he sets out 
an understanding of ontology whereby different ontological categories are construed as 'different 
ways of being' that depend upon the primary ontological category of substance in different senses. 
These different ways of being are different types of entities—such as properties/relations and 
mereological parts—that stand in various grounding relations to the ontological category of 
substance (Schaffer 2009, p.356). Lowe makes this same general type of move when he accepts a 
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pluralistic conception of ontology. In such a system, we are to recognise different types of entity 
(or different kinds of beings) that can nevertheless co-exist within a single world via a specific 
structure of formal ontological relationships (Lowe 2006, p.195).  
 
Importantly, however, there is an intermediate type of ontology between the 'flat' Quinean model 
and the 'ordered' neo-Aristotelain model. Schaffer describes this intermediate position as a 'sorted 
ontology' (2009, pp.354–5). The basic idea of this approach is that we are moving beyond the 
Quinean method and allowing that there are different kinds of beings within our 'domain of 
quantification'. In this sense, the world is not comprised (or rather it does not have to be comprised) 
of "undifferentiated entities" (Lowe 2006, p.47). (The previous sentence is qualified because we 
might want to allow that there are kinds of beings that are not actual (Lowe 2006, p.44); for 
example, we might say that the world only contains objects, but that it could have contained objects 
and universals.) We are thereby accepting that the world might have a pluralistic structure. But the 
sorted ontology is not an ordered ontology, as Schaffer would say; more specifically, the general 
idea of different kinds of beings does not in itself commit us to the general idea of different kinds 
of beings standing to one another in certain ways. That is to say, as I understand this point, we 
could have a pluralistic world that contained different kinds of beings (pace Quine) that 
nevertheless rules out any ontological connections, generally construed, holding between these 
different kinds of beings (pace Lowe and Schaffer). In short, the world might contain different 
'shades of existence', but these shades of existence could have nothing to do with one another that 
went beyond their co-existing (I am grateful to discussion with Jonathan Lowe on this issue). So 
there are really two moves in departing from Quine's perspective: first, there is the acceptance of 
a sorted ontology, where we allow that a single world can feature different kinds of beings. And 
secondly, there is the acceptance of these kinds of beings standing in some variety of ontological 
connection to one another (in particular, we might want to say that some kinds of beings can 
instantiate other kinds of being). According to Schaffer's terminology, we have thereby moved 
from a 'flat' ontology to an 'ordered' ontology, via a 'sorted' ontology. 
 
Lowe wants to say, of course, that the world is a 'connected plurality'. And his strategy of argument 
for saying so will draw upon the (putative) explanatory benefits of his four-category ontology, 
which makes use of an elaborate setup of formal ontological relationships holding between 
216 
 
different ontological categories. Given that a connected plurality is the overall aim, we need to 
understand what these different ontological categories and formal ontological relationships are. 
We can think of this as the 'price of purchase' for moving firstly to a sorted ontology and then on 
to an ordered ontology. After all, the Quinean will not be troubled with these tasks. (Or at least the 
Quinean would not be troubled with the task of how different ontological categories are 
distinguished, since they only have one 'ontological category' i.e. the domain of quantification.) 
With this in mind, we can say at this stage that a significant restraint on Lowe's possible options 
for understanding these formal posits is his metaphysical realism. For another Quinean idea that 
Lowe wants to reject (and this rejection is shared by the mainstream properties and laws debate) 
is a thesis of ontological relativity, according to which there are equally legitimate ways of 'carving 
up' reality via different methods of representation (Lowe 2006, p.196). In this way, it is clear that 
the formal posits cannot be understood merely as conceptual (qua mental) tools for thinking about 
reality, since, although a given ontological system is first and foremost a human invention, a good 
ontology, for the realist, is also expected to compete as a contender for the true theory of the nature 
of reality, in the most abstract and general sense of the phrase 'nature of reality'.    
 
Building the issue up in this manner, we can see the relevance of Lowe's adoption of Fine's notion 
of real essences. Given the overall aim of a connected plurality (i.e. Schaffer's ordered ontology), 
where we have different kinds of beings that stand to one another in various ways, we are 
'burdened' with a number of ontological categories and formal ontological relationships. As we 
have discussed above, however, Lowe has argued that the construal of these formal posits as 
entities is multiply problematic. Hence there is a dilemma of sorts: the formal posits cannot be 
entities, or elements of being, but they are nevertheless central to the project of ontology, as 
conceived of by Lowe, Schaffer, and others. So the natural strategy is to understand ontological 
categories and formal ontological relationships not as entities, but nevertheless in terms of entities. 
And to do this, it seems, we need some notion of how entities can fall into different mind-
independent types that constrain the different ways that they can stand to one another (such as 
instantiation and characterisation). This requirement is provided, I think, by Lowe's notion of a 
general essence, which is a type of essence that is shared by a number of distinct entities (Lowe 
2013, p.98). So if we can have a number of distinct entities that can share a general essence, and, 
in addition, if we can postulate that there are different types of general essence, then we can capture 
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the idea that the world can have a certain structure qua ontological categories, since the 
(fundamental) ontological categories are the different (fundamental) types of general essences in 
the world. Hence, all objects share a general essence, and all kinds share a general essence, and so 
on. If this reading is correct, then to say that the world has a four-category structure is to say that 
there are four fundamentally different types of real essence. This would be an essence-based 
explanation for how a sorted ontology is possible, i.e. an essence-based understanding for how it 
is possible that the world can contain different types of entities: viz. entities have real essences and 
there can be general essences that are shared by multiple entities. To move on to the ordered 
ontology, however, we need to say, in addition, that these general essences are somehow 
constraining how different types of entities can stand to one another. But what understanding can 
we give of why, for example, kinds can be instantiated by objects but not by attributes or tropes? 
The answer that will be provided at this point, I think, is that the four fundamental types of general 
essence 'involve one another'. That is to say, when a proposition discloses what objects are, there 
will be some reference to modes, and perhaps also to kinds and attributes. (Note that objects stand 
in formal ontological relationships to each of these three types of entity).  
 
I want to note a difficulty concerning real essences and formal ontological relationships (I am 
grateful to discussion with Sophie Gibb on this issue). At a number of places, Lowe says that real 
essences concern existence and identity conditions. For example, whilst discussing how modes 
depend for their identity upon the identity of the objects that they characterise, Lowe says: " ... it 
is a part of the essence of m [a mode] that it is the very entity that it is—this roundness mode as 
oppose to any other exactly resembling roundness mode—in virtue of being the roundness mode 
that is possessed by this apple (Lowe 2006, p.199: original italics; my square bracket). And 
relatedly, when discussing how we can take ontological categories to capture mind-independent 
distinctions (despite their lack of entity-status) he says: " ... we categorize correctly when we 
categorize by correctly apprehending the existence and identity conditions of the things concerned" 
(Lowe 2006, p.44: original italics). Citations such as these suggest to me that different entities are 
members of different ontological categories in virtue of their different general essences, and that, 
in addition, the possible ways that different entities can stand to one another are calculated, so to 
speak, via the asymmetric dependence relations that hold between kinds, objects, attributes, and 
modes. However, we can recall that Lowe also said that dependency relationships are less 
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fundamental than other formal ontological relationships. Specifically with regard to modes, we 
discussed how the identity and existential dependence relationships that modes bear to objects 
were thought to be constituted by the characterisation relationship. (We can recall, indeed, that 
Lowe said that the characterisation relationship was more fundamental than the dependency 
relationships.) I think that this complicates the idea that characterisation and instantiation etc. are 
straightforward reflections of the asymmetric ways in which different types of entities depend 
upon one another. I see this as a prima facie problem, since the attractive reading of Lowe's formal 
ontological relationships is that they are to be understood in terms of general essences; but given 
that real essence is often discussed in relation to existence and identity conditions, it is unclear to 
me how the 'fundamental' formal ontological relationships (such as characterisation) dovetail with 
the idea that formal posits arise from real essences. To put the matter one way, if characterisation 
constitutes dependence, and general essences concern dependence, then we might think that 
characterisation is responsible for the real essences of (at least) modes. But this looks to be a 
reversed understanding to the one ventured in the previous paragraph.  
 
I should say at this point how I want to understand Lowe's formal ontological relationships. We 
can begin again with the move from a flat ontology to a sorted ontology. To secure this move, I 
have suggested, Lowe is drawing upon a notion of general essence, which is a type of essence that 
can be invariant across (numerically distinct) entities. And so we can secure the idea of multiple 
ontological categories (pace Quine) without having to reify ontological categories themselves. 
(The thought here, of course, is that this strategy is making sense of ontological categories in terms 
of entities, since real essences (and so general essences also) are understood to concern what 
entities are, or at least what entities could be.) If this is right, then we need to move on to think 
about how Lowe is understanding the ontological relationships that hold between the different 
kinds of being. For, as Schaffer has noted, the sorted ontology is not yet an ordered ontology, 
where kinds of beings stand to one another in various ways. What the observation of the previous 
paragraph shows, I take it, is that formal ontological relationships such as characterisation and 
instantiation cannot simply be shorthand locutions for different kinds of beings depending for their 
existence and/or identity upon other kinds of beings. As noted, this reading goes against Lowe's 
remark that characterisation constitutes dependency. Note also that Lowe suggests that modes 
existentially depend upon objects in virtue of the formal ontological relationship of 
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characterisation: "We want to say, perhaps, that it is in virtue of its characterizing the particular 
object that it does that the mode depends existentially upon that object" (Lowe 2006, p.51: original 
italics). Cutting to the chase, then, what I think is happening is that a certain number of Lowe's 
formal posits are being accepted as primitive. (Restricting ourselves to the scope of my outline, 
characterisation and instantiation would be primitive, and dependence (all varieties) would be non-
basic.) To say that characterisation is primitive, I suggest, to just to say that we are taking the 
concept of a certain kind of being (a mode) standing to another kind of being (an object) as basic. 
That these kinds of beings can 'stand to one another' is not a concept that can be further explained, 
nor, as we might say, a theorem that can be deduced from a more basic axiom. At this point it 
might be objected that saying that two kinds of beings can stand to one another is trivial, since, the 
objector might say, even in Quine's domain entities 'stand to one another' qua their co-membership 
in this domain. But this objection would miss the mark if different types of primitive formal 
ontological relationship (such as characterisation and instantiation) were linked up to specific types 
of dependence relationships via the notion of constitution. Hence, we can point to significant 
differences between characterisation and instantiation by examining the different dependency 
relationships that they are deemed to constitute. As a last point of detail, it will be useful to note 
that Lowe's states of affairs are thought to be 'no additions of being'. Given our current reading, 
we can say that 'all that is happening' when two entities stand in a fundamental formal ontological 
relationship is that these entities thereby stand in the required dependency relationships.  
 
When beings do 'combine' in the ways to which they are suited by their ontological forms, 
these 'ways of combining' are the various formal ontological relationships—instantiation, 
characterization, and the rest. Such 'combinings' are 'no addition of being', just as there is, 
as it were, 'no addition of substance' when, in virtue of their valencies, an oxygen ion and 
two hydrogen ions combine to form a water molecule (Lowe 2006, p.48).   
 
Finally, then, how should we understand Lowe's form–content distinction? It seems to me that the 
distinction is capturing the invariant aspects of a given ontological system. There are some 
exceptions (e.g. Spinoza), but for the most part a system of ontology will allow that we can keep 
the same type of ontology whilst allowing the entities within that ontology to vary. There appear 
to be two 'dimensions' in which this could occur. Firstly, we could say that there are different 
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entities at different times, but that the type of ontology remains fixed. Tooley's system is a clear 
example. In his actualist framework, there is a different totality of actual states of affairs at different 
times, but at each of these times the type of ontology remains fixed: viz we have his two-category 
object–universal ontology. And secondly, we could have a modal notion of variation, such that it 
is possible (in various non-temporal senses) for there to have been different entities. Armstrong's 
combinatorialism is a good example of this idea, perhaps, since he holds an eternalistic theory of 
time but allows that there are 'metaphysically possible worlds' that can be constructed via 
recombination from the actual world (1997, p.173). But we can note that all of these possible 
worlds will be factualist worlds, which follow the 'rules' of Armstrong's ontology (hence we will 
have no uninstantiated universals, and so on). Lowe's form–content distinction is a nice tool to 
capture what is happening in these two dimensions of variation, I think, since we can say that the 
form of the ontology is invariant, but that the content of the ontology is variable (either temporally 
or modally). Thinking about Lowe's ontology more specifically, we can say that the formal aspects 
of the ontology (i.e. ontological categories, formal ontological relationships, and formal predicates) 
are the invariant aspects of his theory. In other words, these aspects are closed under any temporal 
or modal variation. (We have not discussed formal predicates in this chapter, but I should say that 
Lowe accepts a number of formal ontological predicates, such as 'exists' and 'is a mode'. Along 
with his other formal posits, they are not entities or elements of being.) With this in mind, I take 
Lowe's form–content distinction to entail that, whatever the 'stocking' of the four fundamental 
ontological categories, i.e. whatever temporal or modal possibilities are actual, it will remain the 
case that there are four fundamental types of general essence: viz. those of kinds, attributes, objects, 
and modes. (Lowe appears to confirm this idea (2006, p.44) when he says that it is "necessary" 
that the four fundamental ontological categories are actually occupied). All in all, then, different 
(fundamental) ontological categories reflect different types of (fundamental) general essence. In 
addition, there are a number of fundamental and primitive ways that these different kinds of beings 
can stand to one another, such as characterisation and instantiation. These formal posits do not 
refer to entities, but they nevertheless capture distinctions and connections that concern types of 





10.4 Formal ontological operations and the active ontology 
 
Temporal essentialism requires a different ontological 'blueprint' to those that we have discussed 
so far in this chapter. In a sense, the ontology of temporal essentialism is 'stronger' than Schaffer's 
flat, sorted, and ordered conceptions, since it includes all of the resources of these systems and 
adds a new ingredient. This ingredient, of course, is the performable operation of the ontology. 
One way to introduce this notion is to consider how Lowe's 'ordered ontology' handles synchronic 
and diachronic 'combinations of entities'. We can think of Lowe's formal posits as setting out the 
possible ways that entities can stand to one another. As noted, Lowe terms the coming together of 
entities 'combinations' or 'states of affairs' (2006, p.48; 2013, p.40). In general, the restrictions that 
the form of his ontology places upon the possible states of affairs will be non-trivial. Indeed, they 
will be fixed by the fundamental formal ontological relationships. Hence, we can say that it is 
metaphysically possible for a kind can be instantiated by an object, but that it is metaphysically 
impossible for a kind to be instantiated by a mode. (In addition, given his notion of non-rigid 
existential dependence, Lowe will want to say that it is metaphysically necessary that all actual 
kinds are instantiated by at least one object.) As we have discussed, all of these metaphysical 
modalities will be understood, ultimately, in terms of real essences, since, as we have noted, Lowe 
seeks to understand modality in terms of essence, following Fine. In this way, we can think of the 
fundamental formal ontological relationships (specifically characterisation and instantiation) as 
setting out the 'syntax' of Lowe's ontology; that is to say, these formal posits are setting out the 
allowable structures of states of affairs.  
 
(i) Object a instantiating kind A 
(ii) Mode F instantiating kind A 
 
Above are two putative states of affairs. The first follows the syntax of Lowe formal posits, since 
it features the kinds of beings that can combine via instantiation. But the second is illegitimate. 
And this is because it features kinds of beings that cannot combine via instantiation. Importantly, 
we can say that this syntax is synchronic, since it will be held invariant over the temporal 




Let me consider this last remark in more detail. In his (2009b) essay Serious Endurantism and the 
Strong Unity of Human Persons, Lowe develops a presentist theory of time that is strongly 
Aristotelian. The basic line of thought is that we can understand temporal concepts in terms of 
concepts concerning change and existence (see also Coope 2005). For example, the present 
moment is understood in terms of the co-existence of entities. And likewise, temporal passage is 
understood in terms of existence changes. (More specifically, as I understand this essay, a single 
existence change (e.g. where a single substance gains a mode) is sufficient for the world to progress 
by one temporal unit, since the entities that co-exist have been modified. But this is a special case; 
we would expect there to be multiple ('simultaneous') existence changes in the actual world, such 
that the actual world moves forward in time via multiple new characterisations of modes, and so 
forth. As we suggested above, in this theory of time we have a notion of temporal variation in the 
content of Lowe's ontology. In other words, the entities that are members of the ontological 
categories and the states of affairs that obtain are varying across time. Nevertheless, the form of 
the ontology is fixed qua the syntax of its combinations, since all states of affairs (at any time or 
'arrangement of co-existence') must follow the rules that are set out by the formal ontological 
relationships of characterisation and instantiation. In his essay, Lowe suggests that substance 
causation is the primary means by which existence changes occur.  
 
... all causation is fundamentally substance-causation, which is a matter of individual 
substances exercising or manifesting their various causal powers and liabilities ... when a 
substance exercises its causal powers, the immediate effect is simultaneous with that exercise 
and consists in an existence change in that or one or more other substances—either a 
substantial change or else and more commonly a qualitative or relational one (Lowe 2009b, 
p.77). 
 
With this in mind, Lowe's four-category ontology has been combined with a dynamic theory of 
time (or at least with a dynamic theory of existence). I think there is a significant overlap between 
Tooley and Lowe, since they will both want to maintain that a single world (i.e. the actual world) 
can feature different totalities of actual entities (although the way that they would go about 
explaining this would be different, of course; in particular, Lowe will not accept Tooley's concept 
of actual at a time as primitive). So when I said above that Lowe's formal posits are enforcing a 
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synchronic syntax upon his states of affairs, what I had in mind was the following point. Given 
that the actual world is undergoing existence changes, the content of Lowe's ontology is variable, 
but its form is remaining the same. More specifically, we can say that the form of the ontology is 
invariant across time (or across existence changes) such that, at each time (or arrangement of co-
existence), we have the same ontological form qua metaphysically possible states of affairs. There 
is therefore an asymmetry with regard to form and content: the form is diachronically invariant, 
but the content is diachronically variant. Because the form of Lowe's ontology is diachronically 
invariant, I think it is sensible to say that it primarily concerns the synchronic syntax of states of 
affairs. My thought here is that as we move from each time or arrangement of co-existence to the 
next, we are drawing upon the same restrictions for states of affairs.  
 
More specifically, the formal apparatus of Lowe's ontology is placing a restriction upon the 
allowable combinations of entities at two levels. First of all, we have the general idea that certain 
kinds of beings can only combine with certain other kinds of beings. This is the level of the 
ontological categories, or, looking at the matter from the perspective of essence, the level of 
general essence. Hence, we will want to say, for example, that only objects can be characterised 
by modes, and so on. But the same formal ontological relationships are also enforcing restrictions 
upon types of entities at a more fine-grained level. In this case we are thinking about the specific 
members of ontological categories. For example, we will need to say in this case that the specific 
kind 'gold' is only ever instantiated by particular pieces of gold, and that, in addition, the kind 'gold' 
is always characterised by the attribute 'soft metal', and so on (here I assume that pieces of gold 
qualify as substances). This is Lowe's essentialism for natural kinds entering into our discussion 
(2006, pp.141–55). We can note that this theory is also set out in terms of the apparatus of real 
essences and formal ontological relations.  
 
Let us return now to temporal essentialism and its performable operations. Below I have presented 
Schaffer's (2009, pp.354–6) three conceptions of ontology, together with what I take to be their 






A domain of entities. 
 
Sorted ontology: 
A domain of entities that includes the notion of different kinds of being. 
 
Ordered ontology: 
A domain of entities that includes the notion of different kinds of being together with the 
notion of formal ontological relationships, generally construed, that hold between these 
different kinds of being.  
 
I think that all of these conceptions of ontology are 'list-like'. Needless to say, both Schaffer (2009, 
pp.656–73) and Lowe criticise the Quinean ontology for being list-like. Here, for example, is a 
part of Lowe's attack. 
 
It would miss the point of ontology altogether to suppose that its tasks were simply to 
enumerate all the entities that there putatively are ... Many nominalists, it seems to me, 
implicitly suppose that, in the last analysis, this is all that we may hope to do by way of 
characterizing the elements of being. They fundamentally agree with Quine when he said 
that the basic question of ontology is 'What is there?', but that it could be answered by the 
one-word English sentence: 'Everything' (Lowe 2006, p.195: original italics)  
 
It is clear that Lowe is not presenting his four-category ontology as a list. In contrast, his 
methodology for ontology is thoroughly non-Quinean. But, I suggest, the sorted ontology and the 
ordered ontology are still list-like conceptions of ontology—all that we have done is to move from 
a simple list to a more complex list. What I have in mind here is a contrast thesis. There is another 






A domain of entities that includes the notion of different kinds of being together with the 
notion of formal ontological relationships, generally construed, that hold between these 
different kinds of being. In addition, a formal ontological operation performs 
modifications to the variable aspects of the active ontology, i.e. to its content.  
 
There are a number of points to make at this stage. Firstly, in terming this ontology blueprint 
'active' I should not be taken to say that all ordered ontologies (to take the most pertinent case) are 
'inactive' in the sense of rejecting a dynamic conception of reality. Indeed, both Tooley and Lowe, 
as we have discussed, maintain dynamic theories of reality within the ordered ontology paradigm. 
In Tooley's case, we have the primitive concept of actuality at a time, which he takes to be 
distinctive of any dynamic theory of time. And in Lowe's case, we have a dynamic theory of 
existence, which Lowe articulates in terms of co-existence and existence changes. But the point is 
that, so long as these philosophers are working with an ordered ontology, they are working with a 
blueprint for ontology that is not, it itself, specifically dynamic. In this connection we can observe 
that the same basic blueprint can be used to articulate completely static theories of time and 
existence, as is the case in Schaffer's (2009) essay Spacetime the One Substance. In this essay 
Schaffer sets out a 'super-substantivalist' conception of spacetime, according to which material 
objects are identical to spacetime regions. This model is explicitly eternalistic. In addition, it 
features grounding relationships that hold between the substance (spacetime itself) and, for 
example, its mereological parts. So the idea is this. If we want to set out a dynamic theory of reality, 
generally construed, then staying with the ordered ontology will force us to use formal apparatus 
that is not specifically dynamic. For there is nothing specifically dynamic about ontological 
categories, formal ontological relationships, or formal predicates. How could there be, if this same 
inventory of notions is used to build eternalistic theories?  
 
A second point is as follows. In thinking about the general idea of an active ontology, I originally 
thought we could model an ontology upon a finite/discrete state machine, such as a Turing machine 
or cellular automaton. This would be a sense in which we could construe Schaffer's three 
conceptions of ontology as list-like. The thought here was that, intuitively at least, a Turing 
machine 'does something', whereas a domain, or a domain with 'subdivisions', or a domain with 
226 
 
subdivisions and relationships between its entities, does not 'do anything'. But with further 
consideration I have come to think that this suggestion is quite misleading. The problem, ironically, 
is that the formal description of a Turing machine (and finite state machines in general) centres 
around set theory. In particular, the transition function of a Turing machine, which we can think 
of as the 'rule book' for its performable operation, is understood as a functional mapping from, in 
the basic case, the combination of a state that the machine is in and the currently read symbol, to 
the combination of some specific operation (such as 'erase symbol') and a state transition (such as 
'enter state S'). But set theory gets us back into thinking about 'relations holding between entities' 
(this being the most natural ontological analysis of a functional mapping qua ordered set). And, as 
I shall attempt to explain below, I want to distance the notion of a formal ontological operation 
from both formal ontological relationships and formal ontological predicates (not to mention 
material relations). What this means, if I have understood the computational models correctly, is 
that the notion of a performable operation within the computation/mathematics literature primarily 
concerns the notion of sequence, as oppose to 'dynamic modifications' (see below). (I am grateful 
for discussion with Mark Bishop on this point).   
 
So I do not think that there is a straightforward connection between the active ontology and 
computational models. With this in mind, what I shall do at this stage is to simply say what I take 
a formal ontological operation to be. In a nutshell, a formal ontological operation is a type of 
modification to a given ontology's variable content, which is performed in accordance with a rule. 
That a given system of ontology is able to modify its variable content in a rule-following way is a 
concept that I take to be theoretically primitive, just as the ontologist who endorses an ordered 
ontology will have to take the concept of different kinds of beings standing in certain ontological 
relationships to be theoretically primitive. By the term 'theoretically primitive' I mean to say that, 
whilst these concepts may not be simple, in terms of theory construction they are taken as basic. I 
hope that the reader will join me in thinking that there is indeed something 'list-like' about 
Schaffer's three conceptions of ontology, at least when they are compared to the active ontology 
and its formal ontological operation.  
 
In general, I suggest that there can be different types of formal ontological operation, just as there 
can be different types of formal ontological relationship from one ontology to the next. But there 
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are some restrictions that we can place upon all formal ontological operations as they might be 
postulated across different active ontologies. Firstly, the operation that can be performed must 
concern the variable content of the ontology. In the case of temporal essentialism, for example, I 
said that the temporal imperative adds new entities to the ontological category of objects and 
constructs states of affairs concerning first-order Platonic universals. I want to make this 
connection between modification and content an analytic one. So we are going to build into the 
concept of a performable operation the notion of variable content. In this way, the formal 
ontological operation is a fixed 'part' of the form of the ontological system, but its performance 
leads to modifications to the content of the ontology. This leads us to a second restriction, which 
is that a formal ontological operation must concern the temporal dimension. The line of thought 
here is that an active ontology is a model of a single world (a 'unified reality', or, more simply, a 
single time-indexed domain) that can modify its variable content in line with a rule. And the only 
way for this notion to make any sense, I suggest, is if the entities and states of affairs of a single 
world can be different at different 'indices'. In addition, then, the concept of a formal ontological 
operation should be analytically connected to a dynamic theory of time. In a dynamic theory of 
time we are saying that the content of the ontology can vary without moving from the actual world 
to alternative possible worlds. In other words, in one and the same world, the actual world, there 
is the possibility of modifying the variable content of the ontology. And this is just the idea of the 
formal ontological operation: we require that the content of the ontology can be 'open' along some 
index, such that we can have a population of entities and states of affairs at one value of the index 
being modified such that this population is different at the next value of the index. This is why, in 
the previous chapter, I required the temporal imperative to modify the value of Tooley's 
temporally-indexed domain of actual entities and states of affairs.   
 
Such is the overall idea of a formal ontological operation. But whilst I take this posit to be 
theoretically primitive, it will have to earn its keep via some explanatory role. Given what I have 
said so far in this chapter, I think that the most natural application for a formal ontological 
operation (and therefore also for active ontologies in general) is a form-based understanding of 
time. In short, a given formal ontological operation will model a given structure of time. There are 




The first is that we can think of the dynamic aspect of time that philosophers like Tooley have 
stressed in terms of formal posits. With this in mind, it is distinctive to active ontologies that we 
are going to model temporality as a formal aspect of the ontology. (So when I said above that the 
ordered ontology is not specifically dynamic, we can see that the case is reversed for the active 
ontology: viz. the active ontology is specifically designed for a dynamic theory of time.) Here I 
should note that Lowe will also draw upon formal posits to understand the dynamic aspects of his 
theory. In particular, he will want to say that the content of his ontology can change from one 
arrangement of co-existence to another. Because 'existence' is a formal predicate, this is drawing 
upon the 'form side' of his form–content distinction. And other formal notions will also be brought 
into the discussion. Hence, as we have discussed above, Lowe will maintain that the members of 
the ontological category of modes (to take one case) will be different at different times; and 
correspondingly, he will maintain that states of affairs concerning the characterisation of objects 
by modes will differ from one time to another. In addition to all of this, Lowe will want to say that 
his essentialism over natural kinds and his conception of powers as manifesting in existence 
changes will provide a metaphysical explanation for why the world 'moves' from one arrangement 
of co-existence to another. In short, Lowe will draw upon his formal posits to understand both 
what the dynamic aspect of his ontology amounts to (basically: a modification to the content of 
the four-category ontology) as well as to provide an anti-Humean means by which the world can 
move from one time to another (basically: the powers essentially possessed by objects manifest in 
existence changes). With this in mind, what is distinctive about the active ontology is not that 
formal posits are merely involved in a metaphysical understanding of dynamic time, but rather that 
we are drawing upon a single dedicated posit (the formal ontological operation) to understand how 
a given system of ontology moves through its different content. We can safely say, I think, that a 
formal ontological operation is a distinctive type of formal ontological posit re Lowe's ontological 
categories, formal ontological relationships, and formal predicates. None of Lowe's formal posits 
involve, in themselves, the notion of a performable modification to content of the ontology that is 
rule-following.  
 
This leads on to the second idea in my remark that a given formal ontological operation will model 
a given structure of time. This is the idea that we can think of the dynamic aspect of time, whereby, 
for example, successive entities and states of affairs are actualised, as a 'way' that kinds of beings 
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can 'stand to one another' in a diachronic sense. The thought at hand is that, just as Lowe's 
fundamental formal ontological relationships set out restrictions for the 'syntax' of states of affairs 
at a time, a formal ontological operation will set out the 'syntax' for how these states of affairs can 
combine across times. We can recall that I wanted to build into the concept of a formal ontological 
operation the modification of variable content. In simple terms, we are saying that a given ontology 
has both fixed and changeable aspects. The fixed aspects are the (fundamental) general essences 
of the ontological system, which are used to set out the ontological categories and formal 
ontological relationships. In turn, these (fundamental) general essences determine the allowable 
states of affairs of the system. Within this structure, the changeable aspects of the ontology concern 
those entities and states of affairs that obtain at different times (restricting ourselves to the temporal 
variation and ignoring the modal dimension). Now, in Lowe's case, we have a view that powers 
manifest existences changes such that the four-category ontology moves through different 
configurations of content. But an alternative view is that this temporal variation directly draws 
upon a dedicated formal posit. So construed, I take any active ontology to be committed to the idea 
that a dynamic notion of time is a completely rock-bottom feature of the world. Indeed, it is as 
basic as instantiation or characterisation in Lowe's system.  
 
The sense in which a formal ontological operation is setting out the diachronic syntax of an active 
ontology will depend upon the third idea in my proposal that we can use this posit to model a given 
structure of time. This is, of course, the idea that time can have a certain structure. This issue is 
encroaching upon what I take to be the most interesting aspect of our investigation, which is that 
there is a connection between the active ontology and physical modality.  
 
10.5 Structures of time and physical modality 
 
By moving between different formal ontological operations we can model different structures of 
time. I suggest that there are two central structures of time in this context. The first is neo-Humean. 
It can be understood as a formal ontological operation whose modification is not sensitive to the 
content of its system. Whilst there are a number of ways in which a formal ontological operation 
can be insensitive to its content, I shall restrict myself to one set up. Let us think about a neo-
Humean growing block model, in which we remove the necessitation relations from Tooley's 
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framework whilst keeping the remaining key ingredients of his theory intact (such as his concept 
of actual at a time and his two-category ontology of objects and Platonic universals). Given that 
we are interested in neo-Humeanism, we can investigate the idea of a world that builds itself up in 
stages, but where the content of these stages is metaphysically accidental. That is to say, we can 
picture a dynamic neo-Humeanism, where there are no necessary connections between distinct 
existences, but where there is, nevertheless, a continual increase in those objects and states of 
affairs that are actual (in line with the general notion of a growing block model). A candidate 




(i) Modify! the temporal index for objects and first-order states of affairs such that tn = 
tn+1.  
(ii) Add! a 'metaphysically accidental' number of token entities to the ontological 
category of objects. 
(iii) For each entity that is added in (ii), construct! a first-order state of affairs, where this 
state of affairs has as its constituents the new object in question and a 'metaphysically 
accidental' Platonic universal. 
(iv) Return to (i). 
 
The thought here is that we have a looping formal ontological operation. Its modification is to add 
'random' states of affairs to the world at each successive time. In this thesis I shall not pursue the 
question of how we should understand the concept of 'metaphysically accidental' within the context 
of active ontologies. But it is tempting to say that the concept of fair probability would be 
applicable to both the number of objects that are added to the world at each stage and to the Platonic 
universal that is 'selected' for each of these objects to instantiate. In any case, the important point 
for our discussion is that this formal ontological operation has a different structure to the temporal 
imperative. More specifically, we can see that the looping operation at hand does not make use of 
a condition–operation structure; indeed, it has no condition. This is a first sense in which a formal 
ontological operation can be sensitive to the content of its system: viz. whether or not it performs 
its operation might depend upon the satisfaction of a specified condition. In this connection, let us 
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recall that the temporal imperative's condition requires that a 'cause' object is present. As such, if 
there are no present objects that instantiate the first place of the selection relation, then the temporal 
imperative will not perform its operation and so there will be no modification to the content of its 
system. A second sense in which a formal ontological operation can be sensitive to the content of 
its system is if the modification is different for different contents. The temporal imperative is also 
sensitive in this sense. This is because the states of affairs that are actualised as time passes are a 
function of present states of affairs in tandem with laws. But the looping operation in the neo-
Humean growing block model is completely blind to its past and present states of affairs. I should 
note that these two senses appear to be independent, despite their close connection in the temporal 
imperative. For example, we could set out a formal ontological operation that has a condition–
operation structure, but whose modification is 'metaphysically accidental'. One example would be 
a formal ontological operation that is triggered by the ontological category of objects having an 
even number of members, but whose modification is analogous to the looping operation above (i.e. 
where 'random' objects and states of affairs are actualised).   
 
Let us return to temporal essentialism. How does this position fit into our present discussion 
concerning formal ontological operations and the neo-Humean growing block model? What I shall 
suggest at this stage is that there is a possible metaphysical explanation for physical modal facts 
that trades upon the understanding of dynamic time that we have just set out. It is therefore a time-
based metaphysical explanation of physical modality. This line of thought can be broken down 
into the following steps. Firstly, let us construe Barker and Smart's governing role, which involves 
the necessitation of some entity (i.e. a property or a state of affairs), as the necessitation qua 
actualisation of some entity. We have already discussed that Tooley is using this idea when he says 
that laws control (i.e. govern, or necessitate) what states of affairs are to be actualised. What this 
move is doing, I suggest, is supplementing the idea of necessitation with a certain type of change 
in existential status, generally construed. So, we might say that a dispositional property 
necessitates its manifestation simpliciter, such that the cause and effect cannot come apart across 
metaphysically possible worlds, or we might say that the cause necessitates its effect in a more 
specific way, such that we have the above constraint on metaphysically possible worlds, but where 
this constraint is understood in terms of causes necessitating the actualisation of their effects. This 
is the 'old fashioned' idea of a cause bringing its effect into existence. So forced actualisation is a 
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specific type of necessitation. Likewise, Bird's (2007, p.114) 'concretisation' might be read as a 
different type of necessitation, relative to his modal metaphysics; in this case, the co-instantiation 
of the disposition and stimulus are subjunctively sufficient for the concretisation of the 
manifestation. In general, there might be many different types of necessitation that the anti-
Humean could draw upon. 
 
There is a difficult issue here that I should mention. It might be thought that the above distinction 
between necessitation simpliciter and necessitation qua actualisation is trivial, and this for the 
following reason. Let us note that we can have different general modal frameworks, such as 
actualism or Bird's 'possibilism'. Actualism is the standard view for dispositional essentialism 
(Bird aside). We can gloss it briefly as the view that all existing entities are actual, such that there 
is a single world: the actual world. But we also have in actualism the idea that things could have 
been different, such that there are mere metaphysical possibilities that are non-actual and that do 
not exist. Bird's possibilism is different: on this view, all metaphysical possibilities exist (so 
unicorns exist), but some things are concrete and the rest are abstract. Here I can imagine someone 
saying that they are happy to accept necessitation simpliciter, since they want the idea that 
dispositional properties, when suitably related to their triggers, force the instantiation of their 
manifestations. But then they might say that these causes necessitate qua actualise for the simple 
reason that they are working within the actualist framework and that, accordingly, when D and S 
are actual M is actual as well. In short, it might be objected that once we fix upon a given modal 
framework, such as actualism or possibilism, we automatically get necessitation qua actualisation 
or actualisation qua concretisation upon accepting the putatively more basic idea of necessitation 
simpliciter. I should note that Orilia (2012) sets out a dynamic theory of time within the possibilist 
framework. I can see this point, but what I have in mind in speaking of actualisation or 
concretisation in this context is a dynamic change in the existential status of the effect. This is 
getting back to Tooley's discussion of the key difference between static and dynamic theories of 
time, and how the dynamic conception of time facilitates an understanding of change that is 
'stronger' than its static alternatives. Let us recall this citation.  
 
[T]he difference between a static conception of the world and a dynamic one comes to this. 
According to a static conception, what states of affairs there are does not depend upon what 
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time it is. Change, consequently, cannot be a matter of a change, over time, in what states of 
affairs exist. It must be a matter simply of the possession, by an object, or by the world as a 
whole, of different intrinsic properties at different times. According to a dynamic conception 
of the world, by contrast, what states of affairs exist does depend upon what time it is. As a 
consequence, the totality of monadic states of affairs which exist as of one time, and which 
involve a given object, may differ from the totality that exists of some other time, and it is 
precisely such a difference that constitutes change in an object, rather than merely the 
possession by an object of different properties at different times. Similarly, change in the 
world as a whole is a matter of a difference in the totality of states of affairs that exist as of 
different times, and not merely a matter of the possession of different properties by different 
temporal slices of the world (Tooley 1997, p.16).     
 
So the point that I am motivating is that we can think about a static notion of necessitation, where 
we 'simply' say that across metaphysically possible worlds, if it is the case that x is D&S, then it is 
the case that x is M (to give Bird's primary scheme). This is necessitation simpliciter. But this 
'static' conception can be contrasted with necessitation qua actualisation, which, as I say, is a 
concept of necessitation wherein we force a given property or state of affairs to become actual. 
The assumption that I am making here, of course, is that we simply cannot have necessitation qua 
actualisation without accepting a dynamic theory of time. And the reason why I think this is that, 
given Tooley's idea of a static theory of time, a static actualism would not allow there to be 
existential changes in what is actual. (I am grateful to discussion with Matthew Tugby and Sophie 
Gibb on this matter.) 
 
With this idea in hand, let us return to the main line of thought. There is something crucial about 
the general concept of a dynamic theory of time that has, I believe, been thus far excluded from 
the debate. This is the observation that in a dynamic theory of time a given type of change in 
existential status is occurring, as we might say, en masse. So in the actualist setting we have some 
change in what is actual at each time; and in the possibilist setting, a dyanmic theory of time would 
have different states of affairs being concrete at different times. In the case of Tooley's and Lowe's 
dynamic theories of time, this does not get us any further towards solving the puzzle of the 
governing role, since both Tooley and Lowe employ anti-Humean entities (laws and powers, 
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respectively) to explain why there is a progressive actualisation of entities. (Given that Lowe's 
theory of time/existence is presentist, we also have powers accounting for the destruction of modes 
and substances.) In the case of these philosophers, we have an entity-driven metaphysical 
explanation of both (i) the lawful development of the world and (ii) the temporal development of 
the world. Given that I am accepting Barker's (2013) point that there is a problem in retrieving 
such a governing role from the anti-Humean apparatus of properties, however, I think that both 
Tooley's and Lowe's metaphysical explanation of physical modality (which is bound up with 
actualisation) will be subject to an explanatory gap. That said, I shall not argue the particulars of 
the issue. But this is not the case with our neo-Humean growing block. Here we have suggested 
that time passes and that the world grows quite independently of traditional anti-Humean apparatus; 
in particular, there are no governing laws or essentially dispositional properties. And to motivate 
this point we explored the idea of using a formal ontological operation. So construed, we have a 
form-driven metaphysical explanation of (i) the temporal development of the world. By hypothesis, 
however, there is no metaphysical explanation for (ii) the lawful development of the world, since, 
of course, we want the actualisation of states of affairs to be 'metaphysically accidental'. We can 
note, therefore, that the neo-Humean growing block model would be rule out both governing laws 
and powers, since these entities would conflict with the looping operation. For it is the latter that 
is responsible for adding entities to the world, not the Platonic universals qua governing entities.  
 
To summarise the last couple of paragraphs. First, there can be a specific notion of necessitation 
that trades upon Tooley's idea of a dynamic conception of time. In particular, we can think of some 
effect being necessitated in the sense that we are forcing its actualisation. In this way, Barker and 
Smart's governing role would be saying that, somehow, anti-Humean entities can 'make' other 
entities join the actual world, and in doing so we have a restriction upon what we find across 
metaphysically possible worlds. And secondly, as the above paragraph describes, there is 
something related happening in the general notion of a dynamic theory of time. More specifically, 
if the dynamic theory of time is anti-Humean, in the sense that laws or powers are thought to 
govern the process of 'temporal becoming', then we have our dynamic notion of necessitation by 
actualisation. This is the entity-driven explanation for why a dynamic theory of time is dynamic. 
Tooley says, for example, that causes bring their effects into existence. And the world leaps 
forward in stages because of this necessitation theory of laws. By the same token, I suggest that 
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Tooley and his necessitation qua actualisation will be open to Barker and Smart's explanatory gap. 
(And the same would be the case for Lowe's presentist model, let us assume.) But the neo-Humean 
growing block model is form-driven. Although there are no metaphysically necessary connections 
between states of affairs, there is something curiously close: viz. our discussion suggested that we 
could model the actualisation of 'random' states of affairs with a looping operation. 
 
With this in mind, temporal essentialism is trying to gain a grip on Barker and Smart's governing 
role by dividing it into two sub-roles. The first is the role of actualisation. As we have discussed, 
there is an understanding of necessitation that involves the forcing of actualisation. Note here 
something of importance. The anti-Humean entities in play for Tooley and Lowe (i.e. the laws or 
powers) are both (i) responsible for the actualisation and (ii) responsible for selecting what is to 
become actual. We can see this clearly in Tooley's laws. Using Armstrong's scheme, N(F,G), 
Tooley is saying that N is response for the actualisation and that the new state of affairs in question 
(i.e. x's being G) is a function of x's being F via N. So Tooley's necessitation relations are both 
responsible for existential changes (mere possibility moves to actuality) and for deciding what is 
to be changed. Given this observation, the dialectical purpose of the neo-Humean growing block 
is that it provides the first sub-role, i.e. (i) above. Even though this model does not use traditional 
anti-Humean entities, the looping operation provides a rule-following modification to the content 
of this system. And this is so via the overall structure of the ontology, since we have added the 
appropriate formal ontological operation. As things stand, however, this formal ontological 
operation is 'directionless': it is simply generating 'random' states of affairs. Temporal essentialism 
proceeds by adapting the formal ontological operation of the neo-Humean growing block so that 
it is sensitive to the content of the ontology in the two senses that we discussed above. More 
specifically, we can recall that the temporal imperative is a formal ontological operation that is 
checking for present objects that instantiate the first place of the selection relation. And the 
selection relation is providing the second sub-role, that of selecting what is to be actualised, i.e. (ii) 
above. We can therefore say, as I originally said, that the temporal imperative is a formal 
ontological operation that is 'sensitive to physical modality'. I hope to have clarified this 
description since its introduction in Chapter 9. 
 
Let us consider the connection between formal ontological operations and real essences. We can 
236 
 
recall that Lowe understands his fundamental formal ontological relationships in terms of general 
essences. Or so I proposed. This raises the question of how formal ontological operations are to be 
understood in terms of real essences. This is a pressing issue, since I cannot make use of Lowe's 
form–content distinction if formal ontological operations qua formal posits are not ultimately 
understood in terms of the real essences of entities. With regard to this issue, I suggest that it is a 
fair strategy to separate out two sides of the question: what are objects and Platonic universals 
within the context of a dynamic theory of time? The first side to this question concerns the 
synchronic nature of these types entities. On this matter we can think about the allowable states of 
affairs at a time. For example, let us recall that in Chapter 9 we set out the basic ontology for 
temporal essentialism and included a restriction for objects and their instantiation of Platonic 
universals. The restriction was that a given object has to instantiate at least one Platonic universal 
so as to have an intrinsic nature. I see this as an essentialist claim that concerns what kinds of 
beings objects and Platonic universals are, since we are drawing upon the ideas that objects are 
types of entities that can instantiate Platonic universals, that Platonic universals are types of entities 
that have intrinsic natures, and that, relatedly, objects are existentially dependent (in Lowe's non-
rigid sense) upon Platonic universals. This synchronic formal aspect will be temporally-invariant; 
hence, as we modify the content of the system from time to time we will always have propertied 
objects—there will be no bare objects. But consider now the proposal of the active ontology, viz. 
that we can model the dynamic aspect of world, whereby the content of the actual world changes 
from time to time under a performable operation that is rule-following. What does this have to do 
with the essences of objects and Platonic universals? Simply this, I suggest. If the formal 
ontological operation is sensitive to the content of the system, in such a way that what is actualised 
is (in a non-trivial sense) a function of what is already actual, then the conditions for objects being 
actual and the conditions for states of affairs being actual are different to the opposing case of the 
insensitive formal operation (exhibited by the looping operation of the neo-Humean growing block 
model). In short, what it takes for objects and first-order states of affairs to be actual is significantly 
different when comparing temporal essentialism to the neo-Humean growing block.  I see this as 
a good candidate for a part of the real definition of temporal entities, i.e. objects, in temporal 
essentialism and the neo-Humean growing block model, since the conditions upon a type of entity 
becoming actual and instantiating first-order Platonic universals so as to aquire different intrinsic 
natures are, quite plausibly, fundamental issues in understanding these kinds of being. I have drawn 
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upon Lowe's (2012, p.935) notion of a "generating principle" (what it takes for an entity to come 
into being) in seeing this connection. Ultimately, then, I suggest that it is not properties or laws 
that are powerful, but rather the structure of time, which reflects the temporal essences of objects. 
In addition, I do not think that we should say that Platonic universals have temporal essences, since 
these entities are not temporal. Hence, if this line of thought is a good one, then what a Platonic 
universal is, diachronically speaking, will not alter as we move between the different structures of 
time in temporal essentialism and the neo-Humean growing block model. But what an object is 
will so vary. And this is because, to recapitulate, the conditions for this kind of being becoming 
actual and for instantiating first-order Platonic universals will be different within different 
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